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[AZ-531] [AZ-532] Refresh-token rotation + ES256 signing with JWKS
AZ-531 — /login now returns access (15 min) + opaque refresh; rotation on /token/refresh; reuse of a rotated refresh kills the entire session family per OAuth 2.1 §6.1; sliding 8 h + absolute 12 h windows; new sessions table with serializable-tx rotation. AZ-532 — switched access-token signing from HS256 shared-secret to ES256 file-backed PEMs; new JwtSigningKeyProvider, JWKS at /.well-known/jwks.json with public-only fields and 1 h cache; ValidAlgorithms pinned so an HS256-with-public-key alg-confusion attack is rejected; production keys ignored under secrets/jwt-keys, deterministic test fixtures committed under e2e/test-keys. Tests: 10/10 new ACs covered (RefreshTokenFlowTests, AsymmetricSigningTests). Pre-existing AuthTests.Jwt_contains_expected_claims_and_lifetime updated for 15 min + sid/jti claims; SecurityTests.Expired_jwt re-signed with ES256; ResilienceTests login p95 SLO raised 500 ms → 1500 ms in test env to reflect Argon2id + dual DB writes + ES256 sign cost (production Linux budget unchanged, see batch_02_cycle2_review.md F1). Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -33,14 +33,27 @@ public sealed class ApiClient : IDisposable
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_httpClient.DefaultRequestHeaders.Authorization = new AuthenticationHeaderValue("Bearer", token);
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}
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public async Task<LoginResponse> LoginFullAsync(string email, string password, CancellationToken cancellationToken = default)
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{
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using var response = await PostAsync("/login", new { email, password }, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
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response.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
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var body = await response.Content.ReadFromJsonAsync<LoginResponse>(JsonOptions, cancellationToken)
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.ConfigureAwait(false);
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if (body?.AccessToken is not { Length: > 0 })
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throw new InvalidOperationException("Login response did not contain an access token.");
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if (body.RefreshToken is not { Length: > 0 })
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throw new InvalidOperationException("Login response did not contain a refresh token.");
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return body;
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}
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public async Task<string> LoginAsync(string email, string password, CancellationToken cancellationToken = default)
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{
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using var response = await PostAsync("/login", new { email, password }, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
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response.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
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var body = await response.Content.ReadFromJsonAsync<LoginResponse>(JsonOptions, cancellationToken)
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.ConfigureAwait(false);
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if (body?.Token is not { Length: > 0 } t)
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throw new InvalidOperationException("Login response did not contain a token.");
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if (body?.AccessToken is not { Length: > 0 } t)
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throw new InvalidOperationException("Login response did not contain an access token.");
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return t;
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}
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@@ -84,8 +97,11 @@ public sealed class ApiClient : IDisposable
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return _httpClient.PostAsync(url, content, cancellationToken);
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}
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private sealed class LoginResponse
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public sealed class LoginResponse
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{
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public string Token { get; init; } = "";
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public string AccessToken { get; init; } = "";
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public DateTime AccessExp { get; init; }
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public string RefreshToken { get; init; } = "";
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public DateTime RefreshExp { get; init; }
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}
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}
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@@ -8,6 +8,17 @@ namespace Azaion.E2E.Helpers;
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/// or seed rows directly. Used by AZ-536 (password hash format) and AZ-537
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/// (lockout state, audit_events) acceptance tests.
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/// </summary>
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public sealed record SessionRow(
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Guid Id,
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Guid UserId,
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Guid FamilyId,
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DateTime IssuedAt,
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DateTime ExpiresAt,
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DateTime? RevokedAt,
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string? RevokedReason,
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Guid? ParentSessionId,
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DateTime FamilyStartedAt);
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public sealed class DbHelper
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{
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private readonly string _connectionString;
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@@ -108,6 +119,87 @@ public sealed class DbHelper
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await cmd.ExecuteNonQueryAsync(ct);
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// AZ-531 — looks up a session row by the refresh token's sha256 hash. Tests
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/// hash the opaque token the same way RefreshTokenService does, then assert
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/// on the persisted row.
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/// </summary>
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public async Task<SessionRow?> GetSessionByHash(string refreshHashHex, CancellationToken ct = default)
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{
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await using var conn = await OpenAsync(ct);
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await using var cmd = new NpgsqlCommand(@"
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SELECT id, user_id, family_id, issued_at, expires_at, revoked_at,
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revoked_reason, parent_session_id, family_started_at
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FROM public.sessions
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WHERE refresh_hash = @h", conn);
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cmd.Parameters.AddWithValue("h", refreshHashHex);
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await using var rd = await cmd.ExecuteReaderAsync(ct);
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if (!await rd.ReadAsync(ct)) return null;
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return new SessionRow(
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Id: rd.GetGuid(0),
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UserId: rd.GetGuid(1),
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FamilyId: rd.GetGuid(2),
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IssuedAt: DateTime.SpecifyKind(rd.GetDateTime(3), DateTimeKind.Utc),
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ExpiresAt: DateTime.SpecifyKind(rd.GetDateTime(4), DateTimeKind.Utc),
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RevokedAt: rd.IsDBNull(5) ? null : DateTime.SpecifyKind(rd.GetDateTime(5), DateTimeKind.Utc),
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RevokedReason: rd.IsDBNull(6) ? null : rd.GetString(6),
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ParentSessionId: rd.IsDBNull(7) ? null : rd.GetGuid(7),
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FamilyStartedAt: DateTime.SpecifyKind(rd.GetDateTime(8), DateTimeKind.Utc));
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}
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public async Task<int> CountActiveInFamily(Guid familyId, CancellationToken ct = default)
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{
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await using var conn = await OpenAsync(ct);
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await using var cmd = new NpgsqlCommand(
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"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM public.sessions WHERE family_id = @f AND revoked_at IS NULL", conn);
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cmd.Parameters.AddWithValue("f", familyId);
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return Convert.ToInt32(await cmd.ExecuteScalarAsync(ct), CultureInfo.InvariantCulture);
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}
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public async Task<int> CountReuseRevokedInFamily(Guid familyId, CancellationToken ct = default)
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{
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await using var conn = await OpenAsync(ct);
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await using var cmd = new NpgsqlCommand(
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"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM public.sessions WHERE family_id = @f AND revoked_reason = 'reuse_detected'", conn);
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cmd.Parameters.AddWithValue("f", familyId);
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return Convert.ToInt32(await cmd.ExecuteScalarAsync(ct), CultureInfo.InvariantCulture);
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// AZ-531 AC-4 — backdate a family so the absolute-expiry check fires
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/// without waiting 12 hours of wall-clock time.
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/// </summary>
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public async Task BackdateFamily(Guid familyId, TimeSpan ageFromNow, CancellationToken ct = default)
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{
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await using var conn = await OpenAsync(ct);
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await using var cmd = new NpgsqlCommand(@"
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UPDATE public.sessions
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SET family_started_at = now() - @age,
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issued_at = now() - @age,
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last_used_at = now() - @age
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WHERE family_id = @f", conn);
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cmd.Parameters.AddWithValue("age", ageFromNow);
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cmd.Parameters.AddWithValue("f", familyId);
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await cmd.ExecuteNonQueryAsync(ct);
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}
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public async Task DeleteSessionsFor(string email, CancellationToken ct = default)
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{
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await using var conn = await OpenAsync(ct);
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await using var cmd = new NpgsqlCommand(@"
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DELETE FROM public.sessions
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WHERE user_id = (SELECT id FROM public.users WHERE email = @e)", conn);
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cmd.Parameters.AddWithValue("e", email);
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await cmd.ExecuteNonQueryAsync(ct);
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}
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public static string HashRefreshToken(string opaqueToken)
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{
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var bytes = System.Text.Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(opaqueToken);
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var digest = System.Security.Cryptography.SHA256.HashData(bytes);
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return Convert.ToHexString(digest);
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}
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private async Task<NpgsqlConnection> OpenAsync(CancellationToken ct)
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{
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var conn = new NpgsqlConnection(_connectionString);
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@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
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using System.Security.Cryptography;
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namespace Azaion.E2E.Helpers;
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/// <summary>
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/// AZ-532 — test helper for loading the same ES256 PEMs the SUT trusts. Used
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/// by tests that need to forge a token (expired JWT, alg-confusion attack) so
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/// the only failure mode under test is the one being asserted.
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/// </summary>
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public static class JwtTestSigner
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{
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public static ECDsa LoadActive(string keysFolder, string activeKid)
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{
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var path = Path.Combine(keysFolder, $"{activeKid}.pem");
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if (!File.Exists(path))
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throw new FileNotFoundException(
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$"Test key '{path}' not found. The e2e-consumer container must mount the same /etc/jwt-keys directory as the SUT.",
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path);
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var ecdsa = ECDsa.Create();
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ecdsa.ImportFromPem(File.ReadAllText(path));
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return ecdsa;
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}
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}
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@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ public sealed class TestSettings
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[Required] public string AdminPassword { get; init; } = null!;
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[Required] public string UploaderEmail { get; init; } = null!;
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[Required] public string UploaderPassword { get; init; } = null!;
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[Required] public string JwtSecret { get; init; } = null!;
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[Required] public string JwtKeysFolder { get; init; } = null!;
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[Required] public string JwtActiveKid { get; init; } = null!;
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[Required] public string TestDbConnectionString { get; init; } = null!;
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}
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@@ -25,7 +26,8 @@ public sealed class TestFixture : IAsyncLifetime
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public string AdminPassword => Settings.AdminPassword;
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public string UploaderEmail => Settings.UploaderEmail;
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public string UploaderPassword => Settings.UploaderPassword;
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public string JwtSecret => Settings.JwtSecret;
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public string JwtKeysFolder => Settings.JwtKeysFolder;
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public string JwtActiveKid => Settings.JwtActiveKid;
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public DbHelper Db { get; private set; } = null!;
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public IConfiguration Configuration { get; private set; } = null!;
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@@ -59,10 +61,18 @@ public sealed class TestFixture : IAsyncLifetime
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public ApiClient CreateApiClient()
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{
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var client = new HttpClient { BaseAddress = new Uri(Settings.ApiBaseUrl, UriKind.Absolute), Timeout = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5) };
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var client = CreateHttpClient();
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return new ApiClient(client, disposeClient: true);
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Returns a fresh, unauthenticated <see cref="HttpClient"/> for tests that need
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/// to send raw requests (forged headers, manual JSON bodies, JWKS fetch, etc.).
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/// Caller owns the disposal.
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/// </summary>
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public HttpClient CreateHttpClient() =>
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new() { BaseAddress = new Uri(Settings.ApiBaseUrl, UriKind.Absolute), Timeout = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5) };
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public ApiClient CreateAuthenticatedClient(string token)
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{
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var api = CreateApiClient();
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@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
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using System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt;
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using System.Net;
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using System.Net.Http.Headers;
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using System.Net.Http.Json;
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using System.Security.Claims;
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using System.Security.Cryptography;
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using System.Text.Json;
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using Azaion.E2E.Helpers;
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using FluentAssertions;
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using Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens;
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using Xunit;
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namespace Azaion.E2E.Tests;
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/// <summary>
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/// AZ-532 — ES256 signing + JWKS endpoint + alg-confusion defence.
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/// </summary>
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public class AsymmetricSigningTests : IClassFixture<TestFixture>
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{
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private readonly TestFixture _fixture;
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public AsymmetricSigningTests(TestFixture fixture) => _fixture = fixture;
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[Fact]
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public async Task AC1_Access_token_header_uses_ES256_with_active_kid()
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{
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// Arrange
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using var client = _fixture.CreateHttpClient();
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var api = new ApiClient(client);
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// Act
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var login = await api.LoginFullAsync(_fixture.AdminEmail, _fixture.AdminPassword);
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var jwt = new JwtSecurityTokenHandler().ReadJwtToken(login.AccessToken);
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// Assert
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jwt.Header.Alg.Should().Be("ES256");
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jwt.Header.Kid.Should().Be(_fixture.JwtActiveKid, "tokens must carry the active key's kid");
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}
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[Fact]
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public async Task AC2_JWKS_endpoint_returns_public_key_set_with_long_cache()
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{
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// Arrange
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using var client = _fixture.CreateHttpClient();
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// Act
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using var resp = await client.GetAsync("/.well-known/jwks.json");
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// Assert — status, cache headers, payload shape
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resp.StatusCode.Should().Be(HttpStatusCode.OK);
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resp.Headers.CacheControl.Should().NotBeNull();
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resp.Headers.CacheControl!.Public.Should().BeTrue();
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resp.Headers.CacheControl.MaxAge.Should().Be(TimeSpan.FromHours(1));
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var doc = await resp.Content.ReadFromJsonAsync<JsonElement>();
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doc.TryGetProperty("keys", out var keys).Should().BeTrue();
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keys.GetArrayLength().Should().BeGreaterThan(0);
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foreach (var k in keys.EnumerateArray())
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{
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k.GetProperty("kty").GetString().Should().Be("EC");
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k.GetProperty("crv").GetString().Should().Be("P-256");
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k.GetProperty("alg").GetString().Should().Be("ES256");
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k.GetProperty("use").GetString().Should().Be("sig");
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k.GetProperty("kid").GetString().Should().NotBeNullOrEmpty();
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k.GetProperty("x").GetString().Should().NotBeNullOrEmpty();
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k.GetProperty("y").GetString().Should().NotBeNullOrEmpty();
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}
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}
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[Fact]
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public async Task AC3_Both_keys_appear_in_JWKS_during_rotation_overlap()
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{
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// Arrange — the e2e fixture mounts kid-test-a (active) and kid-test-b (overlap).
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using var client = _fixture.CreateHttpClient();
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// Act
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using var resp = await client.GetAsync("/.well-known/jwks.json");
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var doc = await resp.Content.ReadFromJsonAsync<JsonElement>();
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var kids = doc.GetProperty("keys").EnumerateArray()
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.Select(k => k.GetProperty("kid").GetString())
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.ToHashSet();
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// Assert
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kids.Should().Contain("kid-test-a");
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kids.Should().Contain("kid-test-b",
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"kid-test-b is mounted alongside kid-test-a precisely to verify rotation-overlap");
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}
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[Fact]
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public async Task AC4_JWKS_response_omits_all_private_key_components()
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{
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// Arrange
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using var client = _fixture.CreateHttpClient();
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// Act
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using var resp = await client.GetAsync("/.well-known/jwks.json");
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var raw = await resp.Content.ReadAsStringAsync();
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var doc = JsonDocument.Parse(raw);
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// Assert — no EC private scalar (`d`) and no RSA private primes anywhere
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foreach (var k in doc.RootElement.GetProperty("keys").EnumerateArray())
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{
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k.TryGetProperty("d", out _).Should().BeFalse("EC private scalar must never leak");
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k.TryGetProperty("p", out _).Should().BeFalse("RSA private prime must never leak");
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k.TryGetProperty("q", out _).Should().BeFalse("RSA private prime must never leak");
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k.TryGetProperty("dp", out _).Should().BeFalse();
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k.TryGetProperty("dq", out _).Should().BeFalse();
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k.TryGetProperty("qi", out _).Should().BeFalse();
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}
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}
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[Fact]
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public async Task AC5_Forged_HS256_token_signed_with_public_key_is_rejected()
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{
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// Arrange — alg-confusion: take the public key bytes and use them as an
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// HMAC secret; sign a token with alg=HS256. A naive verifier that only
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// uses ValidIssuerSigningKey without pinning algorithms accepts it. AZ-532
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// pins ValidAlgorithms = [ES256], so this MUST be rejected.
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using var client = _fixture.CreateHttpClient();
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using var jwks = await client.GetAsync("/.well-known/jwks.json");
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var doc = await jwks.Content.ReadFromJsonAsync<JsonElement>();
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var k = doc.GetProperty("keys").EnumerateArray().First();
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var x = Base64UrlEncoder.DecodeBytes(k.GetProperty("x").GetString()!);
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var y = Base64UrlEncoder.DecodeBytes(k.GetProperty("y").GetString()!);
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var publicKeyBytes = new byte[1 + x.Length + y.Length];
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publicKeyBytes[0] = 0x04; // uncompressed point marker — exact bytes don't matter
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Buffer.BlockCopy(x, 0, publicKeyBytes, 1, x.Length);
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Buffer.BlockCopy(y, 0, publicKeyBytes, 1 + x.Length, y.Length);
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var hmacKey = new SymmetricSecurityKey(publicKeyBytes) { KeyId = k.GetProperty("kid").GetString() };
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var creds = new SigningCredentials(hmacKey, SecurityAlgorithms.HmacSha256);
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var token = new JwtSecurityToken(
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issuer: "AzaionApi",
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audience: "Annotators/OrangePi/Admins",
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claims:
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[
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new Claim(ClaimTypes.Role, "ApiAdmin"),
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new Claim(ClaimTypes.Name, "forged@x.com")
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],
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notBefore: DateTime.UtcNow.AddMinutes(-1),
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expires: DateTime.UtcNow.AddMinutes(5),
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signingCredentials: creds);
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var jwt = new JwtSecurityTokenHandler().WriteToken(token);
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// Act
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using var req = new HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod.Get, "/users");
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req.Headers.Authorization = new AuthenticationHeaderValue("Bearer", jwt);
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using var resp = await client.SendAsync(req);
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// Assert
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resp.StatusCode.Should().Be(HttpStatusCode.Unauthorized,
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"alg=HS256 must be rejected even when the HMAC secret is the public key bytes");
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}
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}
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@@ -62,9 +62,13 @@ public sealed class AuthTests
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var expSeconds = long.Parse(
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jwt.Claims.Single(c => c.Type == JwtRegisteredClaimNames.Exp).Value,
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System.Globalization.CultureInfo.InvariantCulture);
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// AZ-531 — access tokens are now 15-min (refresh-flow shortened from 4h).
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TimeSpan.FromSeconds(expSeconds - iatSeconds)
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.Should().BeCloseTo(TimeSpan.FromHours(4), TimeSpan.FromSeconds(60));
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.Should().BeCloseTo(TimeSpan.FromMinutes(15), TimeSpan.FromSeconds(60));
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jwt.Claims.Should().Contain(c => c.Type == "role");
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// AZ-531 / AZ-535 — sid and jti claims are needed for logout + per-token denylist.
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jwt.Claims.Should().Contain(c => c.Type == JwtRegisteredClaimNames.Sid);
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jwt.Claims.Should().Contain(c => c.Type == JwtRegisteredClaimNames.Jti);
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}
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[Fact]
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||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
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using System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt;
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using System.Net;
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using System.Net.Http.Json;
|
||||
using Azaion.E2E.Helpers;
|
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using FluentAssertions;
|
||||
using Xunit;
|
||||
|
||||
namespace Azaion.E2E.Tests;
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// AZ-531 — refresh-token rotation, reuse-detection, sliding/absolute expiry.
|
||||
/// Each test seeds its own user via /users so cleanup never touches the
|
||||
/// shared admin/uploader fixtures.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
public class RefreshTokenFlowTests : IClassFixture<TestFixture>
|
||||
{
|
||||
private readonly TestFixture _fixture;
|
||||
|
||||
public RefreshTokenFlowTests(TestFixture fixture) => _fixture = fixture;
|
||||
|
||||
private async Task<(string Email, string Password)> SeedUser(string suffix)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var email = $"refresh-{suffix}-{Guid.NewGuid():N}@e2e.local";
|
||||
var password = "Refresh1234ABC"; // ≥ 12 chars per RegisterUserValidator
|
||||
using var admin = _fixture.CreateAuthenticatedClient(_fixture.AdminToken);
|
||||
// role=10 = ResourceUploader (numeric per RoleEnum, matches existing test pattern).
|
||||
using var resp = await admin.PostAsync("/users", new { email, password, role = 10 });
|
||||
resp.StatusCode.Should().Be(HttpStatusCode.OK);
|
||||
return (email, password);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private async Task CleanupUser(string email)
|
||||
{
|
||||
await _fixture.Db.DeleteSessionsFor(email);
|
||||
await _fixture.Db.DeleteAuditEventsFor(email);
|
||||
await _fixture.Db.DeleteUser(email);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
public async Task AC1_Login_returns_dual_tokens_with_15min_access_and_refresh_session()
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Arrange
|
||||
var (email, password) = await SeedUser("ac1");
|
||||
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Act
|
||||
using var client = _fixture.CreateHttpClient();
|
||||
var api = new ApiClient(client);
|
||||
var login = await api.LoginFullAsync(email, password);
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert — access token exp ≈ now + 15 min ±60 s
|
||||
var jwt = new JwtSecurityTokenHandler().ReadJwtToken(login.AccessToken);
|
||||
var driftSeconds = (jwt.ValidTo - DateTime.UtcNow.AddMinutes(15)).TotalSeconds;
|
||||
Math.Abs(driftSeconds).Should().BeLessThan(60, "access token TTL must be 15 min ±60 s");
|
||||
|
||||
login.RefreshToken.Length.Should().BeGreaterThanOrEqualTo(43, "AC-1 requires ≥43-char base64url refresh");
|
||||
|
||||
var hash = DbHelper.HashRefreshToken(login.RefreshToken);
|
||||
var session = await _fixture.Db.GetSessionByHash(hash);
|
||||
session.Should().NotBeNull("a sessions row must back the issued refresh token");
|
||||
session!.RevokedAt.Should().BeNull();
|
||||
}
|
||||
finally { await CleanupUser(email); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
public async Task AC2_Refresh_rotates_token_and_chains_parent_session()
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Arrange
|
||||
var (email, password) = await SeedUser("ac2");
|
||||
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
using var client = _fixture.CreateHttpClient();
|
||||
var api = new ApiClient(client);
|
||||
var first = await api.LoginFullAsync(email, password);
|
||||
var firstHash = DbHelper.HashRefreshToken(first.RefreshToken);
|
||||
var firstRow = await _fixture.Db.GetSessionByHash(firstHash);
|
||||
|
||||
// Act — rotate
|
||||
using var refreshResp = await client.PostAsJsonAsync("/token/refresh", new { RefreshToken = first.RefreshToken });
|
||||
refreshResp.StatusCode.Should().Be(HttpStatusCode.OK);
|
||||
var rotated = await refreshResp.Content.ReadFromJsonAsync<ApiClient.LoginResponse>();
|
||||
rotated.Should().NotBeNull();
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert — old row revoked=rotated, new row chained
|
||||
var oldRow = await _fixture.Db.GetSessionByHash(firstHash);
|
||||
oldRow!.RevokedAt.Should().NotBeNull();
|
||||
oldRow.RevokedReason.Should().Be("rotated");
|
||||
|
||||
var newHash = DbHelper.HashRefreshToken(rotated!.RefreshToken);
|
||||
var newRow = await _fixture.Db.GetSessionByHash(newHash);
|
||||
newRow.Should().NotBeNull();
|
||||
newRow!.ParentSessionId.Should().Be(firstRow!.Id);
|
||||
newRow.FamilyId.Should().Be(firstRow.FamilyId, "rotation must stay in the same family");
|
||||
newRow.RevokedAt.Should().BeNull();
|
||||
}
|
||||
finally { await CleanupUser(email); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
public async Task AC3_Replaying_a_rotated_refresh_kills_the_entire_family()
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Arrange
|
||||
var (email, password) = await SeedUser("ac3");
|
||||
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
using var client = _fixture.CreateHttpClient();
|
||||
var api = new ApiClient(client);
|
||||
var first = await api.LoginFullAsync(email, password);
|
||||
|
||||
using var rotateResp = await client.PostAsJsonAsync("/token/refresh", new { RefreshToken = first.RefreshToken });
|
||||
rotateResp.StatusCode.Should().Be(HttpStatusCode.OK);
|
||||
var rotated = await rotateResp.Content.ReadFromJsonAsync<ApiClient.LoginResponse>();
|
||||
rotated.Should().NotBeNull();
|
||||
|
||||
var firstHash = DbHelper.HashRefreshToken(first.RefreshToken);
|
||||
var firstRow = await _fixture.Db.GetSessionByHash(firstHash);
|
||||
|
||||
// Act — replay R1 (already rotated)
|
||||
using var replayResp = await client.PostAsJsonAsync("/token/refresh", new { RefreshToken = first.RefreshToken });
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert
|
||||
replayResp.StatusCode.Should().Be(HttpStatusCode.Unauthorized, "replaying a rotated refresh must fail");
|
||||
|
||||
var active = await _fixture.Db.CountActiveInFamily(firstRow!.FamilyId);
|
||||
active.Should().Be(0, "the entire family must be revoked on reuse-detection");
|
||||
|
||||
var killed = await _fixture.Db.CountReuseRevokedInFamily(firstRow.FamilyId);
|
||||
killed.Should().BeGreaterThan(0, "at least the rotated child must carry reuse_detected");
|
||||
|
||||
// R2 must also be dead
|
||||
using var rUseResp = await client.PostAsJsonAsync("/token/refresh", new { RefreshToken = rotated!.RefreshToken });
|
||||
rUseResp.StatusCode.Should().Be(HttpStatusCode.Unauthorized);
|
||||
}
|
||||
finally { await CleanupUser(email); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
public async Task AC4_Family_older_than_absolute_window_is_rejected()
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Arrange
|
||||
var (email, password) = await SeedUser("ac4");
|
||||
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
using var client = _fixture.CreateHttpClient();
|
||||
var api = new ApiClient(client);
|
||||
var first = await api.LoginFullAsync(email, password);
|
||||
|
||||
var firstHash = DbHelper.HashRefreshToken(first.RefreshToken);
|
||||
var firstRow = await _fixture.Db.GetSessionByHash(firstHash);
|
||||
|
||||
// Act — backdate the family past the 12 h absolute cap
|
||||
await _fixture.Db.BackdateFamily(firstRow!.FamilyId, TimeSpan.FromHours(13));
|
||||
|
||||
using var resp = await client.PostAsJsonAsync("/token/refresh", new { RefreshToken = first.RefreshToken });
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert
|
||||
resp.StatusCode.Should().Be(HttpStatusCode.Unauthorized,
|
||||
"absolute expiry must reject regardless of sliding-window state");
|
||||
}
|
||||
finally { await CleanupUser(email); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
public async Task AC5_Refresh_token_is_opaque_and_stored_as_sha256_hash()
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Arrange
|
||||
var (email, password) = await SeedUser("ac5");
|
||||
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
using var client = _fixture.CreateHttpClient();
|
||||
var api = new ApiClient(client);
|
||||
var login = await api.LoginFullAsync(email, password);
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert — token must NOT be a JWT (no header.payload.signature triple
|
||||
// that decodes to JSON). A safe heuristic: refuse anything with two dots
|
||||
// whose first two segments base64url-decode to '{' JSON objects.
|
||||
var dots = login.RefreshToken.Count(c => c == '.');
|
||||
dots.Should().Be(0, "refresh tokens are opaque base64url, not JWTs");
|
||||
|
||||
// Stored as SHA-256 (hex 64 chars).
|
||||
var hash = DbHelper.HashRefreshToken(login.RefreshToken);
|
||||
hash.Length.Should().Be(64);
|
||||
var session = await _fixture.Db.GetSessionByHash(hash);
|
||||
session.Should().NotBeNull("the SHA-256 hash must be the lookup key");
|
||||
}
|
||||
finally { await CleanupUser(email); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -83,8 +83,12 @@ public sealed class ResilienceTests
|
||||
p95Index = 0;
|
||||
var p95 = sorted[p95Index];
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert
|
||||
p95.Should().BeLessThan(500);
|
||||
// Assert — post-AZ-531/AZ-536, the per-login budget covers Argon2id verify
|
||||
// (~250 ms with 64 MiB), audit_event insert, sessions insert, plus ES256 sign.
|
||||
// The original 500 ms SLO was set when login was just SHA-384 + JWT; raising
|
||||
// to 1500 ms reflects the deliberate auth-hardening trade-off. Production
|
||||
// Linux + dedicated Postgres comfortably stays under 600 ms.
|
||||
p95.Should().BeLessThan(1500);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -113,9 +113,13 @@ public sealed class SecurityTests
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
public async Task Expired_jwt_is_rejected_for_admin_endpoint()
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Arrange
|
||||
var key = new SymmetricSecurityKey(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(_fixture.JwtSecret));
|
||||
var creds = new SigningCredentials(key, SecurityAlgorithms.HmacSha256Signature);
|
||||
// Arrange — sign a deliberately-expired token with the same ES256 test key
|
||||
// the SUT trusts. AZ-532 dropped HS256 acceptance, so this test must use the
|
||||
// production signing path or every "is the token expired?" check would short-
|
||||
// circuit on a wrong-algorithm rejection instead.
|
||||
using var ecdsa = JwtTestSigner.LoadActive(_fixture.JwtKeysFolder, _fixture.JwtActiveKid);
|
||||
var key = new ECDsaSecurityKey(ecdsa) { KeyId = _fixture.JwtActiveKid };
|
||||
var creds = new SigningCredentials(key, SecurityAlgorithms.EcdsaSha256);
|
||||
var token = new JwtSecurityToken(
|
||||
issuer: "AzaionApi",
|
||||
audience: "Annotators/OrangePi/Admins",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
|
||||
"AdminPassword": "Admin1234",
|
||||
"UploaderEmail": "uploader@azaion.com",
|
||||
"UploaderPassword": "Upload1234",
|
||||
"JwtSecret": "TestSecretKeyThatIsAtLeast32CharactersLong123!",
|
||||
"JwtKeysFolder": "/etc/jwt-keys",
|
||||
"JwtActiveKid": "kid-test-a",
|
||||
"TestDbConnectionString": "Host=test-db;Port=5432;Database=azaion;Username=postgres;Password=test_password"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -8,4 +8,5 @@ psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -U "$POSTGRES_USER" -d azaion -f "$SQL_DIR/03_add_timest
|
||||
psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -U "$POSTGRES_USER" -d azaion -f "$SQL_DIR/04_detection_classes.sql"
|
||||
psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -U "$POSTGRES_USER" -d azaion -f "$SQL_DIR/06_users_email_unique.sql"
|
||||
psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -U "$POSTGRES_USER" -d azaion -f "$SQL_DIR/07_auth_lockout_and_audit.sql"
|
||||
psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -U "$POSTGRES_USER" -d azaion -f "$SQL_DIR/08_sessions.sql"
|
||||
psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -U "$POSTGRES_USER" -d azaion -f /opt/test-seed.sql
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
|
||||
# Test JWT Signing Keys
|
||||
|
||||
These ES256 (`prime256v1`) private keys are **test fixtures only** — they are
|
||||
mounted into the test SUT container by `docker-compose.test.yml` so the AZ-532
|
||||
JWKS / signing tests can exercise a real two-key configuration without any
|
||||
runtime setup hooks.
|
||||
|
||||
- `kid-test-a.pem` — primary signing key in tests (matches `JwtConfig__ActiveKid`).
|
||||
- `kid-test-b.pem` — secondary key kept in JWKS to exercise the rotation overlap
|
||||
acceptance criterion (AZ-532 AC-3).
|
||||
|
||||
**Never** copy these into a production secrets directory. Production keys live in
|
||||
`secrets/jwt-keys/` and are generated per environment by `scripts/generate-jwt-key.sh`.
|
||||
The kid is the filename without `.pem`.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
|
||||
MHcCAQEEIKsZoiX7zjchNhuYBaONK+1JCqsVyLbx7chHOn4G1h7toAoGCCqGSM49
|
||||
AwEHoUQDQgAEJySg5qLEi+UUiypD6x+41gByjmxfwldVHilU7gpCyIf761sIfC8l
|
||||
Dji2yHj8WFqt5k+ZnyXC06kVSKdYpe4qng==
|
||||
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
|
||||
MHcCAQEEIFU5IdZXAmhQB2E3LKhtVIN5qIIhh24rmWp2wCmrxlNBoAoGCCqGSM49
|
||||
AwEHoUQDQgAETWVNEGK9OHwyVv6qCiatl8e3kIfl8CHtgNEd/6WPgMqzAYOm/C4v
|
||||
Lq8klDbUZWdfZkyXf9c6j/H4lFKjSj+jdg==
|
||||
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user