refactor: remove deploy.cmd and update Dockerfile for health checks
ci/woodpecker/push/01-test Pipeline failed
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- Deleted the deploy.cmd script as it was no longer needed.
- Updated Dockerfile to include curl for health checks and added a non-root user for improved security.
- Modified health check command to use curl for better reliability.
- Adjusted docker-compose.test.yml to reflect changes in health check configuration.
- Cleaned up appsettings.json and removed unused configuration properties.
- Removed Resource entity and related requests from the codebase as part of the architectural shift.
- Updated documentation to reflect the removal of hardware binding and related endpoints.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
This commit is contained in:
Oleksandr Bezdieniezhnykh
2026-05-13 08:47:21 +03:00
parent 43fe38e67d
commit c7b297de83
76 changed files with 4034 additions and 832 deletions
@@ -29,12 +29,14 @@
### Entities
> **Cycle 1 (2026-05-13) note** — `DetectionClass` (AZ-513) entity was added. `Resource` (AZ-183) was added then removed in the same cycle (post-cycle-1 revert; security audit F-1 + the OTA delivery model itself was deemed obsolete). The `User.Hardware` column is left in place as a tombstone (nullable, unused) per AZ-197. A UNIQUE INDEX `users_email_uidx` was added on `users.email` (security audit F-3, `env/db/06_users_email_unique.sql`).
```
User:
Id: Guid (PK)
Email: string (required)
PasswordHash: string (required)
Hardware: string? (optional)
Hardware: string? (optional — TOMBSTONED by AZ-197; nullable, unused; no application code reads or writes)
Role: RoleEnum (required)
CreatedAt: DateTime (required)
LastLogin: DateTime? (optional)
@@ -49,7 +51,19 @@ UserQueueOffsets:
AnnotationsConfirmOffset: ulong
AnnotationsCommandsOffset: ulong
DetectionClass (AZ-513):
Id: int (PK, DB-assigned identity)
Name, ShortName, Color: string
MaxSizeM: double
PhotoMode: string?
CreatedAt: DateTime
// Resource entity — REMOVED post-cycle-1 (AZ-183 reverted). The `resources`
// table no longer exists; see env/db/ for the current migration set.
RoleEnum: None=0, Operator=10, Validator=20, CompanionPC=30, Admin=40, ResourceUploader=50, ApiAdmin=1000
// ResourceUploader is now data-only — no endpoint policy references it
// after AZ-183 was reverted.
```
### Configuration POCOs
@@ -69,6 +83,7 @@ ResourcesConfig:
ResourcesFolder: string
SuiteInstallerFolder: string
SuiteStageInstallerFolder: string
# EncryptionMasterKey was added by AZ-183 and removed in the post-cycle-1 revert.
```
## 3. External API Specification
@@ -81,23 +96,26 @@ N/A — internal component.
| Query | Frequency | Hot Path | Index Needed |
|-------|-----------|----------|--------------|
| `SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = ?` | High | Yes | Yes (email) |
| `SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = ?` | High | Yes | Yes — UNIQUE INDEX `users_email_uidx` on `email` (security audit F-3, `env/db/06_users_email_unique.sql`) |
| `SELECT * FROM users` with optional filters | Medium | No | No |
| `UPDATE users SET ... WHERE email = ?` | Medium | No | No |
| `INSERT INTO users` | Low | No | No |
| `INSERT INTO users` | Low | No | No (UNIQUE INDEX above also enforces single-row-per-email atomically) |
| `DELETE FROM users WHERE email = ?` | Low | No | No |
### Caching Strategy
| Data | Cache Type | TTL | Invalidation |
|------|-----------|-----|-------------|
| User by email | In-memory (LazyCache) | 4 hours | On hardware update, queue offset update, hardware check |
| User by email | In-memory (LazyCache) | 4 hours | On `UpdateQueueOffsets` (post-AZ-197 — hardware paths gone) |
> The `Resources.Latest.{arch}.{stage}` cache key (added by AZ-183) was removed in the post-cycle-1 revert.
### Storage Estimates
| Table | Est. Row Count (1yr) | Row Size | Total Size | Growth Rate |
|-------|---------------------|----------|------------|-------------|
| `users` | 1001000 | ~500 bytes | ~500 KB | Low |
| `users` | 1001000 web users + 200010000 CompanionPC device users (AZ-196 grows this) | ~500 bytes | ~5 MB | Medium (device fleet) |
| `detection_classes` (AZ-513) | 10200 | ~250 bytes | ~50 KB | Low |
### Data Management
@@ -116,7 +134,7 @@ N/A — internal component.
| linq2db | 5.4.1 | ORM for PostgreSQL access |
| Npgsql | 10.0.1 | PostgreSQL ADO.NET provider |
| LazyCache | 2.4.0 | In-memory cache with async support |
| Newtonsoft.Json | 13.0.1 | JSON serialization for UserConfig |
| Newtonsoft.Json | 13.0.4 | JSON serialization for UserConfig (bumped from 13.0.1 by security audit D-1, GHSA-5crp-9r3c-p9vr) |
**Error Handling Strategy**:
- `DbFactory.LoadOptions` throws `ArgumentException` on empty connection strings (fail-fast at startup).
@@ -167,7 +185,8 @@ N/A — internal component.
- `Common/Configs/ResourcesConfig`
- `Common/Entities/User`
- `Common/Entities/RoleEnum`
- `Common/Database/AzaionDb`
- `Common/Entities/DetectionClass` *(added cycle 1, AZ-513)*
- `Common/Database/AzaionDb` (now also holds the `DetectionClasses` table; the `Resources` ITable added by AZ-183 was removed in the post-cycle-1 revert)
- `Common/Database/AzaionDbSchemaHolder`
- `Common/Database/DbFactory`
- `Services/Cache`
@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
# User Management
> **Cycle 1 (2026-05-13) note** — hardware-binding methods (`UpdateHardware`, `CheckHardwareHash`) and `SetHWRequest` were removed by AZ-197; the `ValidateUser` error set now includes `UserDisabled`; `RegisterDevice` was added by AZ-196 to back the new `POST /devices` endpoint. Post-cycle-1 (security audit F-3): `RegisterDevice` now reuses `RegisterUser` for the row insert; the duplicate-row race was closed by adding a UNIQUE INDEX on `users.email` (`env/db/06_users_email_unique.sql`) and translating `Npgsql.PostgresException(SqlState=23505)` to `BusinessException(EmailExists)` inside `RegisterUser`.
## 1. High-Level Overview
**Purpose**: Full user lifecycle management — registration, credential validation, hardware binding, role changes, account enable/disable, and deletion.
**Purpose**: Full user lifecycle management — web-user registration, credential validation, role changes, account enable/disable, deletion, plus auto-provisioning of CompanionPC device users.
**Architectural Pattern**: Service layer — stateless business logic operating on the Data Layer through `IDbFactory`.
**Upstream dependencies**: Data Layer (IDbFactory, ICache, User entity), Security & Cryptography (hashing).
**Upstream dependencies**: Data Layer (IDbFactory, ICache, User entity), Security & Cryptography (hashing), `System.Security.Cryptography.RandomNumberGenerator` (device password entropy).
**Downstream consumers**: Admin API (endpoint handlers), Authentication (GetByEmail).
@@ -16,18 +18,19 @@
| Method | Input | Output | Async | Error Types |
|--------|-------|--------|-------|-------------|
| `RegisterUser` | `RegisterUserRequest, CancellationToken` | void | Yes | `BusinessException(EmailExists)` |
| `ValidateUser` | `LoginRequest, CancellationToken` | `User` | Yes | `BusinessException(NoEmailFound, WrongPassword)` |
| `RegisterUser` | `RegisterUserRequest, CancellationToken` | void | Yes | `BusinessException(EmailExists)` — translated from `PostgresException(23505)` after the F-3 hardening |
| `RegisterDevice` | `CancellationToken` | `RegisterDeviceResponse` | Yes | `BusinessException(EmailExists)` (propagated from `RegisterUser`) — added by AZ-196, refactored post-audit to call `RegisterUser` end-to-end |
| `ValidateUser` | `LoginRequest, CancellationToken` | `User` | Yes | `BusinessException(NoEmailFound, WrongPassword, UserDisabled)` |
| `GetByEmail` | `string? email, CancellationToken` | `User?` | Yes | `ArgumentNullException` |
| `UpdateHardware` | `string email, string? hardware, CancellationToken` | void | Yes | None |
| `UpdateQueueOffsets` | `string email, UserQueueOffsets, CancellationToken` | void | Yes | None |
| `GetUsers` | `string? searchEmail, RoleEnum? searchRole, CancellationToken` | `IEnumerable<User>` | Yes | None |
| `CheckHardwareHash` | `User, string hardware, CancellationToken` | `string` (hash) | Yes | `BusinessException(HardwareIdMismatch)` |
| `ChangeRole` | `string email, RoleEnum, CancellationToken` | void | Yes | None |
| `SetEnableStatus` | `string email, bool, CancellationToken` | void | Yes | None |
| `RemoveUser` | `string email, CancellationToken` | void | Yes | None |
**Input DTOs**:
**Removed by AZ-197**: `UpdateHardware`, `CheckHardwareHash`, and the private `UpdateLastLoginDate` helper.
**Input / Output DTOs**:
```
RegisterUserRequest:
Email: string (required) — validated: min 8 chars, valid email format
@@ -38,9 +41,10 @@ LoginRequest:
Email: string (required)
Password: string (required)
SetHWRequest:
Email: string (required, validated: not empty)
Hardware: string? (optional — null clears hardware)
RegisterDeviceResponse (AZ-196):
Serial: string ("azj-NNNN", zero-padded)
Email: string ("azj-NNNN@azaion.com")
Password: string (32-char hex, plaintext, exposed exactly once)
SetUserQueueOffsetsRequest:
Email: string (required)
@@ -67,7 +71,7 @@ N/A — exposed through Admin API component.
| Data | Cache Type | TTL | Invalidation |
|------|-----------|-----|-------------|
| User by email | In-memory (via ICache) | 4 hours | After UpdateHardware, UpdateQueueOffsets, CheckHardwareHash (first login) |
| User by email | In-memory (via ICache) | 4 hours | After `UpdateQueueOffsets` (only — `UpdateHardware` / `CheckHardwareHash` invalidations are gone with AZ-197) |
## 5. Implementation Details
@@ -89,20 +93,21 @@ N/A — exposed through Admin API component.
| Helper | Purpose | Used By |
|--------|---------|---------|
| `Security.ToHash` | Password hashing (SHA-384) | RegisterUser, ValidateUser |
| `Security.GetHWHash` | Hardware fingerprint hashing | CheckHardwareHash |
| `Security.ToHash` | Password hashing (SHA-384) | RegisterUser, RegisterDevice, ValidateUser |
| `RandomNumberGenerator.GetBytes(16)` + `Convert.ToHexString` | 32-char hex device password | RegisterDevice |
| `QueryableExtensions.WhereIf` | Conditional LINQ filters | GetUsers |
## 7. Caveats & Edge Cases
**Known limitations**:
- No pagination on `GetUsers` — returns all matching users.
- `CheckHardwareHash` auto-stores hardware on first access (no explicit admin approval step).
- `RemoveUser` is a hard delete, not soft delete.
- `RegisterDevice` returns the plaintext password to the caller exactly once; if the provisioning script loses it, the device must be re-registered.
- The `User.Hardware` column is left in place but unused (AZ-197 chose to leave the column nullable rather than ship a migration).
**Potential race conditions**:
- Concurrent `RegisterUser` calls with the same email: both could pass the existence check before insert. Mitigated by database unique constraint on email (if one exists).
- `CheckHardwareHash` first-login path: concurrent requests could trigger multiple hardware updates.
- Concurrent `RegisterDevice` calls: both could read the same "most recent CompanionPC" row and try to claim the same `azj-NNNN` serial. Mitigated by the `users.email` unique constraint — the loser will fail the insert. (Out of cycle-1 scope: a sequence-based serial allocator would eliminate the retry.)
**Performance bottlenecks**:
- `GetUsers` loads full user objects including `UserConfig` JSON; for large user bases, projection would be more efficient.
@@ -123,5 +128,7 @@ No explicit logging in UserService.
- `Services/UserService`
- `Common/Requests/LoginRequest`
- `Common/Requests/RegisterUserRequest`
- `Common/Requests/SetHWRequest`
- `Common/Requests/RegisterDeviceResponse` *(added cycle 1, AZ-196)*
- `Common/Requests/SetUserQueueOffsetsRequest`
**Removed cycle 1 (AZ-197)**: `Common/Requests/SetHWRequest`
@@ -1,14 +1,16 @@
# Authentication & Security
> **Cycle 1 (2026-05-13) note** — AZ-197 simplified `GetApiEncryptionKey` to `(email, password)` and removed `GetHWHash` outright. The hardware-binding threat model that motivated those primitives is no longer in scope (fTPM-anchored Jetsons + browser SaaS).
## 1. High-Level Overview
**Purpose**: JWT token creation/validation and cryptographic utilities (password hashing, hardware fingerprint hashing, AES file encryption/decryption).
**Purpose**: JWT token creation/validation and cryptographic utilities (password hashing, AES file encryption/decryption).
**Architectural Pattern**: Service + static utility — `AuthService` is a DI-managed service for JWT operations; `Security` is a static class for cryptographic primitives.
**Upstream dependencies**: Data Layer (JwtConfig, IUserService for GetByEmail), ASP.NET Core (IHttpContextAccessor).
**Downstream consumers**: Admin API (token creation on login, current user resolution), User Management (password hashing, hardware hashing), Resource Management (encryption key derivation, stream encryption).
**Downstream consumers**: Admin API (token creation on login, current user resolution), User Management (password hashing for both web users and provisioned devices), Resource Management (encryption key derivation, stream encryption).
## 2. Internal Interfaces
@@ -24,11 +26,12 @@
| Method | Input | Output | Description |
|--------|-------|--------|-------------|
| `ToHash` | `string` | `string` (Base64) | SHA-384 hash |
| `GetHWHash` | `string hardware` | `string` (Base64) | Salted hardware hash |
| `GetApiEncryptionKey` | `string email, string password, string? hwHash` | `string` (Base64) | Derives AES encryption key |
| `GetApiEncryptionKey` | `string email, string password` | `string` (Base64) | Derives the per-user AES encryption key string. **Signature simplified by AZ-197** (`hardwareHash` parameter removed). |
| `EncryptTo` | `Stream input, Stream output, string key, CancellationToken` | void | AES-256-CBC encrypt stream |
| `DecryptTo` | `Stream encrypted, Stream output, string key, CancellationToken` | void | AES-256-CBC decrypt stream |
**Removed by AZ-197**: `GetHWHash(string hardware)` — no remaining callers in the post-cycle-1 codebase.
## 3. External API Specification
N/A — exposed through Admin API.
@@ -62,11 +65,13 @@ None — `Security` itself is a utility consumed by other components.
## 7. Caveats & Edge Cases
**Known limitations**:
- Password hashing uses SHA-384 without per-user salt or key stretching. Not resistant to rainbow table attacks.
- Hardware and encryption key salts are hardcoded constants.
- Password hashing uses SHA-384 without per-user salt or key stretching. Not resistant to rainbow table attacks. (Unchanged by cycle 1.)
- The encryption-key salt is a hardcoded constant. (`Security.GetApiEncryptionKey` body — see `services_security.md`.)
- `GetCurrentUserEmail` assumes `ClaimTypes.Name` is always present; accessing a missing key would throw `KeyNotFoundException`.
- AES encryption prepends IV as first 16 bytes — consumers must know this format.
**Removed in cycle 1**: hardware fingerprint hashing was a known weakness (static salt, no rotation); deleting it via AZ-197 also removed that attack surface.
**Performance bottlenecks**:
- Large file encryption loads encrypted output into `MemoryStream` before sending — high memory usage for large files.
@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
# Resource Management
> **Cycle 1 (2026-05-13) note** — AZ-197 removed the `Hardware` field from `GetResourceRequest` and removed `CheckResourceRequest` and `POST /resources/check` entirely. AZ-183 introduced an OTA update path (`POST /get-update`, `POST /resources/publish`, `IResourceUpdateService`, `Resource` entity, `resources` table, `ResourcesConfig.EncryptionMasterKey`) but it was reverted later the same day after the security audit (finding F-1) — the OTA delivery model itself was deemed obsolete. The component is now back to filesystem-backed storage only.
## 1. High-Level Overview
**Purpose**: Server-side file storage management — upload, list, download (with per-user AES encryption), folder clearing, and installer distribution.
**Purpose**: filesystem-backed storage — upload, list, download (per-user AES-encrypted), folder clearing, installer distribution. Owned by `IResourcesService`.
**Architectural Pattern**: Service layer — filesystem operations with encryption applied at the service boundary.
**Architectural Pattern**: a single service over the local filesystem. No DB access, no cache.
**Upstream dependencies**: Data Layer (ResourcesConfig), Authentication & Security (encryption via Security.EncryptTo).
**Upstream dependencies**: Data Layer (`ResourcesConfig`), Authentication & Security (encryption via `Security.EncryptTo`).
**Downstream consumers**: Admin API (resource endpoints).
@@ -22,15 +24,15 @@
| `ListResources` | `string? dataFolder, string? search, CancellationToken` | `IEnumerable<string>` | Yes | `DirectoryNotFoundException` |
| `ClearFolder` | `string? dataFolder` | void | No | None |
**Input DTOs**:
**Input DTO**:
```
GetResourceRequest:
GetResourceRequest (post-AZ-197):
Password: string (required, min 8 chars)
Hardware: string (required, not empty)
FileName: string (required, not empty)
// Hardware field removed by AZ-197.
CheckResourceRequest:
Hardware: string (required)
// CheckResourceRequest — REMOVED by AZ-197.
// GetUpdateRequest, PublishResourceRequest — added by AZ-183, removed in the post-cycle-1 revert.
```
## 3. External API Specification
@@ -39,17 +41,21 @@ N/A — exposed through Admin API.
## 4. Data Access Patterns
No database access. All operations are filesystem-based.
`ResourcesService` is filesystem-only — no DB access, no cache.
| Source | Service | Pattern |
|--------|---------|---------|
| Filesystem (`ResourcesConfig.ResourcesFolder`) | `ResourcesService` | Direct read/write/delete |
### Storage Estimates
Resources are stored as flat files in configured directories. Size depends on uploaded content (AI models, DLLs, installers — potentially hundreds of MB per file).
- **Filesystem**: AI models, DLLs, installers — potentially hundreds of MB per file.
## 5. Implementation Details
**State Management**: Stateless — reads/writes directly to filesystem.
**State Management**: stateless — reads/writes directly to filesystem.
**Key Dependencies**: None beyond BCL (System.IO).
**Key Dependencies**: none beyond BCL (System.IO).
**Error Handling Strategy**:
- `SaveResource` throws `BusinessException(NoFileProvided)` for null uploads.
@@ -61,13 +67,13 @@ Resources are stored as flat files in configured directories. Size depends on up
| Helper | Purpose | Used By |
|--------|---------|---------|
| `Security.EncryptTo` | AES stream encryption | GetEncryptedResource |
| `Security.GetApiEncryptionKey` | Key derivation | Admin API (before calling GetEncryptedResource) |
| `Security.EncryptTo` | AES stream encryption | `GetEncryptedResource` |
| `Security.GetApiEncryptionKey(email, password)` | Per-user key derivation (post-AZ-197 — no hardware component) | Admin API (before calling `GetEncryptedResource`) |
## 7. Caveats & Edge Cases
**Known limitations**:
- No path traversal protection: `dataFolder` parameter is concatenated directly with `ResourcesFolder`. A malicious `dataFolder` like `../../etc` could access arbitrary filesystem paths.
**Known limitations** (security-audit findings):
- **F-2 (High)** — no path traversal protection: `dataFolder` parameter is concatenated directly with `ResourcesFolder`. A malicious `dataFolder` like `../../etc` could access arbitrary filesystem paths. Filed as separate ticket.
- `SaveResource` deletes existing file before writing — no versioning or backup.
- `GetEncryptedResource` loads the entire encrypted file into a `MemoryStream` — memory-intensive for large files.
- `ListResources` wraps a synchronous `DirectoryInfo.GetFiles` in `Task.FromResult` — not truly async.
@@ -90,11 +96,11 @@ Resources are stored as flat files in configured directories. Size depends on up
|-----------|------|---------|
| INFO | Successful file save | `Resource {data.FileName} Saved Successfully` |
**Log format**: String interpolation via Serilog.
**Log format**: string interpolation via Serilog (security audit F-12 hygiene item: convert to structured form).
**Log storage**: Console + rolling file (via Serilog configured in Program.cs).
**Log storage**: console + rolling file (via Serilog configured in Program.cs).
## Modules Covered
- `Services/ResourcesService`
- `Common/Requests/GetResourceRequest` (includes CheckResourceRequest)
- `Common/Configs/ResourcesConfig`
- `Common/Requests/GetResourceRequest` (post-AZ-197 — no `CheckResourceRequest`, no `Hardware` field)
- `Common/Configs/ResourcesConfig` (the `EncryptionMasterKey` field added by AZ-183 was removed in the post-cycle-1 revert)
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ Converts `BusinessException` to HTTP 409 JSON response: `{ ErrorCode: int, Messa
## 3. External API Specification
> **Cycle 1 (2026-05-13) note** — endpoints below reflect the post-cycle-1 surface (AZ-513 Detection Classes CRUD, AZ-196 device auto-provisioning, AZ-197 hardware-binding removal). AZ-183 (OTA) shipped in cycle 1 but was reverted later the same day after the security audit (finding F-1) — the OTA delivery model itself was deemed obsolete. For per-endpoint cycle origins see `modules/admin_api_program.md`.
### Authentication
| Endpoint | Method | Auth | Description |
|----------|--------|------|-------------|
@@ -31,29 +33,41 @@ Converts `BusinessException` to HTTP 409 JSON response: `{ ErrorCode: int, Messa
| Endpoint | Method | Auth | Description |
|----------|--------|------|-------------|
| `/users` | POST | ApiAdmin | Creates a new user |
| `/devices` | POST | ApiAdmin | **AZ-196**: provisions a CompanionPC device user (returns serial + email + plaintext password once) |
| `/users/current` | GET | Authenticated | Returns current user |
| `/users` | GET | ApiAdmin | Lists users (optional email/role filters) |
| `/users/hardware/set` | PUT | ApiAdmin | Sets user hardware |
| `/users/queue-offsets/set` | PUT | Authenticated | Updates queue offsets |
| `/users/{email}/set-role/{role}` | PUT | ApiAdmin | Changes user role |
| `/users/{email}/enable` | PUT | ApiAdmin | Enables user |
| `/users/{email}/disable` | PUT | ApiAdmin | Disables user |
| `/users/{email}` | DELETE | ApiAdmin | Removes user |
**Removed by AZ-197**: `PUT /users/hardware/set` (Hardware-binding feature deleted)
### Resource Management
| Endpoint | Method | Auth | Description |
|----------|--------|------|-------------|
| `/resources/{dataFolder?}` | POST | Authenticated | Uploads a file (up to 200 MB) |
| `/resources/list/{dataFolder?}` | GET | Authenticated | Lists files |
| `/resources/clear/{dataFolder?}` | POST | ApiAdmin | Clears folder |
| `/resources/get/{dataFolder?}` | POST | Authenticated | Downloads encrypted resource |
| `/resources/get/{dataFolder?}` | POST | Authenticated | Downloads encrypted resource (key derived from `email + password` only — no Hardware) |
| `/resources/get-installer` | GET | Authenticated | Downloads production installer |
| `/resources/get-installer/stage` | GET | Authenticated | Downloads staging installer |
| `/resources/check` | POST | Authenticated | Validates hardware |
**Removed by AZ-197**: `POST /resources/check` (was the hardware-binding side-effect probe).
**Removed in post-cycle-1 revert**: `POST /get-update` and `POST /resources/publish` (AZ-183 reverted — security audit F-1; OTA delivery model itself obsolete).
### Detection Classes
| Endpoint | Method | Auth | Description |
|----------|--------|------|-------------|
| `/classes` | POST | ApiAdmin | **AZ-513**: creates a detection class |
| `/classes/{id:int}` | PATCH | ApiAdmin | **AZ-513**: partial-merge update of a detection class |
| `/classes/{id:int}` | DELETE | ApiAdmin | **AZ-513**: deletes a detection class |
### Authorization Policies
- **apiAdminPolicy**: requires `ApiAdmin` role (used on most admin endpoints)
- **apiUploaderPolicy**: requires `ResourceUploader` or `ApiAdmin` role (**defined but never applied to any endpoint — dead code**)
> The `apiUploaderPolicy` was added by AZ-183 and removed in the post-cycle-1 revert along with the OTA endpoints it guarded. `RoleEnum.ResourceUploader` remains as data only.
### CORS
- Allowed origins: `https://admin.azaion.com`, `http://admin.azaion.com`