UserService.ValidateUser calls RegisterSuccessfulLogin on a successful
password verify, which resets FailedLoginCount=0 even on the MFA path
(the reset happens inside ValidateUser before the MFA branch returns
the step-1 token). Seeding the counter before /login was therefore a
no-op — the threshold-1 seed was wiped before the wrong-TOTP request
got a chance to trip the lockout.
Move SetLockoutUntil to AFTER step 1 succeeds in AC1, AC2, AC7. AC7
now also genuinely exercises MfaService's own counter reset on a
correct TOTP, instead of being satisfied by the password-success reset.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
AZ-556 collapses every /login rejection (unknown email, wrong password,
disabled account, lockout, per-account rate limit) to a single opaque
InvalidCredentials (70) → 401 response. Timing equalised by a new
Security.VerifyDummy using the same Argon2id parameters. Audit log keeps
the rejection category internally (login_failed_unknown_email,
login_failed_disabled).
AZ-557 wires /login/mfa into the existing per-account lockout +
rate-limit pipeline. MFA failures now feed UserService's shared failure
accounting (RegisterMfaFailedLogin → RegisterFailedLoginCore) and
CountRecentFailedLogins aggregates both login_failed and
mfa_login_failed rows. Successful TOTP / recovery resets the counter.
Deprecated five legacy ExceptionEnum members (NoEmailFound,
WrongPassword, UserDisabled, AccountLocked, LoginRateLimited) — kept
defined for cross-workspace verifier compatibility during the
deprecation window.
E2E coverage updated: AuthTests (byte-identical body assertion +
disabled-account audit row), LoginRateLimitTests, PasswordHashingTests,
SecurityTests, plus four new MfaLoginTests (AC1, AC2, AC5, AC7).
Code review verdict: PASS_WITH_WARNINGS (batch_06_cycle2_review.md).
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Add RFC 6238 TOTP enrollment, two-step /login flow, recovery codes, and
the amr=["pwd","mfa"] claim that propagates through refresh-token rotation.
- New endpoints: /users/me/mfa/{enroll,confirm,disable} and /login/mfa.
- /login short-circuits to a 5-min ES256 step-1 token (audience-pinned
azaion-mfa-step2) when the user has MFA enabled; real access+refresh
pair is minted only after /login/mfa.
- mfa_secret encrypted at rest via ASP.NET Core IDataProtector
(purpose=Azaion.Mfa.Secret.v1; key folder configurable via
DataProtection:KeysFolder for production persistence).
- Recovery codes (10 single-use, base32, ~80-bit entropy) hashed with
SHA-256 and stored as JSONB; constant-time compare on lookup.
- RFC 6238 §5.2 replay defense via mfa_last_used_window per user.
- Sessions carry mfa_authenticated so /token/refresh re-stamps the
amr claim correctly across the entire 30-day refresh window.
- New audit events: enroll, confirm, disable, login-success/failed,
recovery-used.
- Schema: env/db/10_users_mfa.sql adds users.mfa_* columns and
sessions.mfa_authenticated; mfa_recovery_codes mapped as BinaryJson
in AzaionDbSchemaHolder; disable path uses raw parameterised SQL to
avoid LinqToDB null-literal type-inference on jsonb columns.
E2E: 6 new tests in MfaLoginTests cover all six AC; full suite
82 passed / 0 failed / 3 intentional skips.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Oleksandr Bezdieniezhnykh