AZ-535: POST /logout (caller's session), /logout/all (all sessions for user),
admin POST /sessions/{sid}/revoke, and verifier-only GET /sessions/revoked
snapshot. New Service role gates the snapshot. Idempotent revoke; reason +
revoked_by_user_id audited per row.
AZ-533: POST /sessions/mission mints a long-lived no-refresh ES256 token bound
to one aircraft + one mission. Audience narrowed to satellite-provider, hard
12 h cap, persisted as class='mission' so the existing logout/revoke surface
covers it. Successful CompanionPC /login or /token/refresh auto-revokes that
aircraft's open mission session (post-flight reconnect).
Schema: 09_sessions_logout_and_mission.sql adds revoked_by_user_id, class,
aircraft_id; drops NOT NULL on refresh_hash for mission rows; adds two partial
indexes for the auto-revoke and snapshot hot paths.
Tests: 13 new e2e tests, all green; full suite 75/76 (1 pre-existing flake in
PasswordHashingTests AC5 timing assertion, unrelated to this batch).
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
AZ-531 — /login now returns access (15 min) + opaque refresh; rotation
on /token/refresh; reuse of a rotated refresh kills the entire session
family per OAuth 2.1 §6.1; sliding 8 h + absolute 12 h windows; new
sessions table with serializable-tx rotation.
AZ-532 — switched access-token signing from HS256 shared-secret to ES256
file-backed PEMs; new JwtSigningKeyProvider, JWKS at /.well-known/jwks.json
with public-only fields and 1 h cache; ValidAlgorithms pinned so an
HS256-with-public-key alg-confusion attack is rejected; production keys
ignored under secrets/jwt-keys, deterministic test fixtures committed
under e2e/test-keys.
Tests: 10/10 new ACs covered (RefreshTokenFlowTests, AsymmetricSigningTests).
Pre-existing AuthTests.Jwt_contains_expected_claims_and_lifetime updated
for 15 min + sid/jti claims; SecurityTests.Expired_jwt re-signed with
ES256; ResilienceTests login p95 SLO raised 500 ms → 1500 ms in test env
to reflect Argon2id + dual DB writes + ES256 sign cost (production Linux
budget unchanged, see batch_02_cycle2_review.md F1).
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
AZ-536 — replace unsalted SHA-384 password hashing with Argon2id (RFC 9106).
Stored as PHC string with 64 MiB / 3 iter / 1 lane defaults; legacy SHA-384
hashes detected by prefix and lazily re-hashed on next successful login.
Verify uses CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals on both formats.
AZ-537 — add per-IP sliding window rate limit on /login (ASP.NET Core
RateLimiter, 10/60s default — production-tight) plus DB-backed per-account
limit (5/300s) and consecutive-failure lockout (10 / 15 min) on the users
row. Adds a generic audit_events table with INSERT/SELECT-only grants for
the app role so the per-account count is queryable and admins cannot erase
their own forensic trail. BusinessExceptionHandler maps AccountLocked to
423 and LoginRateLimited to 429, both with Retry-After.
AZ-538 — drop the http://admin.azaion.com origin from CORS, gate
UseHsts() + UseHttpsRedirection() to non-Development envs (1y / preload).
Test infra: Npgsql in the e2e project + a DbHelper for direct DB
inspection used by the AZ-536/537 ACs. appsettings.Development.json
raises PerIpPermitLimit to 1000 so the suite (~270 logins from one
container IP) doesn't false-trip the limiter.
Tests: 53 pass + 3 documented skips (per-IP rate limit needs distinct
client IPs; HSTS/HTTPS redirect need ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT=Production).
Code review: PASS_WITH_WARNINGS — 0 Critical, 0 High, 1 Medium, 3 Low.
See _docs/03_implementation/reviews/batch_01_cycle2_review.md.
Closes AZ-530 epic batch 1 of 4.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Oleksandr Bezdieniezhnykh