# Azaion Admin API — System Flows

> **Cycle 1 (2026-05-13) note** — F4 (Hardware Check) was deleted by AZ-197; F8 Detection Classes (AZ-513), F9 Device Auto-Provisioning (AZ-196) added; F10 OTA reverted after security audit F-1.
>
> **Cycle 2 — early (2026-05-14)** — F3 (Encrypted Resource Download) and F6 (Installer Download) removed entirely as obsolete. ADR-003 retired.
>
> **Cycle 2 — Auth Modernization (2026-05-14)** — F1 was rebuilt around the new dual-token + MFA model (AZ-531/532/534/536/537). Six new flows were added: F11 Refresh Token Rotation (AZ-531), F12 Logout / Revocation (AZ-535), F13 Mission Token Issuance (AZ-533), F14 MFA Enrollment & Confirmation (AZ-534), F15 Verifier Revocation Snapshot (AZ-535), F16 Account Lockout & Per-IP Rate Limit (AZ-537). The legacy single-token narrative is no longer accurate.

## Flow Inventory

| # | Flow Name | Trigger | Primary Components | Criticality |
|---|-----------|---------|-------------------|-------------|
| F1 | User Login (dual token + MFA) | `POST /login` (+ `/login/mfa`) | Admin API, User Mgmt, Auth & Security | **Critical** |
| F2 | User Registration | `POST /users` | Admin API, User Mgmt | High |
| ~~F3~~ | ~~Encrypted Resource Download~~ | — | — | **REMOVED — cycle 2 early** |
| ~~F4~~ | ~~Hardware Check~~ | — | — | **REMOVED — AZ-197** |
| F5 | Resource Upload | `POST /resources` | Admin API, Resource Mgmt | Medium |
| ~~F6~~ | ~~Installer Download~~ | — | — | **REMOVED — cycle 2 early** |
| F7 | User Management (CRUD) | Various `/users/*` | Admin API, User Mgmt | Medium |
| F8 | Detection Classes CRUD | `POST/PATCH/DELETE /classes` | Admin API, DetectionClassService | High |
| F9 | Device Auto-Provisioning | `POST /devices` | Admin API, User Mgmt | High |
| ~~F10~~ | ~~OTA Update Check & Publish~~ | — | — | **REMOVED — post-cycle-1** |
| **F11** | **Refresh Token Rotation** *(AZ-531)* | `POST /token/refresh` | Admin API, RefreshTokenService, AuthService, SessionService | **Critical** |
| **F12** | **Logout / Revocation** *(AZ-535)* | `POST /logout`, `/logout/all`, `/sessions/{sid}/revoke` | Admin API, SessionService | High |
| **F13** | **Mission Token Issuance** *(AZ-533)* | `POST /sessions/mission` | Admin API, MissionTokenService, SessionService, AuthService | High |
| **F14** | **MFA Enrollment & Confirmation** *(AZ-534)* | `POST /users/me/mfa/{enroll,confirm,disable}` | Admin API, MfaService, AuditLog | High |
| **F15** | **Verifier Revocation Snapshot** *(AZ-535)* | `GET /sessions/revoked?since=` | Admin API, SessionService | **Critical** for verifier fleet |
| **F16** | **Account Lockout & Rate Limit** *(AZ-537)* | (cross-cuts F1) | Admin API rate-limiter middleware, UserService, AuditLog | High |
| **F17** | **JWKS Publication** *(AZ-532)* | `GET /.well-known/jwks.json` | Admin API, JwtSigningKeyProvider | **Critical** for verifier fleet |

## Flow Dependencies

| Flow | Depends On | Shares Data With |
|------|-----------|-----------------|
| F1 | F17 (signing keys must exist), F16 (rate limit gate) | F11 (refresh chain), F12 (sid is the revocation key), F14 (MFA branch) |
| F2 | — | F1 (created users can log in) |
| F5 | F1 / F11 (access token) | — |
| F7 | F1 / F11 + ApiAdmin | F12 (disabling a user revokes their sessions) |
| F8 | F1 / F11 + ApiAdmin | UI |
| F9 | F1 / F11 + ApiAdmin | F1 (provisioned devices later log in) |
| F11 | F1 (created the family) | F12 (rotation is the same row store) |
| F12 | F1 / F11 (sid claim) | F15 (revoked rows surface here) |
| F13 | F1 / F11 (pilot's interactive token) | F12 (auto-revoke prior aircraft mission rows) |
| F14 | F1 (caller is authenticated) | F1 (the MFA branch consumes enrolled state) |
| F15 | — (verifier role only) | F12 (consumes revocation rows) |
| F16 | — | F1, F11 (gates them) |
| F17 | — | F1, F11, F13, F14 (every signed token), F15 (verifiers cache JWKS) |

---

## Flow F1: User Login (dual token + MFA) *(rebuilt cycle 2)*

### Description
A user submits email/password credentials. The system enforces per-IP and per-account rate limits + lockout (F16), verifies the password with constant-time Argon2id (lazily migrating from SHA-384 if needed — AZ-536), and either:
- (no MFA) issues a short-lived ES256 access token + opaque refresh token bound to a new session row, OR
- (MFA enabled) issues a short-lived `mfa_token` (JWT, audience `mfa-step`, signed by the active ES256 key) and waits for `POST /login/mfa` to complete the second factor.

### Preconditions
- User account exists, is enabled, and is not within an active lockout window
- Per-IP rate-limit bucket has remaining permits
- Per-account sliding-window failed-login count is below threshold
- For the MFA branch: user has previously enrolled and confirmed MFA (F14)

### Sequence Diagram

```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    participant Client
    participant API as Admin API
    participant RL as RateLimiter (per-IP, AZ-537)
    participant US as UserService
    participant AL as AuditLog
    participant Sec as Security (Argon2id, AZ-536)
    participant DB as PostgreSQL
    participant Mfa as MfaService
    participant RT as RefreshTokenService
    participant Auth as AuthService
    participant SS as SessionService

    Client->>API: POST /login {email, password}
    API->>RL: per-IP sliding window check
    alt rate-limited
        RL-->>Client: 429 + Retry-After
    end
    API->>US: ValidateUser(request)
    US->>DB: SELECT users WHERE email=? (read conn)
    US->>AL: CountRecentFailedLogins(email, window)
    alt account locked OR per-account threshold exceeded
        US-->>API: BusinessException(AccountLocked / LoginRateLimited, RetryAfterSeconds)
        API-->>Client: 423 / 429 + Retry-After
    end
    US->>Sec: VerifyPassword(presented, stored)
    alt VerifyResult.Ok=false
        US->>AL: RecordLoginFailed
        US->>DB: UPDATE failed_login_count, lockout_until
        US-->>API: WrongPassword (or NoEmailFound)
        API-->>Client: 409
    end
    alt VerifyResult.NeedsRehash=true
        US->>Sec: HashPassword (Argon2id)
        US->>DB: UPDATE password_hash (lazy migrate)
    end
    US->>AL: RecordLoginSuccess
    US->>DB: UPDATE failed_login_count=0, last_login=now()
    US-->>API: User entity

    alt user.MfaEnabled
        API->>Mfa: IssueMfaStepToken(userId)
        Mfa-->>API: short-lived JWT (mfa_pending=true)
        API-->>Client: 200 OK {mfa_required: true, mfa_token, expires_in: 300}
    else
        API->>RT: IssueForNewLogin(userId, mfaAuthenticated=false)
        RT->>DB: INSERT INTO sessions (new id, family_id=id, refresh_hash, expires_at, mfa_authenticated=false)
        RT-->>API: (opaqueRefreshToken, Session)
        API->>Auth: CreateToken(user, sessionId=Session.Id, jti=new, amr=["pwd"])
        Auth-->>API: AccessToken (ES256)
        opt user.Role == CompanionPC
            API->>SS: RevokeMissionsForAircraft(user.Id)  // F13 / AZ-533 AC-4
        end
        API-->>Client: 200 OK LoginResponse {AccessToken, AccessExp, RefreshToken, RefreshExp}
    end

    Note over Client,API: MFA branch only:
    Client->>API: POST /login/mfa {mfa_token, code}
    API->>RL: per-IP sliding window check
    API->>Mfa: ValidateMfaStepToken(mfa_token) -> userId
    API->>US: GetById(userId)
    API->>Mfa: VerifyForLogin(userId, code) -> amr
    Mfa->>DB: TOTP verify against decrypted mfa_secret OR recovery code consume
    Mfa->>AL: RecordMfaLoginSuccess (or MfaRecoveryUsed)
    API->>RT: IssueForNewLogin(userId, mfaAuthenticated=true)
    API->>Auth: CreateToken(user, sessionId, jti, amr=["pwd","mfa"])
    API-->>Client: 200 OK LoginResponse
```

### Error Scenarios

| Error | Where | Detection | Recovery |
|-------|-------|-----------|----------|
| Per-IP limit exceeded | Rate-limiter middleware | sliding window | 429 + `Retry-After` |
| Account locked | UserService.ValidateUser | `now() < lockout_until` | 423 `AccountLocked` (code 50) + `Retry-After` |
| Per-account threshold | UserService.ValidateUser | failed-login count over window | 429 `LoginRateLimited` (code 51) + `Retry-After` |
| Email not found | UserService.ValidateUser | No DB record | 409 `NoEmailFound` (code 10) |
| Wrong password | UserService.ValidateUser | `VerifyPassword.Ok=false` | 409 `WrongPassword` (code 30) — also increments `failed_login_count` |
| User disabled | UserService.ValidateUser | `is_enabled=false` | 409 `UserDisabled` (code 38) |
| MFA token invalid | MfaService.ValidateMfaStepToken | bad signature / wrong audience / expired | 401 `InvalidMfaToken` (code 61) |
| MFA code wrong | MfaService.VerifyForLogin | TOTP and recovery both miss | 401 `InvalidMfaCode` (code 59) — `mfa_login_failed` audit row |

---

## Flow F2: User Registration

### Description
An admin creates a new user account with email, password, and role.

### Preconditions
- Caller has ApiAdmin role
- Email is not already registered

### Sequence Diagram

```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    participant Admin
    participant API as Admin API
    participant VAL as FluentValidation
    participant US as UserService
    participant DB as PostgreSQL

    Admin->>API: POST /users {email, password, role}
    API->>VAL: Validate RegisterUserRequest
    VAL-->>API: OK
    API->>US: RegisterUser(request)
    US->>DB: SELECT user WHERE email = ?
    DB-->>US: null (no duplicate)
    US->>US: Hash password (Argon2id, AZ-536)
    US->>DB: INSERT user (admin connection)
    DB-->>US: OK
    US-->>API: void
    API-->>Admin: 200 OK
```

### Error Scenarios

| Error | Where | Detection | Recovery |
|-------|-------|-----------|----------|
| Validation failure | FluentValidation | Email < 8 chars, bad format, password < 8 chars | 400 Bad Request |
| Duplicate email | UserService.RegisterUser | Existing user found | 409: EmailExists (code 20) |

---

## Flow F3: Encrypted Resource Download — REMOVED (cycle 2, 2026-05-14)

The `POST /resources/get/{dataFolder?}` endpoint and its supporting stack (`Security.GetApiEncryptionKey`, `Security.EncryptTo`, `Security.DecryptTo`, `ResourcesService.GetEncryptedResource`, `GetResourceRequest` DTO + validator, `ExceptionEnum.WrongResourceName` (50)) were removed as obsolete. Per-user file encryption is no longer part of the system; resource files are now stored as plain bytes and only ever leave the server through the upload (F5) and admin clear paths. ADR-003 in `architecture.md` was retired in the same change.

---

## Flow F4: Hardware Check (REMOVED by AZ-197)

The hardware-fingerprint binding flow (`POST /resources/check`, `UserService.CheckHardwareHash`, `Security.GetHWHash`, error code 40 `HardwareIdMismatch`, error code 45 `BadHardware`) was removed entirely in cycle 1.

Reason: the threat the binding mitigated (credential reuse via desktop installers) was eliminated by the architectural shift to fTPM-secured Jetsons + browser-only SaaS access. See `_docs/03_implementation/batch_06_report.md` and the obsolete diagram `diagrams/flows/flow_hardware_check.md`.

---

## Flow F5: Resource Upload

### Description
An authenticated user uploads a file to a specified resource folder on the server.

### Preconditions
- User is authenticated (JWT)
- File size <= 200 MB

### Sequence Diagram

```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    participant User
    participant API as Admin API
    participant RS as ResourcesService
    participant FS as Filesystem

    User->>API: POST /resources/{folder} (multipart/form-data)
    API->>RS: SaveResource(folder, file)
    RS->>FS: Create directory (if needed)
    RS->>FS: Delete existing file (same name)
    RS->>FS: Write file
    FS-->>RS: OK
    RS-->>API: void
    API-->>User: 200 OK
```

---

## Flow F6: Installer Download — REMOVED (cycle 2, 2026-05-14)

The `GET /resources/get-installer` and `GET /resources/get-installer/stage` endpoints, the `ResourcesService.GetInstaller` method, the `ResourcesConfig.SuiteInstallerFolder` / `SuiteStageInstallerFolder` configuration properties, and their environment-variable rows in every config artifact (`appsettings.json`, `.env.example`, `secrets/*.public.env`, `docker-compose.test.yml`) were removed. The installer-shipping era is over in the target architecture (browser SaaS + fTPM Jetsons); installer artefacts are no longer served from the Admin API.

---

## Flow F7: User Management (CRUD)

### Description
Admin operations: list users, change role, enable/disable, update queue offsets, delete user. (The "set hardware" operation was removed by AZ-197 — see F4.)

### Preconditions
- Caller has ApiAdmin role (for most operations)

All operations follow the same pattern: API endpoint → UserService method → DbFactory.RunAdmin → PostgreSQL UPDATE/DELETE. Cache is invalidated for affected user keys after writes.

> **Cycle 2 cross-cut**: `PUT /users/{email}/disable` now also calls `SessionService.RevokeAllForUser` so disabling a user instantly cuts every active session. Verifiers pick this up via F15 within their poll cadence.

---

## Flow F8: Detection Classes CRUD *(AZ-513, 2026-05-13)*

### Description
ApiAdmin manages the detection-class catalogue exposed to operators in the UI: create new entries, partial-merge edits, delete entries. The UI's existing add/delete affordances start working end-to-end once this flow exists; the in-place edit affordance arrives via UI cycle AZ-512.

### Preconditions
- Caller has ApiAdmin role (`apiAdminPolicy`)
- `detection_classes` table exists in the admin DB

### Sequence Diagram

```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    participant Client
    participant API as Admin API
    participant VAL as FluentValidation
    participant DCS as DetectionClassService
    participant DB as PostgreSQL

    Client->>API: POST /classes {name, shortName, color, maxSizeM, photoMode?}
    API->>VAL: Validate CreateDetectionClassRequest
    VAL-->>API: OK / 400
    API->>DCS: Create(request)
    DCS->>DB: InsertWithInt32IdentityAsync (admin conn)
    DB-->>DCS: new id
    DCS-->>API: DetectionClass {id, …}
    API-->>Client: 200 OK {DetectionClass}

    Client->>API: PATCH /classes/{id} {…partial fields}
    API->>VAL: Validate UpdateDetectionClassRequest
    VAL-->>API: OK / 400
    API->>DCS: Update(id, request)
    alt id exists
        DCS->>DB: UPDATE row applying non-null fields (admin conn)
        DCS-->>API: DetectionClass
        API-->>Client: 200 OK {DetectionClass}
    else id missing
        DCS-->>API: null
        API-->>Client: 404 Not Found
    end

    Client->>API: DELETE /classes/{id}
    API->>DCS: Delete(id)
    DCS->>DB: DELETE WHERE id = ? (admin conn)
    alt deleted > 0
        DCS-->>API: true
        API-->>Client: 204 No Content
    else
        DCS-->>API: false
        API-->>Client: 404 Not Found
    end
```

### Error Scenarios

| Error | Where | Detection | Recovery |
|-------|-------|-----------|----------|
| Not authenticated | API | No JWT | 401 Unauthorized |
| Wrong role | API | Non-ApiAdmin JWT | 403 Forbidden |
| Validation failure | FluentValidation | Field bounds violated | 400 Bad Request |
| Missing id (PATCH/DELETE) | DetectionClassService | Row not found | 404 Not Found |

---

## Flow F9: Device Auto-Provisioning *(AZ-196, 2026-05-13)*

### Description
ApiAdmin requests a fresh CompanionPC device user. The server allocates the next sequential serial (`azj-NNNN`), generates a 32-char hex password, persists the user with an Argon2id hash (cycle 2 — AZ-536), and returns the plaintext credentials exactly once. The provisioning script (out-of-tree) embeds the values into the device's `device.conf`.

### Preconditions
- Caller has ApiAdmin role (`apiAdminPolicy`)

### Sequence Diagram

```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    participant Admin
    participant API as Admin API
    participant US as UserService
    participant DB as PostgreSQL

    Admin->>API: POST /devices (no body)
    API->>US: RegisterDevice()
    US->>DB: SELECT TOP 1 email FROM users WHERE role = 'CompanionPC' ORDER BY created_at DESC
    DB-->>US: lastEmail (or null)
    US->>US: nextNumber = parse(lastEmail.suffix) + 1 (or 0)
    US->>US: serial = "azj-" + nextNumber.PadLeft(4)
    US->>US: password = ToHex(RandomBytes(16))   // 32 hex chars
    US->>DB: INSERT user {Email=serial@domain, PasswordHash=Argon2id(password), Role=CompanionPC, IsEnabled=true} (admin conn)
    DB-->>US: OK
    US-->>API: RegisterDeviceResponse {Serial, Email, Password}
    API-->>Admin: 200 OK {Serial, Email, Password}
```

### Error Scenarios

| Error | Where | Detection | Recovery |
|-------|-------|-----------|----------|
| Not authenticated / wrong role | API | JWT missing or non-ApiAdmin | 401 / 403 |
| Email already exists | UserService.RegisterUser (called by RegisterDevice) | DB UNIQUE INDEX `users_email_uidx` violation translated to `EmailExists` (5) | 409 — caller retries (the next call recomputes a fresh `azj-NNNN`) |

> **Implementation note** — `RegisterDevice` reuses `UserService.RegisterUser` for the row insert (post-security-audit consolidation, finding F-3). The `users.email` column has a UNIQUE INDEX (`env/db/06_users_email_unique.sql`); concurrent provisioning calls that race on the same serial surface the violation atomically.

---

## Flow F10: OTA Update Check & Publish *(REMOVED — post-cycle-1 revert)*

The `POST /get-update` and `POST /resources/publish` endpoints, the `IResourceUpdateService` / `ResourceUpdateService` / `ResourceColumnEncryption` types, the `Resource` entity, the `resources` table, the `apiUploaderPolicy`, and the `ResourcesConfig.EncryptionMasterKey` field were all removed shortly after AZ-183 shipped.

Reasons:
1. Security audit finding F-1 — `/get-update` was registered with `.RequireAuthorization()` (any authenticated caller) and returned the per-resource decrypted `EncryptionKey` in the response body, defeating the at-rest column encryption.
2. The OTA delivery model is itself a leftover from the installer-shipping era; the target architecture (browser-only SaaS + fTPM-secured Jetsons) does not need it.

The `apiUploaderPolicy` definition was removed from `Program.cs`; the `RoleEnum.ResourceUploader` enum value remains as data (the seed `uploader@azaion.com` user still uses it for negative-auth tests) but is no longer wired to any endpoint.

---

## Flow F11: Refresh Token Rotation *(AZ-531, 2026-05-14)*

### Description
The client presents an opaque refresh token; the server validates it, rotates it (marks the old row as `revoked_reason='rotated'`), inserts a new row in the same `family_id`, and mints a new ES256 access token. Reuse of an already-rotated token revokes the entire family with `reason='reuse_detected'` (and triggers F15 surfacing for verifiers).

### Preconditions
- Refresh token is well-formed and corresponds to a non-revoked, non-expired session row
- The session is within both the sliding window (`SessionConfig.RefreshSlidingHours`) and the absolute cap (`SessionConfig.RefreshAbsoluteHours` measured from `family_started_at`)

### Sequence Diagram

```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    participant Client
    participant API as Admin API
    participant RT as RefreshTokenService
    participant US as UserService
    participant Auth as AuthService
    participant SS as SessionService
    participant DB as PostgreSQL

    Client->>API: POST /token/refresh {refreshToken}
    API->>RT: Rotate(opaqueToken)
    RT->>DB: SELECT * FROM sessions WHERE refresh_hash = SHA256(token)
    alt row missing
        RT-->>API: 401 InvalidRefreshToken
    end
    alt row.revoked_reason = 'rotated' (reuse!)
        RT->>DB: UPDATE sessions SET revoked_at=now, revoked_reason='reuse_detected' WHERE family_id = row.family_id AND revoked_at IS NULL
        RT-->>API: 401 InvalidRefreshToken
    end
    alt row.revoked_at IS NOT NULL OR row.expires_at <= now
        RT-->>API: 401 InvalidRefreshToken
    end
    RT->>DB: UPDATE sessions SET revoked_at=now, revoked_reason='rotated', last_used_at=now WHERE id = row.id
    RT->>DB: INSERT INTO sessions (new id, family_id=row.family_id, refresh_hash=SHA256(newToken), parent_session_id=row.id, expires_at=now+sliding, mfa_authenticated=row.mfa_authenticated)
    RT-->>API: (newOpaqueToken, newSession)
    API->>US: GetById(newSession.UserId)
    US-->>API: User
    API->>Auth: CreateToken(user, sessionId=newSession.Id, jti=new, amr= ['pwd','mfa'] if mfaAuthenticated else ['pwd'])
    Auth-->>API: AccessToken
    opt user.Role == CompanionPC
        API->>SS: RevokeMissionsForAircraft(user.Id)
    end
    API-->>Client: 200 OK LoginResponse {AccessToken, AccessExp, RefreshToken=newOpaqueToken, RefreshExp=newSession.ExpiresAt}
```

### Error Scenarios

| Error | Where | Detection | Recovery |
|-------|-------|-----------|----------|
| Token missing / not in DB | RefreshTokenService.Rotate | `SHA256(token)` not found | 401 `InvalidRefreshToken` |
| Reuse detected | RefreshTokenService.Rotate | row already `revoked_reason='rotated'` | 401 `InvalidRefreshToken` + entire family revoked (visible via F15) |
| Sliding window expired | RefreshTokenService.Rotate | `expires_at <= now()` | 401 `InvalidRefreshToken` |
| Absolute cap exceeded | RefreshTokenService.Rotate | `now() - family_started_at > RefreshAbsoluteHours` | 401 `InvalidRefreshToken` |
| User missing (race with deletion) | API | `UserService.GetById` returns null | 401 `InvalidRefreshToken` |

---

## Flow F12: Logout / Revocation *(AZ-535, 2026-05-14)*

### Description
Three endpoints share `SessionService.RevokeBySid` / `RevokeAllForUser`:
- `POST /logout` — revoke caller's current `sid` (idempotent; returns `{ alreadyRevoked }`)
- `POST /logout/all` — revoke every active session for the caller's user
- `POST /sessions/{sid}/revoke` *(ApiAdmin)* — admin revoke-by-sid

All revocations write `revoked_at`, `revoked_reason`, and `revoked_by_user_id`; the rows surface to verifiers via F15 within the next poll window.

### Preconditions
- `/logout` / `/logout/all` — caller is authenticated; the access token's `sid` claim is well-formed
- `/sessions/{sid}/revoke` — caller is `ApiAdmin`

### Sequence Diagram

```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    participant Client
    participant API as Admin API
    participant SS as SessionService
    participant DB as PostgreSQL

    Note over Client,API: Self logout
    Client->>API: POST /logout (Bearer access)
    API->>API: ParseSidClaim(user) -> sid
    API->>API: ParseUserIdClaim(user) -> caller
    API->>SS: RevokeBySid(sid, caller, 'logged_out')
    SS->>DB: UPDATE sessions SET revoked_at=now, revoked_reason='logged_out', revoked_by_user_id=caller WHERE id=sid AND revoked_at IS NULL
    SS-->>API: alreadyRevoked: bool
    API-->>Client: 200 OK { alreadyRevoked }

    Note over Client,API: Logout-all
    Client->>API: POST /logout/all
    API->>SS: RevokeAllForUser(caller, caller, 'logged_out_all')
    SS->>DB: UPDATE ... WHERE user_id=caller AND revoked_at IS NULL
    SS-->>API: int (rows revoked)
    API-->>Client: 200 OK { revoked }

    Note over Client,API: Admin revoke-by-sid
    Client->>API: POST /sessions/{sid}/revoke (ApiAdmin)
    API->>SS: RevokeBySid(sid, admin, 'admin_revoked')
    SS->>DB: UPDATE ... WHERE id=sid AND revoked_at IS NULL
    SS-->>API: alreadyRevoked: bool
    API-->>Client: 200 OK { alreadyRevoked }
```

### Error Scenarios

| Error | Where | Detection | Recovery |
|-------|-------|-----------|----------|
| Missing/malformed `sid` claim | ParseSidClaim | not a Guid | 401 `InvalidRefreshToken` |
| Sid not in DB (admin path) | SessionService.RevokeBySid | row not found | 404 `SessionNotFound` |
| Already revoked | SessionService.RevokeBySid | UPDATE affected 0 rows | 200 OK with `alreadyRevoked: true` (idempotent) |

---

## Flow F13: Mission Token Issuance *(AZ-533, 2026-05-14)*

### Description
A pilot (an authenticated interactive user) requests a long-lived no-refresh access token bound to one aircraft and one mission. Before signing the token, the server inserts a `class='mission'` session row (so `sid` is bound), and revokes any previously-active mission sessions for that aircraft (`reason='aircraft_reconnected'`).

### Preconditions
- Caller is authenticated (interactive token; AMR can be `["pwd"]` or `["pwd","mfa"]` — F1 follow-up tightens this to require `mfa` once policy is set)
- `request.aircraftId` resolves to an existing user with `Role = CompanionPC`
- `request.missionId` matches the validation pattern; `request.plannedDurationH` is within bounds

### Sequence Diagram

```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    participant Pilot
    participant API as Admin API
    participant MTS as MissionTokenService
    participant SS as SessionService
    participant US as UserService
    participant Auth as AuthService
    participant DB as PostgreSQL

    Pilot->>API: POST /sessions/mission {aircraftId, missionId, plannedDurationH, region}
    API->>MTS: Issue(pilotId, request)
    MTS->>US: GetById(aircraftId) (read conn)
    alt aircraft missing or wrong role
        MTS-->>API: 400 AircraftNotFound
    end
    MTS->>SS: RevokeMissionsForAircraft(aircraftId)  // AC-4
    SS->>DB: UPDATE sessions SET revoked_at=now, revoked_reason='aircraft_reconnected' WHERE aircraft_id=? AND class='mission' AND revoked_at IS NULL
    MTS->>DB: INSERT INTO sessions (id, user_id=aircraftId, class='mission', aircraft_id=aircraftId, refresh_hash=NULL, expires_at=now + plannedDurationH)
    MTS->>Auth: CreateToken(aircraftUser, sessionId=newSid, jti, amr=['pwd','mission'])
    Auth-->>MTS: AccessToken
    MTS-->>API: MissionSessionResponse {access_token, expires_at, mission_id, aircraft_id}
    API-->>Pilot: 200 OK
```

### Error Scenarios

| Error | Where | Detection | Recovery |
|-------|-------|-----------|----------|
| Validation failure | FluentValidation / MissionTokenService | bad `mission_id` pattern, `plannedDurationH` out of bounds | 400 `InvalidMissionRequest` (code 54) |
| Aircraft not a CompanionPC | MissionTokenService.Issue | role mismatch | 400 `AircraftNotFound` (code 55) |

---

## Flow F14: MFA Enrollment & Confirmation *(AZ-534, 2026-05-14)*

### Description
Three-step user-initiated lifecycle:
1. **Enroll** — server generates a new TOTP secret, encrypts it via `IDataProtector` (purpose `Azaion.Mfa.Secret`), persists with `mfa_enabled=false`, returns base32 secret + otpauth URL + QR PNG bytes.
2. **Confirm** — client submits a TOTP code; on success server flips `mfa_enabled=true`, generates 10 single-use Argon2id-hashed recovery codes, and returns them once.
3. **Disable** — requires both password + a current TOTP; server clears all MFA columns.

### Preconditions
- Caller is authenticated
- For Confirm: a prior Enroll call left the encrypted secret on the user
- For Disable: `mfa_enabled = true`

### Sequence Diagram

```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    participant User
    participant API as Admin API
    participant Mfa as MfaService
    participant DP as IDataProtector
    participant Sec as Security (Argon2id)
    participant AL as AuditLog
    participant DB as PostgreSQL

    Note over User,API: ENROLL
    User->>API: POST /users/me/mfa/enroll {password}
    API->>Mfa: Enroll(userId, password)
    Mfa->>DB: SELECT user
    Mfa->>Sec: VerifyPassword(presented, stored)
    Mfa->>Mfa: Generate 20-byte secret, base32 encode
    Mfa->>DP: Protect(base32) -> encrypted base64
    Mfa->>DB: UPDATE users SET mfa_secret = encrypted, mfa_enrolled_at = now, mfa_enabled=false
    Mfa->>AL: RecordMfaEnroll
    Mfa-->>API: MfaEnrollResponse { secret_base32, otpauth_url, qr_png }
    API-->>User: 200 OK

    Note over User,API: CONFIRM
    User->>API: POST /users/me/mfa/confirm {code}
    API->>Mfa: Confirm(userId, code)
    Mfa->>DP: Unprotect(stored) -> base32 secret
    Mfa->>Mfa: TOTP verify
    alt code wrong
        Mfa-->>API: 401 InvalidMfaCode
    end
    Mfa->>Mfa: Generate 10 recovery codes
    Mfa->>Sec: HashPassword each (Argon2id)
    Mfa->>DB: UPDATE users SET mfa_enabled=true, mfa_recovery_codes = jsonb([{ hash, used_at=null } x10]), mfa_last_used_window=current_step
    Mfa->>AL: RecordMfaConfirm
    Mfa-->>API: { recovery_codes: [...] }
    API-->>User: 200 OK { mfaEnabled: true, recovery_codes }

    Note over User,API: DISABLE
    User->>API: POST /users/me/mfa/disable {password, code}
    API->>Mfa: Disable(userId, password, code)
    Mfa->>Sec: VerifyPassword
    Mfa->>Mfa: TOTP verify
    Mfa->>DB: UPDATE users SET mfa_enabled=false, mfa_secret=NULL, mfa_recovery_codes=NULL, mfa_enrolled_at=NULL, mfa_last_used_window=NULL
    Mfa->>AL: RecordMfaDisable
    Mfa-->>API: ok
    API-->>User: 200 OK { mfaEnabled: false }
```

### Error Scenarios

| Error | Where | Detection | Recovery |
|-------|-------|-----------|----------|
| Already enrolled (Enroll) | MfaService.Enroll | `mfa_enabled=true` | 409 `MfaAlreadyEnabled` (code 56) |
| Not enrolling (Confirm) | MfaService.Confirm | `mfa_secret IS NULL` | 409 `MfaNotEnrolling` (code 57) |
| Not enabled (Disable) | MfaService.Disable | `mfa_enabled=false` | 409 `MfaNotEnabled` (code 58) |
| Wrong password | Sec.VerifyPassword | hash mismatch | 409 `WrongPassword` (code 30) |
| Wrong TOTP code | MfaService TOTP path | code/window miss | 401 `InvalidMfaCode` (code 59) |

---

## Flow F15: Verifier Revocation Snapshot *(AZ-535, 2026-05-14)*

### Description
A `Service`-role identity (verifier fleet) polls `GET /sessions/revoked?since={iso8601}` periodically. The server returns every session whose `revoked_at >= since` and `expires_at > now()` so verifiers can deny tokens whose `sid` appears in the snapshot.

The `since` parameter is **clamped to a 12-hour floor** server-side so a buggy verifier asking for "everything since 1970" doesn't trigger a multi-million-row table scan. Verifiers should clock-skew-tolerate by stepping `since` back ~30s on each poll.

### Preconditions
- Caller has role `Service` or `ApiAdmin` (`revocationReaderPolicy`)

### Sequence Diagram

```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    participant Verifier
    participant API as Admin API
    participant SS as SessionService
    participant DB as PostgreSQL

    Verifier->>API: GET /sessions/revoked?since=2026-05-14T05:30:00Z
    API->>API: clamp since to max(now-12h, since)
    API->>SS: GetRevokedSince(effectiveSince)
    SS->>DB: SELECT id, expires_at, revoked_at, revoked_reason FROM sessions WHERE revoked_at >= ? AND expires_at > now() ORDER BY revoked_at
    DB-->>SS: rows (uses sessions_revoked_at_idx)
    SS-->>API: IReadOnlyList<RevokedSession>
    API-->>Verifier: 200 OK [{ sid, exp, revokedAt, reason }, ...] + Cache-Control: no-cache
```

### Error Scenarios

| Error | Where | Detection | Recovery |
|-------|-------|-----------|----------|
| Wrong role | API authorization | not Service/ApiAdmin | 403 Forbidden |
| `since` missing | API | bind null `DateTime?` | clamp falls back to `now-12h` |

---

## Flow F16: Account Lockout & Per-IP Rate Limit *(AZ-537, 2026-05-14)*

### Description
Cross-cuts F1 and F11. Two layers:
1. **Per-IP** — ASP.NET Core `RateLimiter` middleware (`SlidingWindowRateLimiter`) attached to `/login` and `/login/mfa` via the `login-per-ip` policy. Rejection sets `429` and stamps `Retry-After` from the lease metadata.
2. **Per-account + lockout** — DB-backed in `UserService.ValidateUser`:
   - Read `failed_login_count` and `lockout_until` from `users`.
   - If `now() < lockout_until` → throw `BusinessException(AccountLocked, RetryAfterSeconds = LockoutUntil - now)`.
   - Else: count `audit_events` rows where `event_type='login_failed' AND email=? AND occurred_at >= now - PerAccountWindowSeconds`. If over threshold → throw `BusinessException(LoginRateLimited, RetryAfterSeconds = PerAccountWindowSeconds)`.
   - On wrong password: `RecordLoginFailed` + UPDATE `failed_login_count = failed_login_count + 1`. If new count >= `ConsecutiveFailureThreshold` → set `lockout_until = now + LockoutSeconds`, `RecordLoginLockout`, throw `AccountLocked`.
   - On success: `RecordLoginSuccess` + UPDATE `failed_login_count = 0`, `lockout_until = NULL`.

### Preconditions
- `AuthConfig.RateLimit.*` and `AuthConfig.Lockout.*` are non-zero
- `audit_events` table exists

### Sequence Diagram

```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    participant Client
    participant Mid as RateLimiter middleware
    participant API as Admin API
    participant US as UserService
    participant AL as AuditLog
    participant DB as PostgreSQL

    Client->>Mid: POST /login {email, password}
    Mid->>Mid: SlidingWindow per-IP check
    alt no permits
        Mid-->>Client: 429 + Retry-After
    end
    Mid->>API: forward
    API->>US: ValidateUser
    US->>DB: SELECT users (read)
    US->>AL: CountRecentFailedLogins(email, window)
    alt account locked OR threshold exceeded
        US->>AL: RecordLoginFailed (or RecordLoginLockout if newly locked)
        US-->>API: BusinessException(AccountLocked / LoginRateLimited, RetryAfterSeconds)
        API-->>Client: 423 / 429 + Retry-After
    end
    US->>US: VerifyPassword
    alt wrong password
        US->>AL: RecordLoginFailed
        US->>DB: UPDATE failed_login_count++; lockout_until = now + LockoutSeconds (if newly over)
        US-->>API: BusinessException(WrongPassword)
        API-->>Client: 409
    end
    US->>AL: RecordLoginSuccess
    US->>DB: UPDATE failed_login_count = 0, lockout_until = NULL, last_login = now
    US-->>API: User
```

### Error Scenarios

| Error | Where | Detection | Recovery |
|-------|-------|-----------|----------|
| Per-IP limit | RateLimiter middleware | sliding window | 429 + `Retry-After` |
| Account locked | UserService.ValidateUser | `now < lockout_until` | 423 `AccountLocked` + `Retry-After` |
| Per-account threshold | UserService.ValidateUser | `audit_events` count over window | 429 `LoginRateLimited` + `Retry-After` |

---

## Flow F17: JWKS Publication *(AZ-532, 2026-05-14)*

### Description
`GET /.well-known/jwks.json` (anonymous) returns the JSON Web Key Set containing one entry per loaded ES256 key. Verifiers cache for 1 hour (`Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600`).

### Preconditions
- `JwtConfig.KeysFolder` exists with at least one well-formed P-256 PEM
- `JwtConfig.ActiveKid` matches one of the loaded files (the others are still served, allowing verifiers to validate already-issued tokens during a key rotation)

### Sequence Diagram

```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    participant Verifier
    participant API as Admin API
    participant JKP as JwtSigningKeyProvider
    participant FS as Filesystem

    Note over JKP,FS: At app startup
    API->>JKP: ctor (eager)
    JKP->>FS: scan KeysFolder/*.pem
    JKP->>JKP: validate P-256 curve, build EcdsaSecurityKey list
    JKP-->>API: ready (or fail-fast if 0 keys)

    Note over Verifier,API: Per-poll
    Verifier->>API: GET /.well-known/jwks.json
    API->>JKP: All
    JKP-->>API: list of JwtSigningKey
    API->>API: project to JWK { kty:EC, crv:P-256, kid, use:sig, alg:ES256, x, y }
    API-->>Verifier: 200 OK { keys: [...] } + Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600
```

### Error Scenarios

| Error | Where | Detection | Recovery |
|-------|-------|-----------|----------|
| No keys / malformed PEM | JwtSigningKeyProvider ctor | startup crash (intentional) | Operator fix + restart |
| Wrong curve in PEM | JwtSigningKeyProvider ctor | startup crash | Operator fix + restart |

> **Rotation procedure**: drop a new PEM into `KeysFolder`, set `JwtConfig:ActiveKid` to the new kid, restart. Already-issued tokens remain verifiable until their `exp`. Old PEMs are physically removed only after the longest possible token TTL has elapsed.