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gps-denied-onboard/_docs/02_document/tests/security-tests.md
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Oleksandr Bezdieniezhnykh cab7b5d020 [AZ-233] Update Docker Compose and enhance test documentation
- Modified the Docker Compose configuration to include an input root for replay tests and added an environment variable for enabling SITL.
- Enhanced documentation for various testing processes, including the addition of a Runtime Completeness Decomposition Gate and clarifications on internal module testing requirements.
- Updated the implementation completeness report to reflect the current state and added new test cases for performance and resilience scenarios.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-05-06 05:03:48 +03:00

3.8 KiB

Security Tests

NFT-SEC-01: Signed Cache Manifest Enforcement

Summary: Validate that unsigned or tampered cache manifests cannot produce trusted anchors.

Traces to: AC-8.2, AC-8.3, AC-NEW-4, AC-NEW-7

Step Consumer Action Expected Response
1 Provide valid signed manifest System accepts cache fixture if all freshness and resolution checks pass
2 Provide unsigned manifest System rejects cache fixture and logs security event
3 Provide hash-mismatched tile sidecar System rejects affected tile and emits no trusted anchor from it

Pass criteria: 0 unsigned or hash-mismatched fixtures produce satellite_anchored output or trusted generated tile promotion.


NFT-SEC-02: Cache Poisoning Write Gate

Summary: Validate that generated onboard tiles are not written or promoted when parent-pose covariance is too weak.

Traces to: AC-8.4, AC-NEW-7

Step Consumer Action Expected Response
1 Replay generated tile candidate with parent sigma <=3 m Tile may be written as candidate with full quality metadata
2 Replay candidate with parent sigma in (3 m, 5 m] Tile is marked lower trust per sidecar policy
3 Replay candidate with parent sigma >5 m Tile is not eligible for write/promotion

Pass criteria: Tile trust level and write eligibility match AC-NEW-7; no over-threshold tile becomes trusted basemap.


Summary: Validate that spoofed real-GPS measurements and unauthorized MAVLink sources do not override trusted estimator state.

Traces to: AC-3.5, AC-4.3, AC-NEW-2, AC-NEW-8

Step Consumer Action Expected Response
1 Inject spoofed GPS_RAW_INT during normal visual operation Estimator rejects inconsistent GPS based on FC health and visual/satellite consistency
2 Inject spoofed GPS during visual blackout Spoofed GPS remains excluded until health and visual consistency gates pass
3 Inject MAVLink messages from unauthorized source ID Message is ignored and security/status event is logged

Pass criteria: No unauthorized or spoofed input causes a confident position estimate; promotion/demotion status is visible to QGC and FDR.


NFT-SEC-04: No In-Flight Satellite Provider Access

Summary: Validate that the runtime system does not call commercial or Suite satellite services during flight.

Traces to: AC-8.1, AC-8.3, Restrictions Satellite Imagery

Step Consumer Action Expected Response
1 Run replay with network blocked System continues using local cache
2 Run replay requiring missing tile System reports degraded/relocalization-needed status, not an external fetch

Pass criteria: 0 outbound satellite-provider or Suite Service calls during runtime; missing cache data produces controlled degraded behavior.


NFT-SEC-INFRA: Invalid Cache No-Fetch Smoke

Summary: Validate that the replay harness treats untrusted cache fixtures as a successful security rejection, not as a trusted anchor.

Traces to: AZ-236 AC-2, AZ-236 AC-3, AZ-233 Security NFR

Step Consumer Action Expected Response
1 Run replay with cache_variant=stale Satellite cache stub marks the manifest untrusted and records no network fetch
2 Inspect replay evidence Scenario reports pass, source_label=untrusted_cache_rejected, and GPS_INPUT.fix_type=0

Pass criteria: The invalid cache smoke scenario passes only when the untrusted fixture is rejected and no external satellite-provider or Suite service network fetch is attempted.