# Azaion.Missions — Architecture

> **NOTE (forward-looking)**: this document reflects the **post-rename, post-GPS-Denied-removal** target. Today's source still uses `Azaion.Flights` namespace, `Aircraft*`/`Flight*`/`Orthophoto*`/`GpsCorrection*` filenames, `[Route("aircrafts"|"flights")]`, and migrates 6 tables. The renames + drops are tracked under Jira AZ-EPIC + child tickets B5–B12 (see `_docs/_process_leftovers/2026-05-14_rename-flights-to-missions.md`). The doc IS the spec for that work.

## Architecture Vision

> **Status**: confirmed-by-user (autodev `/document` Step 4.5, 2026-05-14). Source-of-truth for "what this service is and why" — downstream skills (`/refactor`, `/decompose`, `/new-task`, `/code-review`) consume this section before reading the lower-level technical sections below.

`missions` is the **edge-tier .NET 10 REST service** that owns the **mission domain** of each Azaion deployment — vehicle inventory, mission plans, waypoint sequences, and the cross-service cascade-delete that keeps the rest of the edge stack consistent when missions or waypoints are removed. **Exactly one instance runs per device** (Jetson Orin / OrangePI / operator-PC) alongside sibling edge services (`annotations`, detection, `autopilot`, `gps-denied`, `ui`), all sharing **ONE local PostgreSQL with per-service table ownership enforced by convention**. JWTs are minted remotely by the central `admin` service using ECDSA-SHA256 and validated locally against `admin`'s JWKS, which this service fetches once at startup and caches; request-path validation is local and does not call `admin`. The dominant pattern is **thin controller → service → linq2db active-record over a per-request scoped `DataConnection`**, with **no repository abstraction** and **no in-process message queue / event bus**.

### Components & responsibilities (6 logical components, 1 csproj)

| # | Component | Responsibility |
|---|-----------|----------------|
| 01 | `01_vehicle_catalog` | Vehicle CRUD + "is_default" exclusivity (stricter than spec — B12 decision pending) |
| 02 | `02_mission_planning` | Mission + Waypoint CRUD + the cross-service cascade-delete walk (canonical owner of the full mission ownership graph) |
| 04 | `04_persistence` | `AppDataConnection` (LinqToDB) + `DatabaseMigrator` (`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` for the 4 owned tables post-B7 + B9) |
| 05 | `05_identity` | `JwtExtensions`; ECDSA-SHA256 validation against admin's JWKS (cached locally); one `"FL"` policy (post-B7) |
| 06 | `06_http_conventions` | `ErrorHandlingMiddleware` + `PaginatedResponse<T>` + the unused `ErrorResponse` DTO |
| 07 | `07_host` | `Program.cs` composition root; runs migrator at startup; serves on port 8080 |

### Major data flows (7 — see `system-flows.md` for full sequences)

- **F1 Vehicle CRUD** — operator UI → vehicle service → DB.
- **F2 Mission create/read/update** — UI → mission service, with vehicle existence check.
- **F3 Mission delete + CASCADE** *(critical)* — walks across `annotations` + detection schemas; **not transaction-wrapped today** (ADR-006).
- **F4 Waypoint CRUD** — delete is a scoped F3 cascade.
- **F5 JWT bearer validation** — every protected request; local ECDSA-SHA256 against admin's JWKS (cached); `iss` and `aud` both validated; `alg` pinned to `EcdsaSha256` (defends against HS256-confusion). The CMMC L2 finding tracked under AZ-487 / AZ-494 is now structurally addressed in this service's code; the suite-level docs still describe the legacy HS256 model and have a sync task pending.
- **F6 Startup + schema migration** — `Program → DatabaseMigrator.Migrate → app.Run`.
- **F7 Health probe** — anonymous `GET /health`; process-liveness only.

### Architectural principles / non-negotiables (inferred from the code)

- **One PostgreSQL per device; per-service table ownership enforced by convention.** *[inferred-from: `../../suite/_docs/00_top_level_architecture.md` § Database Topology, `Database/AppDataConnection.cs`, `Database/DatabaseMigrator.cs`]*
- **Manual cascade-delete in code, NOT `ON DELETE CASCADE` in schema.** *[inferred-from: `Database/DatabaseMigrator.cs`, `FlightService.DeleteFlight` (today's `MissionService.DeleteMission`)]*
- **JWT validated locally against admin's public JWKS** (ECDSA-SHA256). The JWKS is fetched once at startup (via `Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols.ConfigurationManager<JsonWebKeySet>`) and refreshed on the default schedule; per-request validation is local. *[inferred-from: `Auth/JwtExtensions.cs`]*
- **Forward-only-additive schema bootstrap** (`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS`); B9's `DROP TABLE IF EXISTS` is the one explicit destructive step. *[inferred-from: `Database/DatabaseMigrator.cs`]*
- **Layer-organized layout** (`Controllers/`, `Services/`, `DTOs/`, `Enums/`), NOT feature-folders; one project / one root namespace; layering rules in `module-layout.md` enforced by convention not by the compiler. *[inferred-from: repository tree + `Azaion.Flights.csproj` (today's `Azaion.Missions.csproj`)]*
- **`gps-denied` is decoupled by design** — no runtime call in either direction; rows reference `mission_id` / `waypoint_id` as plain GUIDs in `gps-denied`'s own tables. *[inferred-from: ADR-007 + AZ-546 acceptance criteria]*
- **Watchtower-restart + `flight-gate` is the ONLY orchestration**; no Kubernetes; vertical scale only (one instance per device). *[inferred-from: `Dockerfile` + `../../suite/_docs/00_top_level_architecture.md`]*

### Carry-forward concerns (acknowledged, NOT in this Epic's scope)

These divergences from spec or known foot-guns are tracked in `00_discovery.md` § Spec ↔ Code Divergences and called out in component / module docs. They are deliberately deferred:

- PascalCase entity-body wire shape vs spec's camelCase (the *error envelope* is already camelCase by accidental match — see ADR-002).
- Cascade-delete is not transaction-wrapped (ADR-006); one-line fix to land opportunistically with B6.
- Swagger UI NOT gated on `IsDevelopment()` (ADR-005, scope reduced — the "dev fallback secrets" aspect is now obsolete; see ADR-005 below for details).
- `"FL"` policy code retains the legacy "Flight" wording even after the service rename — fleet-wide auth change, not in this Epic.
- `Geopoint` stored as 3 flat columns (`lat`, `lon`, `mgrs`) instead of spec's single auto-converting `string GPS`.
- F2 returns `400` instead of spec's `404` on a missing `VehicleId` (`ArgumentException` mapping).
- `ErrorResponse` DTO is dead on the wire and has the wrong shape (`List<string>?` instead of spec's `object?` keyed by field name).

## 1. System Context

**Problem being solved**: Provide the edge-tier (.NET) service that owns the **mission domain** of an Azaion deployment — vehicle inventory (Plane / Copter / UGV / GuidedMissile), mission plans, waypoint sequences, and the cross-service cascade-delete that keeps the rest of the edge stack consistent when missions or waypoints are removed. The service runs **on the device** (Jetson / OrangePI / operator-PC), one instance per device, and shares the local PostgreSQL with its sibling edge services.

**System boundaries**:

- **Inside the system**: the 6 components (`01_vehicle_catalog`, `02_mission_planning`, `04_persistence`, `05_identity`, `06_http_conventions`, `07_host`), their HTTP surface, and the migrator that owns 4 PostgreSQL tables (`vehicles`, `missions`, `waypoints`, `map_objects`).
- **Outside the system**: the central `admin` service (mints JWTs); the React `ui` (consumer); the `autopilot` service (writes `map_objects` via the same DB); the `annotations` service (owns `media` + `annotations` tables); the detection pipeline (owns `detection`); the new `gps-denied` service (owns `orthophotos` + `gps_corrections` — out of this repo as of B7).

**External systems**:

| System | Integration Type | Direction | Purpose |
|--------|------------------|-----------|---------|
| `admin` (.NET, central) | JWKS over HTTPS (outbound, startup + refresh) + JWT validation (inbound) | Outbound at startup; inbound on every request | Issues ECDSA-signed bearer tokens; this service fetches admin's public JWKS once at startup, caches it, and validates tokens locally thereafter. No per-request callback. JWKS rotation does not require a coordinated redeploy |
| Operator UI (React, edge) | REST (JSON over HTTP) | Inbound | All vehicle / mission / waypoint CRUD |
| `autopilot` (edge) | Shared DB (PostgreSQL on the same device) | Bidirectional | `autopilot` writes `map_objects` (this service owns the schema and cascade-deletes them); `autopilot` reads `missions` + `waypoints` to drive the vehicle |
| `annotations` (edge) | Shared DB | Outbound delete | `missions` cascade-deletes from `media` + `annotations` on mission/waypoint delete; `annotations` owns the schema |
| Detection pipeline (edge) | Shared DB | Outbound delete | Same pattern — `missions` cascade-deletes `detection` rows; pipeline owns the schema |
| `gps-denied` (separate edge service) | Shared DB (loose ref by GUID) | None at runtime | `gps-denied` rows reference `mission_id` / `waypoint_id` as plain GUIDs; no inbound HTTP call into `missions` and no outbound call from `missions` to `gps-denied` (decoupled by design after B7) |
| `postgres-local` (PostgreSQL 16+) | TCP | Outbound | Sole datastore. Shared with every other edge service on the same device |

## 2. Technology Stack

| Layer | Technology | Version | Rationale |
|-------|------------|---------|-----------|
| Language | C# | net10.0 | Suite-wide convention for backend services (per `../../suite/_docs/_repo-config.yaml`) |
| Web framework | ASP.NET Core (`Microsoft.NET.Sdk.Web`) | net10.0 | Built-in DI, middleware pipeline, attribute routing, JWT bearer auth |
| Data access | linq2db | 6.2.0 | Suite-wide ORM choice; explicit SQL escape hatch + attribute mapping; works well with the manual cascade pattern |
| Database driver | Npgsql | 10.0.2 | PostgreSQL native protocol driver |
| Schema bootstrap | linq2db raw `Execute` (`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS`) | — | Forward-only-additive; one `DROP TABLE IF EXISTS orthophotos / gps_corrections` block in B9 |
| Auth | `Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer` + `Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols` | 10.0.5 | JWT bearer with ECDSA-SHA256 against admin's JWKS (cached via `ConfigurationManager<JsonWebKeySet>`); `iss`/`aud` validated; algorithm pinned |
| API docs | `Swashbuckle.AspNetCore` | 10.1.5 | Swagger UI + JSON spec (mounted unconditionally — see ADR-005) |
| HTTP error envelope | Custom `ErrorHandlingMiddleware` | — | Maps `KeyNotFoundException`/`ArgumentException`/`InvalidOperationException` → 404/400/409 (see ADR-002 and component `06_http_conventions` Caveats for divergences from suite spec) |
| Container | `mcr.microsoft.com/dotnet/aspnet:10.0` (multi-arch SDK build) | 10.0 | Matches edge target architectures (ARM64 dominant; AMD64 used for operator-PC) |
| CI | Woodpecker (`.woodpecker/build-arm.yml`) | — | Single docker-build-and-push job triggered on `[dev, stage, main]`; suite-standard runner |
| Hosting | Docker compose on each edge device | — | Service runs alongside `annotations`, `detection`, `autopilot`, `gps-denied`, `ui`, `postgres-local` per `../../suite/_docs/00_top_level_architecture.md` |
| Tests | **None present** | — | Tracked in `../../suite/_docs/_process_leftovers/2026-04-22_ci-unit-test-lane-missing-projects.md`; will be filled by the autodev BUILD pipeline (Steps 3 → 6) |

**Key constraints from discovery**:

- **No `src/` directory** — the .NET project sits at the repo root (`Azaion.Missions.csproj`, `Program.cs`). `coderule.mdc` says "follow the established directory structure", and the established structure here has no `src/`. This shape persists post-rename.
- **No per-component csproj** — there is one project, effectively one root namespace (`Azaion.Missions.*` post-B5). Components are logical groupings, not compilation units. Cross-component dependencies are checked by convention (per `module-layout.md` § Allowed Dependencies), not by compiler.
- **Layer-organized, not feature-organized layout** — `Controllers/`, `Services/`, `DTOs/`, `Enums/`, `Auth/`, `Middleware/`, `Database/` at the root. Component `Owns` globs are file-by-file lists across multiple top-level directories. See `module-layout.md` § Layout Rules.
- **One PostgreSQL shared with all edge services** — the per-service ownership pattern is the load-bearing convention (`../../suite/_docs/00_top_level_architecture.md` § Database Topology).
- **No automated tests** — every change today is human-reviewed only. Adding a `tests/Azaion.Missions.Tests/` sibling project is on the autodev backlog (Steps 5–7 of existing-code flow).

## 3. Deployment Model

**Environments**: Development (local `dotnet run` + local PostgreSQL), edge production (Docker compose on each device).

**Infrastructure**:

- **On-prem only** — every Azaion edge deployment is on customer-owned hardware (Jetson Orin / OrangePI / operator-PC). No managed cloud.
- **Container orchestration**: plain `docker compose` per device (see `../../suite/_infra/_compose/`). No Kubernetes.
- **Scaling**: vertical only — exactly one instance of `missions` per edge device, sized to the device. Horizontal scale-out of edge services is explicitly out of scope (each device is its own deployment).
- **Watchtower** restarts the container if it crashes; `flight-gate` (per `../../suite/_docs/00_top_level_architecture.md`) prevents container restart mid-mission.

**Image / port wiring** (post-B10):

- Image tag: `${REGISTRY_HOST}/azaion/missions:${BRANCH}-arm` (was `azaion/flights:*-arm` pre-B10).
- Container `EXPOSE 8080`; edge compose maps host port `5002:8080`.
- Entrypoint: `dotnet Azaion.Missions.dll` (was `Azaion.Flights.dll` pre-B5).
- Multi-arch build: `--platform=$BUILDPLATFORM`, `dotnet publish --os linux --arch $arch` so a single Dockerfile produces both ARM64 and AMD64 image variants.

**Environment-specific configuration**:

| Config | Development | Edge production |
|--------|-------------|-----------------|
| `DATABASE_URL` | Operator-supplied env var or `Database:Url` config key (e.g. `Host=localhost;Database=azaion;Username=postgres;Password=changeme`). **No hardcoded fallback** — `ConfigurationResolver.ResolveRequiredOrThrow` aborts startup if unset | `postgresql://postgres:${PG_LOCAL_PASSWORD}@postgres-local/azaion` (compose env) |
| `JWT_ISSUER` | Operator-supplied (e.g. `https://admin.azaion.dev/`). **Required at startup** | Set by Edge compose to the central admin issuer |
| `JWT_AUDIENCE` | Operator-supplied (e.g. `missions`). **Required at startup** | Set by Edge compose to this service's audience identifier |
| `JWT_JWKS_URL` | Operator-supplied HTTPS URL (e.g. `https://admin.azaion.dev/.well-known/jwks.json`). **Required at startup** + must be HTTPS (`HttpDocumentRetriever.RequireHttps = true`) | Set by Edge compose to admin's JWKS endpoint |
| `CorsConfig:AllowedOrigins` | Optional; defaults to `[]` (implicit-permissive policy + startup warning) | Required when `CorsConfig:AllowAnyOrigin != true` — startup THROWS in `Production` with empty origins |
| `CorsConfig:AllowAnyOrigin` | Optional; defaults to `false` | Optional; explicit opt-in if reverse-proxy already enforces origin checks |
| Logging | Console / Debug (ASP.NET Core defaults) + `PermissiveDefaultWarning` when implicit-permissive CORS applies | Console only (no Serilog / structured logging configured today) |
| Swagger | enabled | enabled (NOT gated on `IsDevelopment()` — see ADR-005) |
| CORS | Permissive fallback (with `PermissiveDefaultWarning` startup log) | Explicit allow-list via `CorsConfig:AllowedOrigins`, or explicit `AllowAnyOrigin=true` if reverse-proxy gates origins; implicit-permissive aborts startup |
| Migrator | runs at process start | runs at process start (idempotent `IF NOT EXISTS` + the one B9 `DROP TABLE IF EXISTS` block for legacy GPS-Denied tables on previously-deployed devices) |

For containerization details, CI pipeline structure, and observability, see `_docs/02_document/deployment/`.

## 4. Data Model Overview

> Detailed entity column shapes live in `_docs/02_document/modules/entities.md`. Detailed cross-service ownership lives in `_docs/02_document/data_model.md`.

**Core entities** (post-B7 shape — 7 entity files, 4 owned tables + 3 borrowed read-only stubs):

| Entity | Description | Owned by component |
|--------|-------------|--------------------|
| `Vehicle` | Operator-managed inventory of mission-capable assets (Plane / Copter / UGV / GuidedMissile). 1 default at most by spec; code currently enforces "exactly one default" (see B12) | `01_vehicle_catalog` (logically); table schema in `04_persistence` |
| `Mission` | Planned mission; FK to a `Vehicle` | `02_mission_planning` (logically); table schema in `04_persistence` |
| `Waypoint` | Ordered geo-point inside a `Mission`; FK to `Mission` | `02_mission_planning` (logically); table schema in `04_persistence` |
| `MapObject` | H3-indexed detection projection written by `autopilot`; FK to `Mission` | `04_persistence` owns the schema; `autopilot` is the writer; this service cascade-deletes |
| `Media` | Borrowed read-only stub. Owned by `annotations`. Cascade-delete only | `04_persistence` declares the entity for ITable access; schema owned by `annotations` |
| `Annotation` | Borrowed read-only stub. Owned by `annotations`. Cascade-delete only | Same as `Media` |
| `Detection` | Borrowed read-only stub. Owned by detection pipeline. Cascade-delete only | Schema owned by detection pipeline; this service has cascade-delete responsibility only |

**Removed in B7+B9**: `Orthophoto` and `GpsCorrection` entities + tables. Now owned by the separate `gps-denied` service.

**Key relationships**:

- `Vehicle (1) ── (0..N) Mission` — `mission.vehicle_id → vehicle.id`. Existence-checked on `MissionService.CreateMission` / `UpdateMission` (the FK constraint is the safety net).
- `Mission (1) ── (0..N) Waypoint` — `waypoint.mission_id → mission.id`.
- `Mission (1) ── (0..N) MapObject` — `map_object.mission_id → mission.id`. Written by `autopilot`; cascade-deleted by `missions`.
- `Waypoint (1) ── (0..N) Media` (cross-service FK to `annotations`-owned table) — cascade-deleted by `missions`.
- `Media (1) ── (0..N) Annotation` (intra-`annotations` FK) — cascade-deleted by `missions` while walking the dependency graph.
- `Annotation (1) ── (0..N) Detection` (intra-detection FK) — cascade-deleted by `missions` while walking the dependency graph.

**No FK to `gps-denied` tables** — `orthophotos` / `gps_corrections` reference `mission_id` and `waypoint_id` as plain GUIDs in the `gps-denied` service's own tables. Cleanup of those rows is `gps-denied`'s own concern; this service does NOT cascade into them.

**Data flow summary**:

- `Operator UI → missions (HTTP)` — vehicle + mission + waypoint CRUD; the dominant inbound flow.
- `admin → operator UI → missions (JWT)` — admin mints token; UI carries it to every backend; this service validates locally (HS256, shared secret).
- `autopilot → missions (DB read)` — `autopilot` reads `missions` + `waypoints` to drive the vehicle.
- `autopilot → missions (DB write)` — `autopilot` writes `map_objects`; this service owns the table schema and cascade-deletes them.
- `missions → annotations + detection (DB delete)` — cascade-delete walk during mission/waypoint delete; tears down `media`, `annotations`, `detection` rows in dependency order.

## 5. Integration Points

### Internal Communication

This service is a single .NET process. Components communicate via direct C# calls registered in DI (`07_host`). There is no in-process message queue, no RPC, no event bus.

| From | To | Protocol | Pattern | Notes |
|------|----|----------|---------|-------|
| `07_host` | `04_persistence`, `05_identity`, `06_http_conventions` | DI registration | Composition root | Wired once at startup |
| `01_vehicle_catalog` (controller → service) | `04_persistence` (`AppDataConnection`) | Direct C# call | Active-record over `ITable<Vehicle>` | Per-request scoped DB connection |
| `02_mission_planning` (controllers → services) | `04_persistence` (`AppDataConnection`) | Direct C# call | Active-record over `ITable<Mission>`, `ITable<Waypoint>`, plus cascade delete touching `MapObject`, `Media`, `Annotation`, `Detection` | Per-request scoped DB connection. **No transaction wraps cascade delete** — see `02_mission_planning` Caveats #1 |
| `02_mission_planning` (`MissionService`) | `01_vehicle_catalog` (existence) | Direct DB read against `vehicles` | Existence check | Cross-component, but reads via the shared `AppDataConnection`; no service-to-service call |
| `01_vehicle_catalog`, `02_mission_planning` (controllers) | `05_identity` (`"FL"` policy) | ASP.NET Core `[Authorize(Policy = "FL")]` attribute | Pipeline check | String-typed policy reference (see `module-layout.md` § Verification Needed #4) |
| `02_mission_planning` (`MissionService.GetMissions`) | `06_http_conventions` (`PaginatedResponse<T>`) | Direct C# type | DTO | Sole consumer of the paginated envelope |
| Every controller exception | `06_http_conventions` (`ErrorHandlingMiddleware`) | Pipeline interceptor | Exception → status mapping | Middleware is registered FIRST so it wraps everything |

### External Integrations

| External system | Protocol | Auth | Rate limits | Failure mode |
|-----------------|----------|------|-------------|--------------|
| Operator UI | REST (JSON over HTTP) | JWT bearer | None enforced | Standard HTTP error envelope (see ADR-002 for the suite-spec divergence still in code) |
| `admin` (token issuance) | None at runtime — this service validates tokens locally | Shared HMAC secret (`JWT_SECRET`) | N/A | Rejected token → `401`. No network call to `admin`, so `admin` outage does NOT take this service down (until issued tokens expire) |
| `postgres-local` | PostgreSQL wire protocol via Npgsql | Username + password (`DATABASE_URL`) | Connection pool default (Npgsql) | Connection failure → `KeyNotFoundException` cannot fire (different exception type) → middleware fallthrough → 500. Migrator failure at startup crashes the process; Watchtower restarts the container |
| `autopilot` (DB-mediated) | Shared `postgres-local` | Same DB credentials | N/A | If `autopilot` writes a `map_object` referencing a deleted mission, the FK constraint rejects the insert. If a mission delete races with an `autopilot` write, the cascade may leave one row of `map_objects` that the next mission delete would reject — small race window, no data corruption |
| `annotations`, detection pipeline (DB-mediated, schema borrowing) | Shared `postgres-local` | Same DB credentials | N/A | If `annotations` is absent at deploy time, the cascade walks `media` / `annotations` and gets `relation does not exist` → 500. In standard edge deployment all services are present (suite compose stack) — see `02_mission_planning` Caveats #6 |
| `gps-denied` (post-B7) | None — no runtime coupling. `gps-denied` owns its own tables and references `mission_id` / `waypoint_id` as plain GUIDs | N/A | N/A | Decoupled by design |

## 6. Non-Functional Requirements

> Numbers below are observable from code + Dockerfile + Woodpecker; the spec (`../../suite/_docs/02_missions.md`) does not state explicit SLOs. Where targets are inferred, that is called out.

| Requirement | Target | Measurement | Priority |
|-------------|--------|-------------|----------|
| Availability | Best-effort per-device; no multi-instance HA per device | One container per device; restart-on-crash via Watchtower; `flight-gate` prevents restart mid-mission per `../../suite/_docs/00_top_level_architecture.md` | High (per-device) |
| Latency (p95) | **Not specified.** Code uses synchronous LINQ-to-SQL with one DB round-trip per operation; cascade delete has up to 7 sequential SELECTs/DELETEs. On a local PostgreSQL on the same device this is single-digit ms typical | `/health` and CRUD endpoints; no explicit latency budget | Medium (inferred) |
| Throughput | **Not specified.** Edge deployment is one operator + one or two background consumers (`autopilot`, `ui`); load is operator-paced not load-tested | — | Low (inferred) |
| Data retention | No retention policy in this service. Data persists in `postgres-local` until manually deleted via the API or device wipe | — | — |
| Recovery (RPO/RTO) | RPO = device-local backup cadence (suite-level concern, not this service); RTO ≈ container restart time (~10s) | Watchtower restart on crash | Medium |
| Scalability | One instance per edge device; horizontal scale-out NOT supported | — | — (out of scope) |
| Cascade delete atomicity | **Currently violated** — `MissionService.DeleteMission` and `WaypointService.DeleteWaypoint` are NOT wrapped in a transaction (see `02_mission_planning` Caveats #1). Partial failure leaves orphan rows in `media` / `annotations` / `detection` / `map_objects`. Fix is one-line (`db.BeginTransactionAsync`) | Carry-forward improvement | High (data integrity) |
| API spec conformance | **Currently divergent** on entity/DTO wire shape (PascalCase vs spec camelCase) and on error envelope's missing `errors` field; the unused `ErrorResponse` DTO has wrong `Errors` shape (see ADR-002). Note: error envelope is already camelCase on case (accidental match) | Manual diff against `../../suite/_docs/00_top_level_architecture.md` § Error Response Format + § Pagination | High (cross-service contract) |
| Health endpoint | `GET /health` returns `{ status: "healthy" }` in <10ms | `Program.cs` `MapGet` | High (used by container orchestration) |

## 7. Security Architecture

**Authentication**: JWT bearer with **ECDSA-SHA256** signature validation. Tokens are minted by the central `admin` service (which holds the ECDSA private key) and validated locally by `05_identity` against admin's public JWKS document. The JWKS is fetched once at startup via `Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols.ConfigurationManager<JsonWebKeySet>` against `JWT_JWKS_URL` (HTTPS only — `HttpDocumentRetriever.RequireHttps = true`) and refreshed on the manager's default schedule. After the initial fetch, request-path validation is local; no per-request callback to `admin`. Validation enforces `iss == JWT_ISSUER`, `aud == JWT_AUDIENCE`, `exp` (with 30-second clock skew), and pins `alg` to `EcdsaSha256` to defend against the HS256-confusion attack. **JWKS rotation does NOT require a coordinated redeploy** — consumers pick up new keys on the next refresh tick, and old tokens signed with the previous `kid` remain valid until their natural expiry. The CMMC L2 finding (`../../suite/_docs/05_security/cmmc_l2_scorecard.md` row 3) about missing `iss`/`aud` validation is structurally fixed in this service's code; the suite-level docs still describe the legacy HS256 model and have a sync task pending (drift recorded in `_docs/02_document/05_drift_findings_2026-05-14.md`).

**Authorization**: Single named policy `"FL"`, gated by a `permissions` claim value. Every controller route in `01_vehicle_catalog` and `02_mission_planning` carries `[Authorize(Policy = "FL")]`. The role → permission matrix lives in `../../suite/_docs/00_roles_permissions.md`. Note: the policy code `"FL"` carries the legacy "Flight" name even after the service rename to `missions`; renaming the permission code is a fleet-wide auth change (would invalidate every issued token until new ones are minted) and is **NOT** in this Epic's scope. Tracked as a TODO in `../../suite/_docs/00_roles_permissions.md`.

**Data protection**:

- **At rest**: PostgreSQL on-disk encryption is the device-level concern (suite-level, not this service). This service does not encrypt data at the column level.
- **In transit**: TLS termination is the reverse proxy's responsibility. This service does NOT enforce HTTPS redirection. The container `EXPOSE 8080` is plain HTTP; the upstream reverse proxy adds TLS. The JWKS fetch is independently constrained to HTTPS by `HttpDocumentRetriever { RequireHttps = true }`.
- **Secrets management**: Four required env vars (`DATABASE_URL`, `JWT_ISSUER`, `JWT_AUDIENCE`, `JWT_JWKS_URL`) plus optional CORS keys flow through `Infrastructure/ConfigurationResolver.cs` → `ResolveRequiredOrThrow`. **There are no hardcoded fallbacks**; a missing required value aborts startup with `InvalidOperationException` before the host is built. A production deploy that forgets `JWT_JWKS_URL` cannot silently accept tokens — it fails fast. The legacy `JWT_SECRET` env var is no longer consulted.

**Audit logging**: None at the application level. The only structured log emitted by app code is `06_http_conventions`' middleware `LogError(ex, "Unhandled exception")` for unhandled 500s, plus `Program.cs`' `PermissiveDefaultWarning` when implicit-permissive CORS applies. There is no per-request audit trail, no correlation ID, and no per-user attribution (the JWT's user-id claim is not consumed — see `05_identity` Caveats #2).

**Input validation**: None. No `[Required]` attributes, no range checks. Empty `Name`, negative `BatteryCapacity`, invalid enum int values are accepted on input. Carry-forward improvement; not in this Epic's scope.

**CORS**: Gated by `Infrastructure/CorsConfigurationValidator.cs`. In `Production` (case-insensitive match on `ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT`) an empty `CorsConfig:AllowedOrigins` with `CorsConfig:AllowAnyOrigin != true` aborts startup. In non-Production environments, an empty allow-list with `AllowAnyOrigin=false` falls back to permissive (`AllowAnyOrigin/Method/Header`) and emits the `PermissiveDefaultWarning` startup log. Explicit `AllowAnyOrigin=true` always applies permissive without warning. The previous "permissive in all environments" model no longer holds.

## 8. Key Architectural Decisions

> ADR numbering reflects what is implemented today (post-rename, post-B7). Items called out as "currently divergent" are intentional carry-forward — they are implemented choices that diverge from the suite spec; tightening them is suite-level work, not part of this Epic.

### ADR-001: One PostgreSQL per edge device, shared by all edge services

**Context**: Each edge device runs ~6 backend services (this one + `annotations`, detection, `autopilot`, `gps-denied`, plus the React `ui`). Each service needs persistent storage; running ~6 separate Postgres instances per device is operationally heavy.

**Decision**: Run ONE `postgres-local` per device. Every service connects to it; every service migrates only the tables it owns (this service owns `vehicles`, `missions`, `waypoints`, `map_objects` post-B7+B9). Cross-service reads / cascade deletes happen through ITable accessors against the shared schema.

**Alternatives considered**:

1. **One Postgres per service** — rejected: 6× the operational overhead per device for no real isolation gain (services run on the same OS anyway).
2. **SQLite per service** — rejected: cross-service queries (cascade delete walking from `mission` to `media` to `annotation` to `detection`) require a single transactional database; SQLite-per-service would require a coordination layer.

**Consequences**:

- Cross-service cascade-delete is physically possible and atomic *within one DB connection* (the transaction-wrap is a one-line carry-forward — see ADR-006).
- Schema ownership boundary is enforced by **convention**, not by access control. Any service could write to any table; the rule "only owners write" is upheld by code review.
- If `annotations` is absent from a deployment, this service's cascade-delete fails on `relation does not exist`. Standard edge compose includes all services; this is acceptable.

### ADR-002: PascalCase wire shape on entity bodies (currently divergent from suite spec)

**Context**: Spec (`../../suite/_docs/00_top_level_architecture.md` § Error Response Format + § Pagination) mandates camelCase JSON across all .NET services. Code today emits PascalCase for entity / DTO responses (`Vehicle`, `Mission`, `Waypoint`, `PaginatedResponse<Mission>`) via System.Text.Json defaults — entity property names are PascalCase and no `JsonNamingPolicy.CamelCase` is configured. **Exception (accidental match)**: the global error envelope IS already camelCase, because `ErrorHandlingMiddleware` writes an anonymous object literal `new { statusCode = ..., message }` whose property names are lowercase-first by construction; `System.Text.Json` preserves them as-is.

**Decision (current, carry-forward)**: Keep PascalCase entity bodies until a coordinated suite-wide camelCase migration. Adding `JsonSerializerOptions.PropertyNamingPolicy = JsonNamingPolicy.CamelCase` would flip every endpoint's wire shape simultaneously; the UI and `autopilot` consumers would need to be updated in lock-step.

**Alternatives considered**:

1. **Fix unilaterally now** — rejected for this Epic: would break the UI without a coordinated cutover.
2. **Per-route override** — rejected: all-or-nothing is the cleaner cutover.

**Consequences**:

- Entity/DTO HTTP responses do NOT match the suite spec on case style.
- The error envelope DOES match spec on case (camelCase) but still misses the `errors` field; the `ErrorResponse` DTO is dead on the wire (middleware writes the anonymous object instead) and its `Errors` field shape (`List<string>?`) doesn't match spec (`object?` keyed by field name) — both carry forward until the migration.

### ADR-003: Manual cascade-delete in code, not `ON DELETE CASCADE` in schema

**Context**: Mission deletion has to clean up rows across multiple tables, some of which are owned by other services (`media` / `annotations` / `detection`). Schema-level `ON DELETE CASCADE` would force the foreign service's schema to encode this service's lifecycle.

**Decision**: This service owns the cascade walk. `MissionService.DeleteMission` deletes in dependency order: `map_objects` → resolve `waypoint_ids` → resolve `media_ids` and `annotation_ids` → `detection` → `annotations` → `media` → `waypoints` → `missions`.

**Alternatives considered**:

1. **`ON DELETE CASCADE` at the schema level** — rejected: would require the `annotations` service to encode this service's domain in its own migration. Schema becomes coupled to consumer.
2. **Soft-delete + tombstone everywhere** — rejected: read paths everywhere would have to filter; the spec does not require it.

**Consequences**:

- The cascade walk lives in one place (`MissionService.DeleteMission` + `WaypointService.DeleteWaypoint`).
- It is **not transaction-wrapped today** (see ADR-006) — a one-line fix carried forward.
- If `gps-denied` ever adds rows that need cleanup on mission delete, that's `gps-denied`'s concern (it owns the tables and the lifecycle) — this service does not extend its cascade.

### ADR-004: Schema bootstrap via `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` (no migration tool)

**Context**: Edge deployments are restart-driven (Watchtower picks up new images); each container start runs the migrator. A heavy migration tool (Flyway, EF Core migrations) adds dependencies and complexity.

**Decision**: `DatabaseMigrator.Migrate` runs additive `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` + `CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS` for the 4 owned tables. The B9 ticket adds a one-shot `DROP TABLE IF EXISTS orthophotos; DROP TABLE IF EXISTS gps_corrections;` block for fielded devices that previously ran the legacy schema.

**Alternatives considered**:

1. **EF Core / Flyway** — rejected: adds a build dependency and a state table for what is currently a 4-table schema with no column drops or type changes.
2. **External SQL scripts** — rejected: harder to keep aligned with code-side entity changes; deployment becomes two-step.

**Consequences**:

- Column drops / type changes / constraint changes will require manual SQL or a future migration tool. The B9 `DROP` is the one explicit destructive step in the migrator's history.
- No version table; the migrator is idempotent and runs every startup.
- Acceptable today; will become a real problem if the schema starts evolving frequently.

### ADR-005: Swagger NOT gated on `IsDevelopment()` (scope reduced — dev-fallback secrets obsoleted)

**Context**: ASP.NET Core's idiomatic pattern gates Swagger UI and dev-only convenience features on `app.Environment.IsDevelopment()`. The original form of this ADR also covered hardcoded dev fallbacks for `JWT_SECRET` / `DATABASE_URL`; that aspect is now obsolete after the introduction of `Infrastructure/ConfigurationResolver.cs` (fail-fast `ResolveRequiredOrThrow`). The only remaining gap is Swagger.

**Decision (current, carry-forward)**: Leave Swagger UI mounted unconditionally. Swagger UI is useful on edge devices for one-off operator debugging through the local network. There is no hardcoded dev fallback for any secret today.

**Alternatives considered**:

1. **Gate Swagger on `IsDevelopment()` (or on `ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT != "Production"`)** — preferred long-term; out of this Epic.
2. **Add a Swagger security scheme so the UI knows how to attach `Authorization: Bearer ...`** — usability improvement; out of this Epic.

**Consequences**:

- Swagger UI is exposed on every deployment. The reverse proxy may or may not whitelist it; verify on first production rollout.
- The "production silently boots with the dev secret" risk no longer exists: `JWT_ISSUER`, `JWT_AUDIENCE`, `JWT_JWKS_URL`, and `DATABASE_URL` are all required, and `ResolveRequiredOrThrow` aborts startup with `InvalidOperationException` if any is missing. The CMMC L2 row-3 finding (HS256 + missing `iss`/`aud`) is also structurally addressed by the ECDSA + JWKS + iss/aud-validation model — see Section 7 above.

### ADR-006: Cascade-delete is NOT transaction-wrapped (carry-forward)

**Context**: `MissionService.DeleteMission` and `WaypointService.DeleteWaypoint` issue 4–7 sequential `DELETE` statements across tables. Without a transaction, partial failure leaves orphan rows.

**Decision (current, carry-forward)**: Today the cascade runs autocommit-per-statement. Wrapping in `db.BeginTransactionAsync()` is one extra line and will land as part of the broader testability / refactor pass after the rename Epic.

**Alternatives considered**:

1. **Wrap now in B6** — possible; B6 is a rename, not a behavior change. The transaction wrap is a separate one-line concern that can either ride along (cheap) or land standalone.
2. **Saga / outbox pattern** — overkill for an in-process, one-DB cascade.

**Consequences**:

- Partial cascade failure leaves orphan rows in `media` / `annotations` / `detection` / `map_objects` / `waypoints`. The next mission delete or `autopilot` write may surface the inconsistency as an FK violation.
- **Recommended**: include the transaction wrap when B6 lands; it is a one-line change that materially raises the data-integrity floor.

### ADR-007: GPS-Denied moved out of this repo (B7 + B9)

**Context**: The pre-rename `flights` repo had a `03_gps_denied` component covering orthophoto upload + live-GPS / GPS-correction endpoints. Per `../../suite/_docs/11_gps_denied.md` and the rename plan, GPS-Denied is its own domain (orthorectification of satellite imagery; correction of GPS drift in denied environments) and does not belong inside the mission-planning service.

**Decision**: Delete `Database/Entities/Orthophoto.cs`, `Database/Entities/GpsCorrection.cs`, the corresponding DTOs/controllers/services, the `"GPS"` policy, and the cascade branches that referenced `orthophotos` / `gps_corrections`. Add a one-shot `DROP TABLE IF EXISTS` block to the migrator for fielded devices.

**Alternatives considered**:

1. **Keep GPS-Denied in this repo, behind a feature flag** — rejected: the new `gps-denied` service has different scaling and deployment concerns (heavier disk for orthos, separate update cadence).
2. **Leave the schema, drop only the API** — rejected: leaves dead tables on every device with no ownership; cleanup later would be harder.

**Consequences**:

- 9 entity files → 7 entity files. 6 owned tables → 4 owned tables.
- `MissionService.DeleteMission` cascade chain shrinks (no `orthophotos` / `gps_corrections` branch). One less foot-gun.
- `gps-denied` references `mission_id` / `waypoint_id` as plain GUIDs in its own tables. **No runtime coupling** between the two services — `gps-denied` is responsible for cleaning up its own rows when missions are deleted (its own concern, its own decision).

### ADR-008: One project, one root namespace (no per-component csproj)

**Context**: Some .NET solutions split each component into its own csproj for compile-time enforcement of "no upward dependencies". This service has 6 logical components but one csproj.

**Decision**: Keep one project (`Azaion.Missions.csproj` post-B5), one effective root namespace (`Azaion.Missions.*`). Layering rules in `module-layout.md` § Allowed Dependencies are enforced by **convention** (and by the autodev `code-review` Phase 7), not by the compiler.

**Alternatives considered**:

1. **Per-component csproj** — rejected for this codebase: 6 csprojs in a service this small has more solution-management overhead than it has value. Cross-component types are referenced directly, not through public APIs.
2. **Shared `Common` project + per-component projects** — rejected: same overhead as #1, plus the cross-cutting concerns (`Auth/`, `Middleware/`) are tiny and don't warrant their own DLL.

**Consequences**:

- A typo in an import won't be caught by the compiler — code review + the layering table in `module-layout.md` are the safety net.
- Solution remains easy for one engineer to navigate.
- If the service ever splits in two, the rename to per-project structure would be a separate refactor (not part of this Epic).