Replaces the 501 stub at POST /api/satellite/upload with a multipart
batch endpoint that ingests UAV-captured tiles, runs each item through
a 5-rule quality gate, and persists accepted tiles via the AZ-484
multi-source storage path with source='uav'.
Quality gate (in fixed order, first failure wins): JPEG format
(content-type + magic), size band 5 KiB-5 MiB, exact 256x256
dimensions, captured-at age (no future >30 s skew, no older than
7 days), luminance variance on 32x32 downsample. Closed reject-reason
enumeration in v1.0.0 contract.
Authorization: custom PermissionsRequirement / PermissionsAuthorization
Handler that reads the JWT `permissions` claim (tolerates both
repeated-string and JSON-array shapes). Endpoint protected by
RequiresGpsPermission policy; 401 without token, 403 without GPS perm.
Persistence: file-first to ./tiles/uav/{z}/{x}/{y}.jpg, then
ITileRepository.InsertAsync UPSERT (per-source UPSERT contract from
AZ-484). Per-item failures reported in response without aborting the
batch. Kestrel MaxRequestBodySize and FormOptions limits set to
MaxBatchSize x MaxBytes (default 100 x 5 MiB = 500 MiB).
New frozen contract: _docs/02_document/contracts/api/uav-tile-upload.md
v1.0.0. PT-08 NFR added to performance-tests.md as Deferred (harness
work tracked in PT-07 leftover, per AZ-488 § Risk 4).
Tests: 11 quality-gate unit tests, 5 handler unit tests, 3 file-path
unit tests, 12 permission-handler unit tests, 7 integration tests
(AC-1..AC-6, AC-8). All 253 unit tests + smoke integration suite
green.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Adds Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 8.0.21 and the
SatelliteProvider.Api.Authentication.AddSatelliteJwt extension that
validates HS256 tokens against a shared JWT_SECRET (>=32 bytes, fail
fast at startup). Every minimal-API endpoint now carries
.RequireAuthorization(); the middleware chain is UseExceptionHandler ->
UseHttpsRedirection -> UseCors -> UseAuthentication -> UseAuthorization
-> endpoints. Swagger UI gets a Bearer security definition so the
Authorize button works.
Test infrastructure: JwtTokenFactory (unit) and JwtTestHelpers
(integration) mint deterministic tokens against the same secret; the
integration test runner attaches a default Bearer token to its shared
HttpClient so existing tests continue to exercise protected endpoints.
JwtIntegrationTests adds AC-1..AC-4 and AC-7 (Swagger advertises
Bearer) end-to-end; AuthenticationServiceCollectionExtensionsTests
covers AC-5 (missing/empty/short secret fail-fast) plus env-var
precedence; JwtTokenFactoryTests covers AC-6 (claims pass through
the JwtSecurityTokenHandler.ValidateToken path JwtBearer uses).
docker-compose and scripts/run-tests.sh now propagate JWT_SECRET to
the api and integration-tests containers, with a >=32-byte guard.
.env.example documents the required keys; .env stays gitignored.
Code review verdict: PASS_WITH_WARNINGS (2 Low findings surfaced
in _docs/03_implementation/reviews/batch_01_cycle2_review.md).
Cross-component coordination: gps-denied-onboard and the mission
planner UI must attach Bearer tokens before this lands in dev.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>