satellite-provider/_docs/05_security/owasp_review.md

Phase 3 — OWASP Top 10:2025 Review

Date: 2026-05-11 OWASP version: OWASP Top 10:2025 (verified at audit start) Project context: Self-hosted .NET 8 backend service. Documented as an "internal/trusted network service — no auth layer" (_docs/02_document/architecture.md §7). Deployed via Docker behind another network boundary (per _docs/02_document/deployment/). The audit is scoped to the codebase as it stands; categories whose findings depend on a missing trust-boundary control are flagged accordingly.

#	Category	Status	Findings	Notes
A01	Broken Access Control	N/A (with caveat)	—	The service intentionally exposes ALL endpoints without authentication or authorization — documented design (architecture.md §7). No IDOR analysis applies because there is no user concept. Caveat: this is only safe if the deployment puts the API behind a network-level gatekeeper (VPN, mTLS, internal-only LB). If the deploy ever moves to a public network, this category becomes the #1 risk and EVERY endpoint becomes an unauthenticated execution surface.
A02	Security Misconfiguration	FAIL	S1, S2, I1, I2	Default Postgres credentials in both appsettings.json and docker-compose.yml; Postgres port bound to 0.0.0.0; container runs as root; no security headers middleware.
A03	Software Supply Chain Failures	PASS_WITH_WARNINGS	D1, D2	Two known transitive CVEs (D1 — ASP.NET Core 8.0.21 SignalR DoS, not exploitable here; D2 — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 17.8.0 → NuGet.Frameworks info disclosure, test-only). No use of unsigned NuGet packages; no auto-update of dependencies in production.
A04	Cryptographic Failures	N/A	—	No password storage (no users), no encryption at rest, no in-app crypto. The Google Maps integration uses HTTPS (default Npgsql/HttpClient stacks). At-rest tile storage is plain JPEG by design — these are public satellite images, not confidential data.
A05	Injection	PASS	—	All Dapper queries use parameter objects (new { Id = id } etc.); no string-built or interpolated user input flows into SQL. No Process.Start, no shell exec, no eval. JSON deserialization uses System.Text.Json defaults (no type-name handling). XSS / template injection N/A — JSON-only API.
A06	Insecure Design	FAIL	S3, I3	No rate limiting on any endpoint despite the existence of an outbound rate-limited dependency (Google Maps). Latitude / longitude inputs are not range-validated at the API boundary (S3). No quota / throttling on region-request creation, which can multiply outbound calls and disk writes.
A07	Authentication Failures	N/A (with caveat)	—	Same caveat as A01 — there is no authentication system to fail.
A08	Software or Data Integrity Failures	PASS	—	DbUp migrations are idempotent and tracked in schemaversions; rollback is forward-only by design. No auto-update path. CI artifacts go through .woodpecker/02-build-push.yml with from_secret: registry_token (not in plaintext). No unsigned external scripts executed at build/deploy.
A09	Security Logging and Alerting Failures	PASS_WITH_WARNINGS	I4	Serilog writes structured logs with file rotation; GlobalExceptionHandler correlates server logs to client responses via correlationId (good). However: no security-event logging (e.g., bad-input bursts, repeated 4xx from same source) and no alerting on log patterns. Acceptable for an internal service; would need attention if exposed publicly.
A10	Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions	PASS	—	GlobalExceptionHandler returns RFC 7807 ProblemDetails with a generic body and a correlationId — no exception text leaks to clients. GlobalExceptionHandlerTests.cs includes a positive control that confirms a "leakySecret"-shaped exception message is NOT echoed.

Cross-reference to Phase 1 / Phase 2 findings

OWASP Cat	Tied finding	Severity	Source phase
A02	S1 — default password in appsettings.json	Medium	Phase 2
A02	S2 — weak Postgres creds + 0.0.0.0 binding in compose	Medium	Phase 2
A02	I1 — Dockerfile runs as root	Low	Phase 4 (next)
A02	I2 — no security headers middleware	Low	Phase 4 (next)
A03	D1 — CVE-2026-26130 in ASP.NET Core 8.0.21 (SignalR; not reachable)	Medium (paper) / Low (real)	Phase 1
A03	D2 — CVE-2022-30184 transitive via test SDK	Low (test-only)	Phase 1
A06	S3 — lat/lon not range-validated at API boundary	Low	Phase 2
A06	I3 — no rate limiting on any endpoint	Medium	Phase 4 (next)
A06	S4 — Google Maps API key handling (no .env.example, no rotation hygiene)	Medium	Phase 2
A09	I4 — no security-event logs, no alerting	Low	Phase 4 (next)

Self-verification

• All current OWASP Top 10:2025 categories assessed
• Each FAIL has at least one specific finding with evidence
• N/A categories have justification + caveat
• No security_approach.md exists in _docs/00_problem/ to cross-reference (project has not declared explicit security requirements; this audit treats the architecture-vision statement "internal/trusted network service" as the de-facto requirement)

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Cycle 2 Refresh (AZ-487 + AZ-488)

Cycle 1's A01 / A07 verdicts were N/A (with caveat) because the service shipped without authentication. AZ-487 (JWT validation baseline) and AZ-488 (UAV upload permission policy) materially change those verdicts. The table below supersedes the cycle-1 row for A01 and A07; all other rows remain as cycle 1 left them, with cycle-2 findings appended where applicable.

#	Category	Cycle 1 Status	Cycle 2 Status	Cycle-2 evidence
A01	Broken Access Control	N/A (with caveat)	PASS_WITH_WARNINGS	Every endpoint requires RequireAuthorization() (AZ-487); POST /api/satellite/upload requires the GPS permission via PermissionsRequirement (AZ-488). No IDOR analysis is needed because the service has no per-user data partitioning — every authenticated principal can read every tile. Warning: per-tenant authorization (e.g. "this UAV may only upload over its assigned region") is not enforced. If a future contract demands it, A01 immediately re-opens.
A02	Security Misconfiguration	FAIL (S1, S2, I1, I2)	FAIL (unchanged + F-AUTH-1)	Cycle-2 ships a clearly-labelled DEV-ONLY JWT secret in appsettings.Development.json. Production override path is correct (env-var wins); deploy gate must check JWT_SECRET. No new cycle-1 findings resolved.
A03	Supply Chain Failures	PASS_WITH_WARNINGS (D1, D2)	PASS_WITH_WARNINGS (+ D3, F-DEPS-UAV)	New JwtBearer 8.0.21 package shares the D1 patch line; new ImageSharp call site widens decoder exposure (mitigations sufficient — see static_analysis.md F-UAV-1).
A04	Cryptographic Failures	N/A	PASS	HS256 token validation uses Microsoft.IdentityModel's SymmetricSecurityKey with RequireSignedTokens = true and RequireExpirationTime = true. The alg=none bypass is blocked by RequireSignedTokens; algorithm-confusion is bounded because only one signing key is registered. Secret length ≥ 32 bytes enforced at startup.
A05	Injection	PASS	PASS	No new SQL / shell / template surfaces. The new JSON parse (PermissionsAuthorizationHandler) runs on signature-validated token bytes — see F-UAV-2 disposition.
A06	Insecure Design	FAIL (S3, S4, I3)	FAIL (+ F-AUTH-3, F-UAV-3)	Rate limiting still absent (now also a 401-flood vector). UAV reject reasons disclose gate structure — accepted UX trade-off, flagged for operator awareness.
A07	Identification & Authentication Failures	N/A (with caveat)	PASS_WITH_WARNINGS → PASS_WITH_WARNINGS (cycle 3: F-AUTH-2 resolved by AZ-494)	HS256 with secret ≥ 32 bytes; lifetime + signature validation; ClockSkew = 30 s. Cycle 3 (AZ-494): ValidateIssuer / ValidateAudience now true; values sourced from JWT_ISSUER / JWT_AUDIENCE env vars with fail-fast contract. Production iss/aud values are admin-team-confirmed at deploy time. Remaining warning: no token revocation list — leaked tokens stay valid until exp.
A08	Software or Data Integrity Failures	PASS	PASS	AZ-488 file-first-then-row write order documented; same migration / CI discipline as cycle 1.
A09	Security Logging Failures	PASS_WITH_WARNINGS (I4)	PASS_WITH_WARNINGS (unchanged)	No new logging changes; 401 responses are not currently aggregated for alerting (out of scope for internal service).
A10	Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions	PASS	PASS	UAV decode failures wrapped in scoped try/catch for UnknownImageFormatException / InvalidImageContentException — produce structured INVALID_FORMAT rejects, no stack-trace leak. SEC-11 test verifies reject details have no path / exception-type leakage.

Cycle-2 cross-reference

OWASP Cat	Cycle-2 finding	Severity	Source phase
A01	A01 status now PASS_WITH_WARNINGS (per-tenant authz absent)	— (status note)	Phase 3
A02	F-AUTH-1 — DEV-ONLY secret in appsettings.Development.json	Low (accepted)	Phase 2
A03	D3 — JwtBearer 8.0.21 shares D1 patch line	Low	Phase 1
A03	F-DEPS-UAV — ImageSharp decode exposure widened	Medium	Phase 1
A06	F-AUTH-3 — rate-limit gap now also covers 401 floods	Low (recurrence of I3)	Phase 2
A06	F-UAV-3 — reject reasons disclose gate structure	Informational (accepted)	Phase 2
A07	F-AUTH-2 — iss/aud not validated	Medium → Resolved cycle 3 (AZ-494)	n/a
A07	No token revocation list (residual after AZ-494)	Low	Phase 2 — out of scope until requirement emerges
(claim handler)	F-UAV-2 — JsonDocument.Parse on token claim values	Low	Phase 2