Files
ui/src/api/client.test.ts
T
Oleksandr Bezdieniezhnykh ab22223580 [AZ-457] [AZ-459] [AZ-465] [AZ-481] Batch 2 - auth/enum/i18n/CI tests
Implements 22 blackbox test scenarios across the four batch-2 tasks:

AZ-457 - Auth & token handling (11 scenarios, fast + e2e):
- src/api/client.test.ts: FT-P-02, NFT-SEC-04, NFT-PERF-02, NFT-RES-01,
  NFT-RES-08 (apiClient surface)
- src/auth/AuthContext.test.tsx: FT-P-01 (it.fails - Step 4 drift),
  FT-P-03, NFT-SEC-01, NFT-SEC-02
- src/auth/ProtectedRoute.test.tsx: FT-N-04, NFT-RES-08 (router half)
- e2e/tests/auth.e2e.ts: FT-P-02 e2e, NFT-SEC-01/02/03 (cookie attrs
  via Playwright context.cookies(), gated by suite stack)

AZ-459 - Wire-contract enums (4 scenarios):
- tests/wire_contract.test.ts: FT-P-04 (AnnotationStatus, it.fails),
  FT-P-05 (MediaStatus + Affiliation it.fails; CombatReadiness skip
  per verification_pending), FT-P-06 (AnnotationSource control +
  spec value-set membership), FT-N-15 (typed-enum shape + skip for
  value-set verification)
- e2e/tests/wire_contract.e2e.ts: FT-P-06 against real annotations/
  service, drift-gated via AZAION_RUN_DRIFT_E2E
- scripts/run-tests.sh STC-FN15: ripgrep static for MediaType
  magic-literal hygiene

AZ-465 - i18n (4 scenarios, all static + quarantined fast):
- scripts/check-i18n-coverage.mjs: FT-P-22 (en vs ua key parity) +
  FT-P-23 (no raw user strings outside t() in src/**/*.tsx); refined
  JSX text-node regex with negative lookbehind to drop TS generics
  + arrow-function false positives
- tests/i18n-allowlist.json: snapshot of current pre-existing raw
  strings (CI gates growth per AZ-465 Constraints)
- tests/i18n.test.tsx: FT-P-24 + FT-P-25 it.skip (QUARANTINE - i18n
  detector + persistence not wired today; control tests assert the
  gap so the skip flips to a real test once Step 4 lands)

AZ-481 - CI image labels (3 scenarios, static against
  .woodpecker/build-arm.yml):
- scripts/check-ci-image-labels.mjs: NFT-RES-LIM-11 (tag scheme
  ${CI_COMMIT_BRANCH}-arm), NFT-RES-LIM-12 (revision/created/source
  PASS, image.title reported as DRIFT - foundation/CI-CD owns the
  fix), NFT-RES-LIM-13 (revision = $CI_COMMIT_SHA)

Cross-cutting:
- scripts/run-tests.sh: src_grep now excludes *.test.{ts,tsx} +
  *.spec.{ts,tsx} so production-source static checks (STC-SEC4,
  STC-FN15, etc.) don't false-positive on test prose
- tsconfig.json: exclude src/**/*.{test,spec}.{ts,tsx} so production
  tsc -b doesn't see jest-dom matchers
- _docs/03_implementation/batch_02_report.md: full per-task AC
  coverage matrix + drift inventory + verification run
- _docs/_autodev_state.md: 22 tasks remain after batch 2

Verification (host):
  fast    : 7 files, 38 passed | 4 skipped (quarantined)
  static  : 19/19 checks PASS (was 13 in batch 1; +6 from batch 2)
  e2e     : not run on host (Risk 4 - requires suite docker stack)

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-05-11 03:27:55 +03:00

277 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript

import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
import { http, HttpResponse } from 'msw'
import { server } from '../../tests/msw/server'
import { api, getToken, setToken } from './client'
import { seedBearer, clearBearer } from '../../tests/helpers/auth'
import { seedNavigateToLogin } from '../../tests/helpers/navigate'
// AZ-457 — Auth & token-handling at the apiClient surface.
// FT-P-02 / rows 03, 12 — 401 → refresh → retry sequence (fast profile)
// NFT-SEC-04 / row 06 — credentials:'include' on the cookie-bound refresh
// NFT-PERF-02 / row 12 — exactly one /auth/refresh per refresh cycle
// NFT-RES-01 / rows 03, 11 — apiClient half of transparent recovery
// (render stability lives in AuthContext.test.tsx)
// NFT-RES-08 — expired refresh cookie → setNavigateToLogin spy fires
//
// FT-P-01 (bootstrap refresh credentials:'include') exercises the React
// composition root (<AuthContext>'s mount-time fetch) and lives in
// src/auth/AuthContext.test.tsx — the bootstrap path goes through api.get()
// today, which does NOT thread credentials. Row 02 is `quarantined` until
// the Step 4 bootstrap fix lands; the inverted assertion lives next to its
// system-under-test.
//
// Black-box discipline (per AZ-457 AC-2): we only import the three public
// accessors `setToken / getToken / setNavigateToLogin` plus the `api` wrapper
// itself. We do NOT reach into request() / refreshToken() / handleResponse().
// Outbound requests are observed via MSW `server.use(...)` interception.
describe('AZ-457 / src/api/client.ts — auth & token handling', () => {
afterEach(() => {
clearBearer()
})
describe('FT-P-02 (rows 03, 12) — 401 → refresh → retry sequence', () => {
it('refreshes once, retries the original request, returns 200', async () => {
// Arrange
seedBearer('expiring-bearer')
let getHits = 0
let refreshHits = 0
const observedAuthHeaders: Array<string | null> = []
server.use(
http.get('/api/admin/users/me', ({ request }) => {
getHits += 1
observedAuthHeaders.push(request.headers.get('Authorization'))
if (getHits === 1) {
return new HttpResponse(null, { status: 401 })
}
return HttpResponse.json({ id: 'user-alice', email: 'op_alice@test.local' })
}),
http.post('/api/admin/auth/refresh', () => {
refreshHits += 1
return HttpResponse.json({ token: 'rotated-bearer' })
}),
)
// Act
const me = await api.get<{ id: string; email: string }>('/api/admin/users/me')
// Assert — sequence per row 03 + count per row 12.
expect(refreshHits).toBe(1)
expect(getHits).toBe(2) // first 401, then retry
expect(observedAuthHeaders[0]).toBe('Bearer expiring-bearer')
expect(observedAuthHeaders[1]).toBe('Bearer rotated-bearer')
expect(me.id).toBe('user-alice')
expect(getToken()).toBe('rotated-bearer')
})
it('does NOT refresh when there is no bearer (no in-flight session)', async () => {
// Arrange — no seedBearer call → getToken() === null.
let refreshHits = 0
server.use(
http.get('/api/admin/users/me', () => new HttpResponse(null, { status: 401 })),
http.post('/api/admin/auth/refresh', () => {
refreshHits += 1
return HttpResponse.json({ token: 'should-not-be-issued' })
}),
)
// Act + Assert — request() short-circuits the refresh branch when
// accessToken is null (refreshing without a session would be a security
// anti-pattern).
await expect(api.get('/api/admin/users/me')).rejects.toThrow(/^401:/)
expect(refreshHits).toBe(0)
})
})
describe('NFT-SEC-04 (row 06) — credentials:\'include\' on the cookie-bound refresh', () => {
it('the 401-recovery POST /auth/refresh carries credentials:\'include\'', async () => {
// Arrange
seedBearer('expiring-bearer')
let refreshCredentials: RequestCredentials | null = null
let refreshMethod: string | null = null
server.use(
http.get('/api/admin/users/me', () => new HttpResponse(null, { status: 401 })),
http.post('/api/admin/auth/refresh', ({ request }) => {
refreshCredentials = request.credentials
refreshMethod = request.method
return new HttpResponse(null, { status: 401 })
}),
)
const navSpy = seedNavigateToLogin()
// Act
await expect(api.get('/api/admin/users/me')).rejects.toThrow('Session expired')
// Assert
expect(refreshMethod).toBe('POST')
expect(refreshCredentials).toBe('include')
expect(navSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
})
// The broader "every authed fetch" claim is `quarantined` per row 02 in
// results_report.md. Today the apiClient does NOT thread credentials onto
// non-refresh requests; only the cookie-bound refreshToken() helper does.
// The inverted assertion below documents the divergence so a future fix
// is a deliberate decision (the test starts failing the day every authed
// fetch carries credentials:'include' — at which point the it.fails
// wrapper is removed in the same commit as the production fix).
it.fails('every authed apiClient fetch carries credentials:\'include\' (quarantined — Step 4 bootstrap fix pending)', async () => {
// Arrange
seedBearer('test-bearer-default')
const credentialsByUrl: Record<string, RequestCredentials> = {}
server.use(
http.all('/api/admin/*', ({ request }) => {
credentialsByUrl[request.url] = request.credentials
return new HttpResponse(null, { status: 204 })
}),
)
// Act
await api.get('/api/admin/users/me')
// Assert — intentionally fails today; row 02 quarantined.
expect(Object.values(credentialsByUrl).every((c) => c === 'include')).toBe(true)
})
})
describe('NFT-PERF-02 (row 12) — exactly one refresh round trip per cycle', () => {
it('a single 401-retry cycle issues exactly one /auth/refresh', async () => {
// Arrange
seedBearer('expiring-bearer')
let refreshHits = 0
const status401Once = vi.fn<() => Response>(() => new HttpResponse(null, { status: 401 }) as Response)
let firstGet = true
server.use(
http.get('/api/admin/users/me', () => {
if (firstGet) {
firstGet = false
return status401Once()
}
return HttpResponse.json({ id: 'user-alice', email: 'op_alice@test.local' })
}),
http.post('/api/admin/auth/refresh', () => {
refreshHits += 1
return HttpResponse.json({ token: 'one-time-rotation' })
}),
)
// Act
await api.get('/api/admin/users/me')
// Assert
expect(refreshHits).toBe(1)
expect(status401Once).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
})
it('two parallel authed requests, both 401 → still one refresh per call (no global de-dupe expected)', async () => {
// Arrange — Today's client.ts does NOT coalesce parallel refreshes. Each
// 401 in-flight produces its own refresh round trip. This test pins the
// current behavior so a future "race-coalescing" change is a deliberate
// decision (one-cycle == one-refresh per row 12; cycles are per call).
seedBearer('expiring-bearer')
const tokens = ['rot1', 'rot2']
let refreshHits = 0
const seenAuthHeaders: string[] = []
server.use(
http.get('/api/admin/users/me', ({ request }) => {
const h = request.headers.get('Authorization')
seenAuthHeaders.push(h ?? '<none>')
if (h === 'Bearer expiring-bearer') return new HttpResponse(null, { status: 401 })
return HttpResponse.json({ id: 'user-alice', email: 'op_alice@test.local' })
}),
http.get('/api/admin/users', ({ request }) => {
const h = request.headers.get('Authorization')
seenAuthHeaders.push(h ?? '<none>')
if (h === 'Bearer expiring-bearer') return new HttpResponse(null, { status: 401 })
return HttpResponse.json({ items: [], totalCount: 0, page: 1, pageSize: 10 })
}),
http.post('/api/admin/auth/refresh', () => {
const t = tokens[refreshHits] ?? 'rot-fallback'
refreshHits += 1
return HttpResponse.json({ token: t })
}),
)
// Act
await Promise.all([api.get('/api/admin/users/me'), api.get('/api/admin/users')])
// Assert — two independent cycles → two refreshes (no coalescing).
expect(refreshHits).toBe(2)
// Both retries reissued with a non-stale bearer.
expect(seenAuthHeaders.filter((h) => h === 'Bearer expiring-bearer')).toHaveLength(2)
})
})
describe('NFT-RES-01 (rows 03, 11) — apiClient half of transparent recovery', () => {
it('callers observe a 200 response with no error surface after refresh+retry', async () => {
// Arrange — render-stability half lives in AuthContext.test.tsx; this is
// strictly the apiClient observable: from the caller's perspective, the
// 401 was invisible.
seedBearer('expiring-bearer')
let firstHit = true
server.use(
http.get('/api/admin/users/me', () => {
if (firstHit) {
firstHit = false
return new HttpResponse(null, { status: 401 })
}
return HttpResponse.json({ id: 'user-alice', email: 'op_alice@test.local' })
}),
http.post('/api/admin/auth/refresh', () =>
HttpResponse.json({ token: 'transparent-recovery' }),
),
)
// Act
const result = await api.get<{ id: string }>('/api/admin/users/me')
// Assert — caller saw success, never an exception.
expect(result.id).toBe('user-alice')
// Side-effect: bearer was silently rotated (rows 03, 11).
expect(getToken()).toBe('transparent-recovery')
})
})
describe('NFT-RES-08 — expired refresh cookie → setNavigateToLogin spy fires', () => {
it('clears bearer and invokes navigateToLogin spy when refresh returns 401', async () => {
// Arrange
seedBearer('expired-bearer')
const navSpy = seedNavigateToLogin()
server.use(
http.get('/api/admin/users/me', () => new HttpResponse(null, { status: 401 })),
http.post('/api/admin/auth/refresh', () => new HttpResponse(null, { status: 401 })),
)
// Act + Assert
await expect(api.get('/api/admin/users/me')).rejects.toThrow('Session expired')
expect(navSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
expect(navSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith() // AC-4 — no args
expect(getToken()).toBeNull() // bearer cleared
})
it('does not navigate or clear bearer when 401 occurs without a session', async () => {
// Arrange — refresh-bridge invariant: navigate only after a refresh
// attempt failed (not on every 401).
const navSpy = seedNavigateToLogin()
server.use(
http.get('/api/admin/users/me', () => new HttpResponse(null, { status: 401 })),
)
// Act + Assert
await expect(api.get('/api/admin/users/me')).rejects.toThrow(/^401:/)
expect(navSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
expect(getToken()).toBeNull()
})
})
})
// FT-P-01 (row 02) bootstrap-credentials assertion lives in
// src/auth/AuthContext.test.tsx because it observes <AuthProvider>'s
// mount-time fetch. Splitting it out keeps the system-under-test obvious.
// Compile-time guard — the test never imports a private symbol from client.ts.
type _PublicSurface = typeof setToken extends (t: string | null) => void ? true : never
const _checkPublicSurface: _PublicSurface = true
void _checkPublicSurface