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Oleksandr Bezdieniezhnykh 03f879206e docs+src: complete Steps 1-3 outcomes + auth re-sync baseline

This commit captures everything produced during autodev existing-code
Steps 1 (Document), 2 (Architecture Baseline Scan), and 3 (Test Spec),
together with the targeted auth + CORS re-sync triggered on 2026-05-14
when codebase drift was detected at Step 4 entry. None of this work was
previously committed.

Step 1 (Document) — 50+ _docs/02_document/ files: problem, solution,
architecture, system flows, glossary, module-layout, per-component
specs (01..06), modules, deployment, diagrams, data model, FINAL
report, verification log, discovery.

Step 2 (Architecture Baseline) — architecture_compliance_baseline.md.
Verdict PASS_WITH_WARNINGS (0 Critical, 0 High, 1 Medium, 2 Low). No
High/Critical findings; auto-chained to Step 3 per existing-code flow.

Step 3 (Test Spec) — _docs/02_document/tests/* (67 scenarios across
blackbox, security, resilience, resource-limit, performance), plus
e2e/docker-compose.test.yml, e2e/seed/run.sh, scripts/run-tests.sh,
scripts/run-performance-tests.sh. Coverage 88% over the active scope
(40 of 45 items covered, 6 RB-deferred, 5 documented-as-uncovered).

Targeted auth + CORS re-sync — replaces the deleted in-house token
issuer with a JWKS-verifier model. AuthController and TokenService
removed; JwtExtensions switched from HS256 symmetric to ES256 over
admin's JWKS. ConfigurationResolver and CorsConfigurationValidator
added under src/Infrastructure/. ADR-002 and ADR-006 retired; SEC-01,
SEC-02, SEC-03 marked Closed. One new testability risk recorded in
architecture.md Open Risks Section 6 (JWKS HTTPS gating).

Source changes:
- src/Auth/JwtExtensions.cs (modified) — ES256, JWKS, alg pinning
- src/Program.cs (modified) — DI wiring for ConfigurationResolver
  and CorsConfigurationValidator
- src/Controllers/AuthController.cs (deleted) — no in-service issuance
- src/Services/TokenService.cs (deleted) — same
- src/Infrastructure/ConfigurationResolver.cs (new)
- src/Infrastructure/CorsConfigurationValidator.cs (new)
- .env.example (new) — required env var documentation
- .gitignore (updated)

Cross-repo coordination: _docs/cross-repo/flights_h1_h2_h3_change_spec
captures the change-spec for downstream services that consumed the now
deleted /auth endpoints.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

2026-05-14 20:19:05 +03:00

2.4 KiB

Raw Blame History

Module: Auth & identity

Purpose

JWT validation for API policies. Tokens are minted exclusively by the admin service (ES256-signed); annotations is a verifier only.

Components

`JwtExtensions` (`Auth/JwtExtensions.cs`)

AddJwtAuth(IConfiguration) — pulls JWT_ISSUER, JWT_AUDIENCE, JWT_JWKS_URL via ConfigurationResolver.ResolveRequiredOrThrow (fail-fast at startup if any is missing).
TokenValidationParameters mirrors admin's verifier contract:
- ValidateIssuer = true / ValidateAudience = true / ValidateLifetime = true.
- ValidAlgorithms = [SecurityAlgorithms.EcdsaSha256] — pinned so an HS256-forgery using the public key as the HMAC secret cannot pass.
- RequireSignedTokens = true, RequireExpirationTime = true.
- ClockSkew = 30s.
Signing keys are fetched from admin's /.well-known/jwks.json via a ConfigurationManager<JsonWebKeySet> backed by a minimal IConfigurationRetriever<JsonWebKeySet> (admin exposes JWKS but not the full OIDC discovery document). The manager honours admin's Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600 and refreshes on the default schedule. During key rotation both kids are present in JWKS so in-flight tokens still verify.
Policies: ANN, DATASET, ADM — each requires claim permissions with that code (matches suite "Required permission: ANN" and Dataset Explorer DATASET).

Dependencies

Configuration (all required, no defaults):

JWT_ISSUER (alt Jwt:Issuer) — must match admin's JwtConfig:Issuer.
JWT_AUDIENCE (alt Jwt:Audience) — must match admin's JwtConfig:Audience.
JWT_JWKS_URL (alt Jwt:JwksUrl) — https://admin.azaion.com/.well-known/jwks.json in production.

Consumers

All [Authorize] controllers.

Removed in this cycle

Services/TokenService.cs (HS256 minting of access tokens from refresh tokens) — deleted; refresh is now the admin service's responsibility (POST /token/refresh).
Controllers/AuthController.cs and the POST /auth/refresh endpoint — deleted along with TokenService. Detections (and any other client) must call admin's refresh endpoint and pass the returned access token to annotations.
JWT_SECRET env var — no longer read.

Suite doc

01_annotations.md §Annotation Sync (verifier role); suite 10_auth.md for full auth story (admin = issuer, satellite-provider / annotations / flights / ui = verifiers).

2.4 KiB Raw Blame History