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annotations/_docs/02_document/modules/auth-identity.md
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Oleksandr Bezdieniezhnykh 03f879206e docs+src: complete Steps 1-3 outcomes + auth re-sync baseline
This commit captures everything produced during autodev existing-code
Steps 1 (Document), 2 (Architecture Baseline Scan), and 3 (Test Spec),
together with the targeted auth + CORS re-sync triggered on 2026-05-14
when codebase drift was detected at Step 4 entry. None of this work was
previously committed.

Step 1 (Document) — 50+ _docs/02_document/ files: problem, solution,
architecture, system flows, glossary, module-layout, per-component
specs (01..06), modules, deployment, diagrams, data model, FINAL
report, verification log, discovery.

Step 2 (Architecture Baseline) — architecture_compliance_baseline.md.
Verdict PASS_WITH_WARNINGS (0 Critical, 0 High, 1 Medium, 2 Low). No
High/Critical findings; auto-chained to Step 3 per existing-code flow.

Step 3 (Test Spec) — _docs/02_document/tests/* (67 scenarios across
blackbox, security, resilience, resource-limit, performance), plus
e2e/docker-compose.test.yml, e2e/seed/run.sh, scripts/run-tests.sh,
scripts/run-performance-tests.sh. Coverage 88% over the active scope
(40 of 45 items covered, 6 RB-deferred, 5 documented-as-uncovered).

Targeted auth + CORS re-sync — replaces the deleted in-house token
issuer with a JWKS-verifier model. AuthController and TokenService
removed; JwtExtensions switched from HS256 symmetric to ES256 over
admin's JWKS. ConfigurationResolver and CorsConfigurationValidator
added under src/Infrastructure/. ADR-002 and ADR-006 retired; SEC-01,
SEC-02, SEC-03 marked Closed. One new testability risk recorded in
architecture.md Open Risks Section 6 (JWKS HTTPS gating).

Source changes:
- src/Auth/JwtExtensions.cs (modified) — ES256, JWKS, alg pinning
- src/Program.cs (modified) — DI wiring for ConfigurationResolver
  and CorsConfigurationValidator
- src/Controllers/AuthController.cs (deleted) — no in-service issuance
- src/Services/TokenService.cs (deleted) — same
- src/Infrastructure/ConfigurationResolver.cs (new)
- src/Infrastructure/CorsConfigurationValidator.cs (new)
- .env.example (new) — required env var documentation
- .gitignore (updated)

Cross-repo coordination: _docs/cross-repo/flights_h1_h2_h3_change_spec
captures the change-spec for downstream services that consumed the now
deleted /auth endpoints.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-05-14 20:19:05 +03:00

41 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown

# Module: Auth & identity
## Purpose
JWT validation for API policies. Tokens are minted exclusively by the admin service (ES256-signed); annotations is a **verifier only**.
## Components
### `JwtExtensions` (`Auth/JwtExtensions.cs`)
- `AddJwtAuth(IConfiguration)` — pulls `JWT_ISSUER`, `JWT_AUDIENCE`, `JWT_JWKS_URL` via `ConfigurationResolver.ResolveRequiredOrThrow` (fail-fast at startup if any is missing).
- `TokenValidationParameters` mirrors admin's verifier contract:
- `ValidateIssuer = true` / `ValidateAudience = true` / `ValidateLifetime = true`.
- `ValidAlgorithms = [SecurityAlgorithms.EcdsaSha256]` — pinned so an HS256-forgery using the public key as the HMAC secret cannot pass.
- `RequireSignedTokens = true`, `RequireExpirationTime = true`.
- `ClockSkew = 30s`.
- Signing keys are fetched from admin's `/.well-known/jwks.json` via a `ConfigurationManager<JsonWebKeySet>` backed by a minimal `IConfigurationRetriever<JsonWebKeySet>` (admin exposes JWKS but not the full OIDC discovery document). The manager honours admin's `Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600` and refreshes on the default schedule. During key rotation both `kid`s are present in JWKS so in-flight tokens still verify.
- Policies: `ANN`, `DATASET`, `ADM` — each requires claim `permissions` with that code (matches suite "Required permission: ANN" and Dataset Explorer `DATASET`).
## Dependencies
Configuration (all required, no defaults):
- `JWT_ISSUER` (alt `Jwt:Issuer`) — must match admin's `JwtConfig:Issuer`.
- `JWT_AUDIENCE` (alt `Jwt:Audience`) — must match admin's `JwtConfig:Audience`.
- `JWT_JWKS_URL` (alt `Jwt:JwksUrl`) — `https://admin.azaion.com/.well-known/jwks.json` in production.
## Consumers
All `[Authorize]` controllers.
## Removed in this cycle
- `Services/TokenService.cs` (HS256 minting of access tokens from refresh tokens) — deleted; refresh is now the admin service's responsibility (`POST /token/refresh`).
- `Controllers/AuthController.cs` and the `POST /auth/refresh` endpoint — deleted along with `TokenService`. Detections (and any other client) must call admin's refresh endpoint and pass the returned access token to annotations.
- `JWT_SECRET` env var — no longer read.
## Suite doc
`01_annotations.md` §Annotation Sync (verifier role); suite `10_auth.md` for full auth story (admin = issuer, satellite-provider / annotations / flights / ui = verifiers).