mirror of
https://github.com/azaion/detections.git
synced 2026-04-22 23:26:31 +00:00
Oleksandr Bezdieniezhnykh
097811a67b
- Pin all deps; h11==0.16.0 (CVE-2025-43859), python-multipart>=1.3.1 (CVE-2026-28356), PyJWT==2.12.1
- Add HMAC JWT verification (require_auth FastAPI dependency, JWT_SECRET-gated)
- Fix TokenManager._refresh() to use ADMIN_API_URL instead of ANNOTATIONS_URL
- Rename POST /detect → POST /detect/image (image-only, rejects video files)
- Replace global SSE stream with per-job SSE: GET /detect/{media_id} with event replay buffer
- Apply require_auth to all 4 protected endpoints
- Fix on_annotation/on_status closure to use mutable current_id for correct post-upload event routing
- Add non-root appuser to Dockerfile and Dockerfile.gpu
- Add JWT_SECRET to e2e/docker-compose.test.yml and run-tests.sh
- Update all e2e tests and unit tests for new endpoints and HMAC token signing
- 64/64 tests pass
Made-with: Cursor
141 lines
7.7 KiB
Markdown
141 lines
7.7 KiB
Markdown
# Security Audit Report
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**Date**: 2026-03-31
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**Scope**: Azaion.Detections (full codebase)
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**Verdict**: FAIL → **REMEDIATED** (Critical/High resolved 2026-04-01)
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## Summary
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| Severity | Count | Resolved |
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|----------|-------|---------|
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| Critical | 1 | 1 ✓ |
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| High | 3 | 3 ✓ |
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| Medium | 5 | 2 ✓ |
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| Low | 5 | — |
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## OWASP Top 10 Assessment
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| Category | Status | Findings |
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|----------|--------|----------|
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| A01 Broken Access Control | FAIL | 3 |
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| A02 Security Misconfiguration | FAIL | 2 |
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| A03 Software Supply Chain Failures | FAIL | 2 |
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| A04 Cryptographic Failures | FAIL | 1 |
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| A05 Injection | PASS | — |
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| A06 Insecure Design | FAIL | 2 |
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| A07 Authentication Failures | FAIL | 1 |
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| A08 Software or Data Integrity Failures | PASS | — |
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| A09 Logging & Alerting Failures | FAIL | 1 |
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| A10 Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions | FAIL | 1 |
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## Findings
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| # | Severity | Category | Location | Title | Status |
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|---|----------|----------|----------|-------|--------|
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| 1 | Critical | A03 Supply Chain | requirements.txt (uvicorn→h11) | HTTP request smuggling via h11 CVE-2025-43859 | **FIXED** — pinned h11==0.16.0 |
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| 2 | High | A04 Crypto | src/main.py | JWT decoded without signature verification | **FIXED** — PyJWT HMAC verification |
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| 3 | High | A01 Access Control | src/main.py (all routes) | No authentication required on any endpoint | **FIXED** — require_auth dependency on all protected endpoints |
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| 4 | High | A03 Supply Chain | requirements.txt (python-multipart) | ReDoS via python-multipart CVE-2026-28356 | **FIXED** — pinned python-multipart>=1.3.1 |
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| 5 | Medium | A01 Access Control | src/main.py | SSE stream broadcasts cross-user data | **FIXED** — per-job SSE (GET /detect/{media_id}), each client sees only their job |
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| 6 | Medium | A06 Insecure Design | src/main.py | No rate limiting on inference endpoints | Open — out of scope for this cycle |
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| 7 | Medium | A02 Misconfig | Dockerfile, Dockerfile.gpu | Containers run as root | **FIXED** — non-root appuser added |
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| 8 | Medium | A03 Supply Chain | requirements.txt | Unpinned critical dependencies | **FIXED** — all deps pinned |
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| 9 | Medium | A02 Misconfig | Dockerfile, Dockerfile.gpu | No TLS and no security headers | Open — handled at infra/proxy level |
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| 10 | Low | A06 Insecure Design | src/main.py | No request body size limit | Open |
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| 11 | Low | A10 Exceptions | src/main.py | Silent exception swallowing | Open |
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| 12 | Low | A09 Logging | src/main.py | Security events not logged | Open |
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| 13 | Low | A01 Access Control | src/main.py | Exception details leaked in responses | Open |
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| 14 | Low | A07 Auth | src/main.py | Token refresh failure silently ignored | Open (by design for offline mode) |
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### Finding Details
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**F1: HTTP Request Smuggling via h11** (Critical / A03)
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- Location: `requirements.txt` — unpinned `uvicorn[standard]` pulls `h11-0.14.0`
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- Description: CVE-2025-43859 (CVSS 9.1). Lenient parsing of chunked-coding line terminators enables HTTP request smuggling.
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- Impact: Bypass security controls, cache poisoning, session hijacking, data leakage
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- Remediation: Pin `h11>=0.15.0` in requirements.txt
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**F2: JWT Decoded Without Signature Verification** (High / A04)
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- Location: `src/main.py:67-99` (`TokenManager._decode_exp`, `decode_user_id`)
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- Description: JWT payloads are base64-decoded without cryptographic signature verification. Any client can forge tokens with arbitrary claims.
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- Impact: Full user impersonation — attacker crafts JWT with target's user ID to access their AI settings, post annotations under their account
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- Remediation: Use PyJWT with signature verification against the issuer's public key
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**F3: No Authentication on Endpoints** (High / A01)
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- Location: `src/main.py` — all route handlers
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- Description: All endpoints are publicly accessible. Bearer tokens are optional.
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- Impact: Unauthorized inference triggering, resource exhaustion, unauthorized access to SSE event stream
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- Remediation: Add FastAPI dependency injection for auth middleware on `/detect`, `/detect/{media_id}`, `/detect/stream`
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**F4: python-multipart ReDoS** (High / A03)
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- Location: `requirements.txt` — unpinned `python-multipart`
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- Description: CVE-2026-28356 (CVSS 7.5). `parse_options_header()` regex causes exponential backtracking on malicious headers.
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- Impact: Denial of service
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- Remediation: Pin `python-multipart>=1.3.1`
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**F5: SSE Stream Cross-User Data Leak** (Medium / A01)
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- Location: `src/main.py:608-627`
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- Description: All detection events broadcast to all connected SSE clients without filtering.
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- Impact: Any client sees all users' detection results (media IDs, coordinates, status)
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- Remediation: Associate SSE queues with authenticated users; filter events by ownership
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**F6: No Rate Limiting** (Medium / A06)
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- Location: `src/main.py:348-469`, `src/main.py:494-605`
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- Description: No rate limiting on compute-intensive inference endpoints.
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- Impact: DoS via inference exhaustion (2 worker threads)
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- Remediation: Add slowapi or similar rate limiting middleware
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**F7: Docker Containers Run as Root** (Medium / A02)
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- Location: `Dockerfile:10`, `Dockerfile.gpu:10`
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- Description: No USER directive; processes run as root inside containers.
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- Impact: Container escape or compromise gives root filesystem access
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- Remediation: Add non-root user (`adduser --disabled-password appuser && USER appuser`)
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**F8: Unpinned Critical Dependencies** (Medium / A03)
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- Location: `requirements.txt`
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- Description: `fastapi`, `uvicorn[standard]`, `python-multipart` are unpinned.
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- Impact: Supply chain attack via compromised PyPI package; inconsistent builds across environments
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- Remediation: Pin all dependencies to specific versions
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**F9: No TLS / No Security Headers** (Medium / A02)
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- Location: `Dockerfile` CMD, `src/main.py` (app setup)
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- Description: Uvicorn runs without TLS. No security headers middleware.
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- Impact: Data in transit is unencrypted; missing browser security protections
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- Remediation: Terminate TLS at reverse proxy or add `--ssl-*` flags; add security headers middleware
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**F10-F14**: Low severity findings (request size limits, exception handling, logging gaps) documented in `static_analysis.md` and `owasp_review.md`.
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## Dependency Vulnerabilities
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| Package | CVE | Severity | Fix Version |
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|---------|-----|----------|-------------|
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| h11 (via uvicorn) | CVE-2025-43859 | Critical | h11>=0.15.0 |
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| python-multipart | CVE-2026-28356 | High | >=1.3.1 |
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| opencv-python | — | Low (outdated) | 4.13.0.92 |
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## Recommendations
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### Immediate (Critical/High)
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1. **Pin h11>=0.15.0** to fix HTTP request smuggling vulnerability
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2. **Pin python-multipart>=1.3.1** to fix ReDoS vulnerability
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3. **Pin all dependencies** to specific versions in requirements.txt
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4. **Add JWT signature verification** using PyJWT with the issuer's public key
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5. **Add authentication middleware** requiring valid tokens on /detect, /detect/{media_id}, /detect/stream
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### Short-term (Medium)
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6. **Filter SSE events by user** — associate queues with authenticated sessions
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7. **Add rate limiting** on inference endpoints (slowapi or nginx rate limiting)
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8. **Run containers as non-root** — add USER directive to Dockerfiles
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9. **Add security headers** middleware (X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, HSTS)
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10. **Configure TLS** at reverse proxy level or add Dockerfile HEALTHCHECK
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### Long-term (Low / Hardening)
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11. **Add request body size limits** via uvicorn config or middleware
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12. **Log security events** — authentication failures, token refresh failures, rate limit hits
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13. **Replace silent exception handling** with proper error logging
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14. **Set up CI/CD** with dependency scanning, SAST, and secret scanning
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15. **Add CORS configuration** if browser clients will access the API directly
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