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097811a67b
- Pin all deps; h11==0.16.0 (CVE-2025-43859), python-multipart>=1.3.1 (CVE-2026-28356), PyJWT==2.12.1
- Add HMAC JWT verification (require_auth FastAPI dependency, JWT_SECRET-gated)
- Fix TokenManager._refresh() to use ADMIN_API_URL instead of ANNOTATIONS_URL
- Rename POST /detect → POST /detect/image (image-only, rejects video files)
- Replace global SSE stream with per-job SSE: GET /detect/{media_id} with event replay buffer
- Apply require_auth to all 4 protected endpoints
- Fix on_annotation/on_status closure to use mutable current_id for correct post-upload event routing
- Add non-root appuser to Dockerfile and Dockerfile.gpu
- Add JWT_SECRET to e2e/docker-compose.test.yml and run-tests.sh
- Update all e2e tests and unit tests for new endpoints and HMAC token signing
- 64/64 tests pass
Made-with: Cursor
7.7 KiB
7.7 KiB
Security Audit Report
Date: 2026-03-31 Scope: Azaion.Detections (full codebase) Verdict: FAIL → REMEDIATED (Critical/High resolved 2026-04-01)
Summary
| Severity | Count | Resolved |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | 1 | 1 ✓ |
| High | 3 | 3 ✓ |
| Medium | 5 | 2 ✓ |
| Low | 5 | — |
OWASP Top 10 Assessment
| Category | Status | Findings |
|---|---|---|
| A01 Broken Access Control | FAIL | 3 |
| A02 Security Misconfiguration | FAIL | 2 |
| A03 Software Supply Chain Failures | FAIL | 2 |
| A04 Cryptographic Failures | FAIL | 1 |
| A05 Injection | PASS | — |
| A06 Insecure Design | FAIL | 2 |
| A07 Authentication Failures | FAIL | 1 |
| A08 Software or Data Integrity Failures | PASS | — |
| A09 Logging & Alerting Failures | FAIL | 1 |
| A10 Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions | FAIL | 1 |
Findings
| # | Severity | Category | Location | Title | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Critical | A03 Supply Chain | requirements.txt (uvicorn→h11) | HTTP request smuggling via h11 CVE-2025-43859 | FIXED — pinned h11==0.16.0 |
| 2 | High | A04 Crypto | src/main.py | JWT decoded without signature verification | FIXED — PyJWT HMAC verification |
| 3 | High | A01 Access Control | src/main.py (all routes) | No authentication required on any endpoint | FIXED — require_auth dependency on all protected endpoints |
| 4 | High | A03 Supply Chain | requirements.txt (python-multipart) | ReDoS via python-multipart CVE-2026-28356 | FIXED — pinned python-multipart>=1.3.1 |
| 5 | Medium | A01 Access Control | src/main.py | SSE stream broadcasts cross-user data | FIXED — per-job SSE (GET /detect/{media_id}), each client sees only their job |
| 6 | Medium | A06 Insecure Design | src/main.py | No rate limiting on inference endpoints | Open — out of scope for this cycle |
| 7 | Medium | A02 Misconfig | Dockerfile, Dockerfile.gpu | Containers run as root | FIXED — non-root appuser added |
| 8 | Medium | A03 Supply Chain | requirements.txt | Unpinned critical dependencies | FIXED — all deps pinned |
| 9 | Medium | A02 Misconfig | Dockerfile, Dockerfile.gpu | No TLS and no security headers | Open — handled at infra/proxy level |
| 10 | Low | A06 Insecure Design | src/main.py | No request body size limit | Open |
| 11 | Low | A10 Exceptions | src/main.py | Silent exception swallowing | Open |
| 12 | Low | A09 Logging | src/main.py | Security events not logged | Open |
| 13 | Low | A01 Access Control | src/main.py | Exception details leaked in responses | Open |
| 14 | Low | A07 Auth | src/main.py | Token refresh failure silently ignored | Open (by design for offline mode) |
Finding Details
F1: HTTP Request Smuggling via h11 (Critical / A03)
- Location:
requirements.txt— unpinneduvicorn[standard]pullsh11-0.14.0 - Description: CVE-2025-43859 (CVSS 9.1). Lenient parsing of chunked-coding line terminators enables HTTP request smuggling.
- Impact: Bypass security controls, cache poisoning, session hijacking, data leakage
- Remediation: Pin
h11>=0.15.0in requirements.txt
F2: JWT Decoded Without Signature Verification (High / A04)
- Location:
src/main.py:67-99(TokenManager._decode_exp,decode_user_id) - Description: JWT payloads are base64-decoded without cryptographic signature verification. Any client can forge tokens with arbitrary claims.
- Impact: Full user impersonation — attacker crafts JWT with target's user ID to access their AI settings, post annotations under their account
- Remediation: Use PyJWT with signature verification against the issuer's public key
F3: No Authentication on Endpoints (High / A01)
- Location:
src/main.py— all route handlers - Description: All endpoints are publicly accessible. Bearer tokens are optional.
- Impact: Unauthorized inference triggering, resource exhaustion, unauthorized access to SSE event stream
- Remediation: Add FastAPI dependency injection for auth middleware on
/detect,/detect/{media_id},/detect/stream
F4: python-multipart ReDoS (High / A03)
- Location:
requirements.txt— unpinnedpython-multipart - Description: CVE-2026-28356 (CVSS 7.5).
parse_options_header()regex causes exponential backtracking on malicious headers. - Impact: Denial of service
- Remediation: Pin
python-multipart>=1.3.1
F5: SSE Stream Cross-User Data Leak (Medium / A01)
- Location:
src/main.py:608-627 - Description: All detection events broadcast to all connected SSE clients without filtering.
- Impact: Any client sees all users' detection results (media IDs, coordinates, status)
- Remediation: Associate SSE queues with authenticated users; filter events by ownership
F6: No Rate Limiting (Medium / A06)
- Location:
src/main.py:348-469,src/main.py:494-605 - Description: No rate limiting on compute-intensive inference endpoints.
- Impact: DoS via inference exhaustion (2 worker threads)
- Remediation: Add slowapi or similar rate limiting middleware
F7: Docker Containers Run as Root (Medium / A02)
- Location:
Dockerfile:10,Dockerfile.gpu:10 - Description: No USER directive; processes run as root inside containers.
- Impact: Container escape or compromise gives root filesystem access
- Remediation: Add non-root user (
adduser --disabled-password appuser && USER appuser)
F8: Unpinned Critical Dependencies (Medium / A03)
- Location:
requirements.txt - Description:
fastapi,uvicorn[standard],python-multipartare unpinned. - Impact: Supply chain attack via compromised PyPI package; inconsistent builds across environments
- Remediation: Pin all dependencies to specific versions
F9: No TLS / No Security Headers (Medium / A02)
- Location:
DockerfileCMD,src/main.py(app setup) - Description: Uvicorn runs without TLS. No security headers middleware.
- Impact: Data in transit is unencrypted; missing browser security protections
- Remediation: Terminate TLS at reverse proxy or add
--ssl-*flags; add security headers middleware
F10-F14: Low severity findings (request size limits, exception handling, logging gaps) documented in static_analysis.md and owasp_review.md.
Dependency Vulnerabilities
| Package | CVE | Severity | Fix Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| h11 (via uvicorn) | CVE-2025-43859 | Critical | h11>=0.15.0 |
| python-multipart | CVE-2026-28356 | High | >=1.3.1 |
| opencv-python | — | Low (outdated) | 4.13.0.92 |
Recommendations
Immediate (Critical/High)
- Pin h11>=0.15.0 to fix HTTP request smuggling vulnerability
- Pin python-multipart>=1.3.1 to fix ReDoS vulnerability
- Pin all dependencies to specific versions in requirements.txt
- Add JWT signature verification using PyJWT with the issuer's public key
- Add authentication middleware requiring valid tokens on /detect, /detect/{media_id}, /detect/stream
Short-term (Medium)
- Filter SSE events by user — associate queues with authenticated sessions
- Add rate limiting on inference endpoints (slowapi or nginx rate limiting)
- Run containers as non-root — add USER directive to Dockerfiles
- Add security headers middleware (X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, HSTS)
- Configure TLS at reverse proxy level or add Dockerfile HEALTHCHECK
Long-term (Low / Hardening)
- Add request body size limits via uvicorn config or middleware
- Log security events — authentication failures, token refresh failures, rate limit hits
- Replace silent exception handling with proper error logging
- Set up CI/CD with dependency scanning, SAST, and secret scanning
- Add CORS configuration if browser clients will access the API directly