Batch 87: 6 NFT-SEC blackbox scenarios + 5 helper evaluators + 75 unit tests + cumulative review batches 85-87. * AZ-436 NFT-SEC-01: cache-poisoning safety budget (AC-NEW-9); aggregate false_trust_count ≤ N×1e-6; zero-tolerance default. Canonical-only by default; E2E_NFT_SEC_01_RELEASE_GATE=1 unlocks full matrix. * AZ-437 NFT-SEC-02 + NFT-SEC-05: shared egress-observation evaluator (AC-NEW-10); SEC-02 = 0 packets to non-e2e-net over 5min replay; SEC-05 = DNS-blackhole sidecar healthy + lookup fails + UDP-53 silent. * AZ-438 NFT-SEC-03: AP-only signing rejection (AC-NEW-11); 3 sub-cases (unsigned/wrong-key/replayed) each reject ≤500ms + no position drift. * AZ-439 NFT-SEC-04: probe (always-run) = no-crash + deterministic decode outcome; ASan-fuzz (release-gate) = 0 findings ≥4h; AC-3 corpus floor informational only per spec. Verdict per-batch: PASS_WITH_WARNINGS (5 Low). Cumulative review for batches 85-87 (K=3 window) also PASS_WITH_WARNINGS with 5 cross-batch findings — recommends hygiene PBIs for write_csv_evidence duplication (13 helpers) and _resolve_fixture_path duplication (13 scenarios), plus new tickets for AZ-595 fixture builder + DNS-blackhole sidecar service. Also adds _docs/LESSONS.md documenting the Jira transition-ID lesson (always call getTransitionsForJiraIssue first, never memorize numeric IDs across sessions). Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
8.8 KiB
Code Review — Batch 87
Tasks: AZ-436 + AZ-437 + AZ-438 + AZ-439 (NFT-SEC-01..05 security scenarios)
Total complexity: 16 points (5 + 3 + 3 + 5)
Reviewer: autodev / implement skill phase 8
Date: 2026-05-17
Verdict: PASS_WITH_WARNINGS (5 Low; 0 Medium / High / Critical)
Phase 1 — Context
Per _dependencies_table.md these four NFT-SEC tasks complete the
security NFT slice of E-BBT (AZ-262). All five scenarios (cache
poisoning, no-egress, MAVLink signing, OpenCV CVE probe, OpenCV CVE
ASan fuzz, DNS blackhole) follow the established batch-85 / batch-86
"helper + fixture-consumer scenario + unit-test trio" pattern.
Public-boundary discipline: every new helper module declares it in its
module docstring; grep confirms none import src/gps_denied_onboard.
Phase 2 — Spec Compliance
| Task | AC | Coverage location |
|---|---|---|
| AZ-436 | AC-1 (N flights complete) | _parse_payload + len(flights) < NFT_SEC_01_CI_MIN_FLIGHTS gate + scenario flight_count NFR record |
| AZ-436 | AC-2 (poison ratio + layer coverage + rejection-reason vocabulary) | passes_ratio + passes_layer_coverage + passes_rejection_reason_vocabulary (3 sub-assertions) |
| AZ-436 | AC-3 (false-trust budget zero-tolerance) | passes_budget + scenario total_false_trust + budget NFR records |
| AZ-436 | AC-4 (canonical-only default; release-gate full matrix) | _is_canonical_param + E2E_NFT_SEC_01_RELEASE_GATE env var |
| AZ-437 | AC-1 (NFT-SEC-02 0 packets to non-internal) | evaluate_no_egress.passes + scenario AC-1 assert |
| AZ-437 | AC-2 (NFT-SEC-05 sidecar healthy) | sidecar_healthy field + scenario AC-2 assert |
| AZ-437 | AC-3a (NFT-SEC-05 lookup fails) | passes_lookup + scenario AC-3a assert |
| AZ-437 | AC-3b (NFT-SEC-05 UDP-53 silent) | passes_udp_silence + scenario AC-3b assert |
| AZ-437 | AC-4 (parameterization) | conftest matrix unchanged; both scenarios run per (fc_adapter, vio_strategy) |
| AZ-438 | AC-1 (iNav SKIP) | if fc_adapter == "inav": pytest.skip(...) |
| AZ-438 | AC-2/3/4 (per-sub-case rejection ≤500ms + no position update) | per-sub-case passes_rejection + passes_no_position_update |
| AZ-438 | AC-5 (vio_strategy parameterization) | conftest matrix |
| AZ-439 | AC-1a (probe: no crash) | passes_no_crash (last FDR record ≥ probe injection) |
| AZ-439 | AC-1b (probe: graceful outcome) | passes_graceful_outcome (decode-success OR frame-decode-error within ±50 ms tolerance) |
| AZ-439 | AC-2 (fuzz: 0 ASan findings ≥4 h) | passes_findings + passes_duration + scenario AC-2 assert |
| AZ-439 | AC-3 (fuzz: ≥1000 corpus) | reached_corpus_floor (informational only — recorded in CSV; not asserted, matches spec "informational only; no hard threshold") |
| AZ-439 | AC-4 (parameterization) | probe = full matrix; fuzz = ardupilot + per-vio (avoids duplicating a 4 h run, justified inline) |
Spec compliance: PASS. AC-3 on AZ-439 fuzz is correctly modeled as informational-only per the task spec.
Phase 3 — Code Quality
- All five helpers use frozen dataclasses for verdicts. Single-responsibility: evaluators do verdict logic only; scenarios do fixture I/O + assertions.
- No
2>/dev/null, bareexcept, or empty try-catch blocks anywhere. - Comment discipline upheld — only
# Arrange/# Act/# Assertin tests; inline comments in helpers explain non-obvious intent (e.g. why ASan threshold patterns are explicitly enumerated rather than wildcard-matched). - All paths are typed;
Sequence/frozen=True/Enum/Pathannotations appear consistently.
Phase 4 — Security Scan
- No new credentials, secrets, or API keys introduced.
cve_probe_evaluatordeliberately rejects "silent drop" outcomes as failure — preventing a regression where the SUT silently swallows malformed JPEGs.asan_fuzz_evaluatorclassifies any unknown ASan match asOTHER_FINDINGand still fails — preventing a regression where a future sanitizer category is silently accepted.egress_observertreats SUCCESS DNS lookup as the only failing outcome.mavlink_signing_evaluatorrequires BOTH rejection STATUSTEXT AND no-position-update for pass — catches signaling-only rejection bug class.- Test data (poisoned tile generators, BAD_SIGNATURE regex) does not contain exploit payloads, only string patterns + benign synthetic counters.
Verdict: PASS.
Phase 5 — Performance Scan
- Evaluators are O(N) over their input collections; no quadratic loops or unbounded recursion.
- No I/O in evaluator hot paths; CSV writing is one-shot at scenario end.
- AZ-436 default N=1000 with single canonical param keeps the per-CI cost bounded; release-gate N=10000 × 6 params is correctly opt-in via env flag.
- AZ-439 fuzz is correctly release-gated (≥4 h is too expensive for CI).
Verdict: PASS.
Phase 6 — Cross-Task Consistency
- All six scenarios share an almost-identical structure:
- tier-guard skip (where applicable),
sitl_replay_readyskip,- fixture-path resolution,
- fixture-not-found →
pytest.failwith explicit production-dep pointer, - payload parse → typed records (with
pytest.failon shape errors), - evaluator call → CSV evidence + NFR records,
- AC assertions with diagnostic messages.
- The five helpers share the
write_csv_evidencepattern (one row per result + aggregate footer where applicable).
Verdict: PASS (consistency upheld).
Phase 7 — Architecture Compliance
- All new files under
e2e/— owned by the Blackbox Tests cross-cutting component per_docs/02_document/module-layout.md. - No
src/gps_denied_onboardimports (verified by inspection of every new file's import section). - New evaluators are leaves of the import DAG — they import only stdlib +
the existing
runner.helpers.sitl_observerfor fixture-path resolution. - No new infrastructure libraries; all helpers use stdlib
csv,dataclasses,enum,re,pathlib,math.
Verdict: PASS.
Findings
F1 — write_csv_evidence boilerplate continues to grow (Low / Maintainability — carry-over of batch-85 F4 + batch-86 F1)
Each of the 5 new evaluators adds its own write_csv_evidence(out_path, report) -> Path with the same header-then-rows pattern. The duplication is now spread across 13 helpers (batches 85, 86, 87 combined).
Verdict: defer to a future hygiene PBI; the per-evaluator schema variation makes a generic abstraction non-trivial (each report's row shape differs significantly — aggregate row vs per-sub-case, single row vs many).
F2 — DNS-blackhole sidecar production dependency not yet realized (Low / Spec-Gap surfacing)
The NFT-SEC-05 scenario depends on a DNS-blackhole sidecar (per environment.md) that must be configured to absorb all UDP-53 probes. This sidecar does not exist in the e2e harness today (no service entry in e2e/docker/docker-compose.test.yml and no dns-blackhole directory under e2e/fixtures/).
Surfaced to AZ-595 + e2e infrastructure: the DNS-blackhole sidecar must be wired before NFT-SEC-05 can run end-to-end with live captures.
Verdict: not a code defect — surfaced as a production dependency in the batch report.
F3 — AP MAVLink 2.0 signing handshake required for NFT-SEC-03 (Low / Spec-Gap surfacing)
NFT-SEC-03 assumes AP has the MAVLink 2.0 signing handshake completed (SETUP_SIGNING exchange + passkey installed) before the test runs. That handshake is owned by FT-P-09-AP (AZ-416 — already in done/); the NFT-SEC-03 fixture builder (AZ-595) must invoke that handshake first when generating its replay.
Verdict: not a code defect — production dependency on AZ-595 noted in the scenario docstring.
F4 — _resolve_fixture_path duplicated across 6 scenarios (Low / Maintainability)
Carry-over of batch-85 F3 + batch-86 F4. The six new security scenarios each define their own _resolve_fixture_path() -> Path with identical logic differing only in env var name + default filename.
Verdict: defer to a future hygiene PBI alongside the NFT-PERF and NFT-RES instances.
F5 — ASan-fuzz AC-3 corpus floor is informational-only (Low / Spec-aligned)
AsanFuzzReport.reached_corpus_floor is correctly computed but does NOT contribute to passes (and is NOT asserted in the scenario). This matches the task spec's "informational only; no hard threshold" wording exactly.
Verdict: not a defect — flagged so a future reviewer doesn't mistake the read-only field for missing coverage.
Auto-Fix Gate
5 Low findings; no Critical / High / Medium. Per the implement-skill auto-fix gate, no auto-fix actions are triggered. F1 + F4 are deferred to hygiene PBIs; F2 + F3 are production dependencies surfaced to the cumulative review + AZ-595 fixture builder; F5 is a documented design decision matching the spec.
Final Verdict
PASS_WITH_WARNINGS — proceed to commit + tracker transition.