mirror of
https://github.com/azaion/satellite-provider.git
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Oleksandr Bezdieniezhnykh
61612044fb
Wrap up cycle 5 verification + documentation: - Steps 10/11 wrap-up reports (implementation_completeness + implementation_report) for the AZ-503-foundation + AZ-504 batch. - Step 12 test-spec sync: AZ-503-foundation/AZ-504 ACs appended; AZ-505 deferred ACs recorded. - Step 13 update-docs: architecture, data-model, glossary, module- layout, uav-tile-upload contract (v1.1.0), DataAccess + Services + Tests module docs synced; new common_uuidv5.md module doc. - Step 14 security audit: PASS_WITH_WARNINGS; 0 new Critical/High; 2 new Low informational (F1 flightId provenance, F2 pgcrypto deploy gap). - Step 15 performance test: PASS_WITH_INFRA_WARNINGS; PT-08 passed twice (AZ-504 fix verified); PT-01/02 failed due to recurring local Docker/colima DNS cold-start (not an app regression). Cycle-3 perf-harness leftover stays OPEN with replay #5 documented. - Autodev state moved to Step 16 (Deploy). Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
54 lines
4.0 KiB
Markdown
54 lines
4.0 KiB
Markdown
# Infrastructure & Configuration Review (Cycle 5)
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**Date**: 2026-05-12
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**Mode**: Delta scan
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**Scope**: Cycle-5 delta over the cycle-3 infrastructure review (`_docs/05_security/infrastructure_review.md`)
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## Container Security
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`Dockerfile` was not modified in cycle 5. Cycle-3 baseline holds: non-root user, distroless ASP.NET base, no secrets in build args, healthcheck present.
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## CI/CD Security
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Woodpecker CI configuration (`.woodpecker/`) was not modified. The cycle-4 dependency-scan workflow remains the supply-chain gate. AZ-504's `run-performance-tests.sh` fix is exercised by the existing perf-test job — no new step added.
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## Environment Configuration
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### `.env` / `.env.example`
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Not modified in cycle 5. AZ-503 introduced no new env vars. The cycle-3 secrets posture (`GOOGLE_MAPS_API_KEY`, `JWT_SECRET`, `JWT_ISSUER`, `JWT_AUDIENCE` from env / gitignored `.env`; `.env.example` documents them with DEV-ONLY values) holds.
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### Database extensions
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Migration 014 issues `CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS pgcrypto`. Posture:
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- **Privilege**: Postgres `CREATE EXTENSION` requires the migration role to be a superuser OR to have explicit `CREATE` on the database. The satellite-provider connection string in `docker-compose.yml` connects as the `postgres` superuser. This is acceptable for the bundled Docker dev/test environment.
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- **Production posture**: in a managed Postgres environment (e.g. AWS RDS, Google Cloud SQL), the deployment role typically does NOT have superuser. Operators MUST pre-install `pgcrypto` (it's in the `postgres-contrib` package on Debian/Ubuntu, and is allow-listed on RDS / Cloud SQL by default). The migration's `IF NOT EXISTS` clause makes pre-installation safe — the migration will succeed whether the extension is freshly created or already present.
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- **Audit log**: extension creation IS visible in Postgres' standard CSV/JSON server logs (`log_statement = 'ddl'` setting). No additional surfaces.
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**Finding**: F2-cy5 — Low (informational), Operational deployment note.
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- Location: `_docs/05_security/infrastructure_review_cycle5.md` + `_docs/02_document/data_model.md` migration 014 entry
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- Description: First production deployment of cycle-5 will issue `CREATE EXTENSION pgcrypto` if the extension is not already present. Some managed Postgres providers (e.g. RDS in strict-IAM mode) require an operator to allow-list the extension before the migration role can install it.
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- Impact: Deployment may fail at the migration step with `must be owner of database` or `permission denied to create extension` if the deployment role lacks the privilege AND the extension is not pre-installed.
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- Remediation: Pre-installation step. Two options:
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- (a) Add a one-line entry to the deployment runbook: "ensure `CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS pgcrypto` has run as a superuser before the satellite-provider migration role runs migration 014."
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- (b) On RDS/Cloud SQL, add `pgcrypto` to the parameter group's `shared_preload_libraries` or use the provider's per-DB extension allow-list UI.
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- Severity rationale: Low (informational) because (i) the Docker compose dev/test environment is unaffected (we connect as `postgres` superuser); (ii) the failure mode is loud (migration fails fast at startup, not at request time); (iii) the remediation is one-line operational, not a code change. Tracked as a deploy-runbook gap, not as a security defect.
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## Network Security
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- No new ports exposed (cycle 5 added no new listening services).
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- No new outbound integrations (cycle 5 added no new HTTP clients).
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- CORS / security headers: unchanged.
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## Self-verification
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- [x] Dockerfile / docker-compose diffs reviewed (none in cycle 5)
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- [x] CI/CD config diffs reviewed (none in cycle 5)
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- [x] Environment/config files reviewed (`.env`, `.env.example`, `appsettings*.json` — none modified)
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- [x] New DB extensions documented (`pgcrypto`)
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## Save action
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Written to `_docs/05_security/infrastructure_review_cycle5.md`. The cycle-3 `infrastructure_review.md` remains authoritative for surfaces untouched by AZ-503.
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