satellite-provider/_docs/05_security/owasp_review.md

# Phase 3 — OWASP Top 10:2025 Review

**Date**: 2026-05-11
**OWASP version**: [OWASP Top 10:2025](https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/en/) (verified at audit start)
**Project context**: Self-hosted .NET 8 backend service. Documented as an "internal/trusted network service — no auth layer" (`_docs/02_document/architecture.md` §7). Deployed via Docker behind another network boundary (per `_docs/02_document/deployment/`). The audit is scoped to the codebase as it stands; categories whose findings depend on a missing trust-boundary control are flagged accordingly.

| # | Category | Status | Findings | Notes |
|---|----------|--------|----------|-------|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | **N/A** (with caveat) | — | The service intentionally exposes ALL endpoints without authentication or authorization — documented design (architecture.md §7). No IDOR analysis applies because there is no user concept. **Caveat**: this is only safe if the deployment puts the API behind a network-level gatekeeper (VPN, mTLS, internal-only LB). If the deploy ever moves to a public network, this category becomes the #1 risk and EVERY endpoint becomes an unauthenticated execution surface. |
| A02 | Security Misconfiguration | **FAIL** | S1, S2, I1, I2 | Default Postgres credentials in both `appsettings.json` and `docker-compose.yml`; Postgres port bound to `0.0.0.0`; container runs as root; no security headers middleware. |
| A03 | Software Supply Chain Failures | **PASS_WITH_WARNINGS** | D1, D2 | Two known transitive CVEs (D1 — ASP.NET Core 8.0.21 SignalR DoS, not exploitable here; D2 — `Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk` 17.8.0 → `NuGet.Frameworks` info disclosure, test-only). No use of unsigned NuGet packages; no auto-update of dependencies in production. |
| A04 | Cryptographic Failures | **N/A** | — | No password storage (no users), no encryption at rest, no in-app crypto. The Google Maps integration uses HTTPS (default Npgsql/HttpClient stacks). At-rest tile storage is plain JPEG by design — these are public satellite images, not confidential data. |
| A05 | Injection | **PASS** | — | All Dapper queries use parameter objects (`new { Id = id }` etc.); no string-built or interpolated user input flows into SQL. No `Process.Start`, no shell exec, no `eval`. JSON deserialization uses `System.Text.Json` defaults (no type-name handling). XSS / template injection N/A — JSON-only API. |
| A06 | Insecure Design | **FAIL** | S3, I3 | No rate limiting on any endpoint despite the existence of an outbound rate-limited dependency (Google Maps). Latitude / longitude inputs are not range-validated at the API boundary (S3). No quota / throttling on region-request creation, which can multiply outbound calls and disk writes. |
| A07 | Authentication Failures | **N/A** (with caveat) | — | Same caveat as A01 — there is no authentication system to fail. |
| A08 | Software or Data Integrity Failures | **PASS** | — | DbUp migrations are idempotent and tracked in `schemaversions`; rollback is forward-only by design. No auto-update path. CI artifacts go through `.woodpecker/02-build-push.yml` with `from_secret: registry_token` (not in plaintext). No unsigned external scripts executed at build/deploy. |
| A09 | Security Logging and Alerting Failures | **PASS_WITH_WARNINGS** | I4 | Serilog writes structured logs with file rotation; `GlobalExceptionHandler` correlates server logs to client responses via `correlationId` (good). However: no security-event logging (e.g., bad-input bursts, repeated 4xx from same source) and no alerting on log patterns. Acceptable for an internal service; would need attention if exposed publicly. |
| A10 | Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions | **PASS** | — | `GlobalExceptionHandler` returns RFC 7807 ProblemDetails with a generic body and a correlationId — no exception text leaks to clients. `GlobalExceptionHandlerTests.cs` includes a positive control that confirms a "leakySecret"-shaped exception message is NOT echoed. |

## Cross-reference to Phase 1 / Phase 2 findings

| OWASP Cat | Tied finding | Severity | Source phase |
|-----------|--------------|----------|--------------|
| A02 | S1 — default password in appsettings.json | Medium | Phase 2 |
| A02 | S2 — weak Postgres creds + 0.0.0.0 binding in compose | Medium | Phase 2 |
| A02 | I1 — Dockerfile runs as root | Low | Phase 4 (next) |
| A02 | I2 — no security headers middleware | Low | Phase 4 (next) |
| A03 | D1 — CVE-2026-26130 in ASP.NET Core 8.0.21 (SignalR; not reachable) | Medium (paper) / Low (real) | Phase 1 |
| A03 | D2 — CVE-2022-30184 transitive via test SDK | Low (test-only) | Phase 1 |
| A06 | S3 — lat/lon not range-validated at API boundary | Low | Phase 2 |
| A06 | I3 — no rate limiting on any endpoint | Medium | Phase 4 (next) |
| A06 | S4 — Google Maps API key handling (no .env.example, no rotation hygiene) | Medium | Phase 2 |
| A09 | I4 — no security-event logs, no alerting | Low | Phase 4 (next) |

## Self-verification

- [x] All current OWASP Top 10:2025 categories assessed
- [x] Each FAIL has at least one specific finding with evidence
- [x] N/A categories have justification + caveat
- [x] No `security_approach.md` exists in `_docs/00_problem/` to cross-reference (project has not declared explicit security requirements; this audit treats the architecture-vision statement "internal/trusted network service" as the de-facto requirement)

---

## Cycle 2 Refresh (AZ-487 + AZ-488)

Cycle 1's A01 / A07 verdicts were `N/A (with caveat)` because the service shipped without authentication. AZ-487 (JWT validation baseline) and AZ-488 (UAV upload permission policy) materially change those verdicts. The table below supersedes the cycle-1 row for A01 and A07; all other rows remain as cycle 1 left them, with cycle-2 findings appended where applicable.

| # | Category | Cycle 1 Status | Cycle 2 Status | Cycle-2 evidence |
|---|----------|----------------|----------------|------------------|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | N/A (with caveat) | **PASS_WITH_WARNINGS** | Every endpoint requires `RequireAuthorization()` (AZ-487); `POST /api/satellite/upload` requires the `GPS` permission via `PermissionsRequirement` (AZ-488). No IDOR analysis is needed because the service has no per-user data partitioning — every authenticated principal can read every tile. **Warning**: per-tenant authorization (e.g. "this UAV may only upload over its assigned region") is *not* enforced. If a future contract demands it, A01 immediately re-opens. |
| A02 | Security Misconfiguration | FAIL (S1, S2, I1, I2) | **FAIL** (unchanged + F-AUTH-1) | Cycle-2 ships a clearly-labelled DEV-ONLY JWT secret in `appsettings.Development.json`. Production override path is correct (env-var wins); deploy gate must check `JWT_SECRET`. No new cycle-1 findings resolved. |
| A03 | Supply Chain Failures | PASS_WITH_WARNINGS (D1, D2) | **PASS_WITH_WARNINGS** (+ D3, F-DEPS-UAV) | New `JwtBearer 8.0.21` package shares the D1 patch line; new ImageSharp call site widens decoder exposure (mitigations sufficient — see static_analysis.md F-UAV-1). |
| A04 | Cryptographic Failures | N/A | **PASS** | HS256 token validation uses `Microsoft.IdentityModel`'s `SymmetricSecurityKey` with `RequireSignedTokens = true` and `RequireExpirationTime = true`. The `alg=none` bypass is blocked by `RequireSignedTokens`; algorithm-confusion is bounded because only one signing key is registered. Secret length ≥ 32 bytes enforced at startup. |
| A05 | Injection | PASS | **PASS** | No new SQL / shell / template surfaces. The new JSON parse (`PermissionsAuthorizationHandler`) runs on signature-validated token bytes — see F-UAV-2 disposition. |
| A06 | Insecure Design | FAIL (S3, S4, I3) | **FAIL** (+ F-AUTH-3, F-UAV-3) | Rate limiting still absent (now also a 401-flood vector). UAV reject reasons disclose gate structure — accepted UX trade-off, flagged for operator awareness. |
| A07 | Identification & Authentication Failures | N/A (with caveat) | **PASS_WITH_WARNINGS** (+ F-AUTH-2) | HS256 with secret ≥ 32 bytes; lifetime + signature validation; ClockSkew = 30 s. **Warning**: `ValidateIssuer = false`, `ValidateAudience = false` per the suite contract — any service that holds `JWT_SECRET` can mint tokens accepted here. Track until admin team defines `iss`/`aud`. No token revocation list — leaked tokens stay valid until `exp`. |
| A08 | Software or Data Integrity Failures | PASS | **PASS** | AZ-488 file-first-then-row write order documented; same migration / CI discipline as cycle 1. |
| A09 | Security Logging Failures | PASS_WITH_WARNINGS (I4) | **PASS_WITH_WARNINGS** (unchanged) | No new logging changes; 401 responses are not currently aggregated for alerting (out of scope for internal service). |
| A10 | Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions | PASS | **PASS** | UAV decode failures wrapped in scoped `try/catch` for `UnknownImageFormatException` / `InvalidImageContentException` — produce structured `INVALID_FORMAT` rejects, no stack-trace leak. SEC-11 test verifies reject details have no path / exception-type leakage.

### Cycle-2 cross-reference

| OWASP Cat | Cycle-2 finding | Severity | Source phase |
|-----------|-----------------|----------|--------------|
| A01 | A01 status now PASS_WITH_WARNINGS (per-tenant authz absent) | — (status note) | Phase 3 |
| A02 | F-AUTH-1 — DEV-ONLY secret in `appsettings.Development.json` | Low (accepted) | Phase 2 |
| A03 | D3 — `JwtBearer 8.0.21` shares D1 patch line | Low | Phase 1 |
| A03 | F-DEPS-UAV — ImageSharp decode exposure widened | Medium | Phase 1 |
| A06 | F-AUTH-3 — rate-limit gap now also covers 401 floods | Low (recurrence of I3) | Phase 2 |
| A06 | F-UAV-3 — reject reasons disclose gate structure | Informational (accepted) | Phase 2 |
| A07 | F-AUTH-2 — `iss`/`aud` not validated; no revocation list | Medium | Phase 2 |
| (claim handler) | F-UAV-2 — `JsonDocument.Parse` on token claim values | Low | Phase 2 |