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satellite-provider/_docs/02_document/tests/security-tests.md
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[AZ-491] [AZ-492] [AZ-493] [AZ-494] [AZ-495] [AZ-496] Cycle 3 Steps 11-13: test-spec sync + ripple log
Step 11 (Run Tests) is recorded as PASS based on the implement skill's
internal Step 16 gate (./scripts/run-tests.sh --full, all-green) per
test-run/SKILL.md § Functional Mode — same runner, immediately
preceding invocation, no value in a second run.

Step 12 (Test-Spec Sync, cycle-update mode):
  - traceability-matrix.md: rows added for AZ-491 AC-1..AC-6,
    AZ-493 AC-1..AC-6, AZ-495 (doc convention), AZ-496 AC-1..AC-N
    (dependency bump); AZ-494 AC-1/AC-2 rows now cross-reference
    new SEC-12 / SEC-13 blackbox IDs.
  - security-tests.md: SEC-12 (wrong iss returns 401) and SEC-13
    (wrong aud returns 401) appended for AZ-494.
  - environment.md: Environment Variables table extended with
    GOOGLE_MAPS_API_KEY, JWT_SECRET, JWT_ISSUER, JWT_AUDIENCE,
    INTEGRATION_TEST_DB_RESET. Closes a cycle-2 oversight where
    JWT_SECRET was never recorded.

Step 13 (Update Docs, task mode):
  - tests_unit.md: consolidated the duplicate
    AuthenticationServiceCollectionExtensionsTests entry that
    spanned AZ-487 + AZ-494 into one coherent block.
  - ripple_log_cycle3.md created: per-task source files +
    every doc that was touched (architecture, module-layout,
    api_program, tests_unit, tests_integration, traceability,
    performance-tests, security-tests, environment, security_report,
    owasp_review, deploy_cycle2, retro_2026-05-11_cycle2). Notes
    which docs were intentionally NOT touched and the open
    cross-repo doc ripple (AC-7).

Autodev state advanced to Step 13 completed. Next: Step 14 Security
Audit (optional gate).

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-05-12 02:57:45 +03:00

105 lines
6.3 KiB
Markdown

# Security Test Scenarios
## SEC-01: SQL Injection via Coordinate Parameters
**Trigger**: GET /api/satellite/tiles/latlon?Latitude=1;DROP TABLE tiles--&Longitude=1&ZoomLevel=18
**Expected**: Request rejected or treated as invalid parameter
**Pass criterion**: HTTP 400 or parameter parsing error; no database damage; tiles table intact
## SEC-02: Path Traversal in Tile Serving
**Trigger**: GET /tiles/18/../../../etc/passwd
**Expected**: Request rejected; no file outside tiles directory served
**Pass criterion**: HTTP 404 or 400; response body does not contain system file content
## SEC-03: Oversized Region Request
**Trigger**: POST /api/satellite/request with sizeMeters=999999999
**Expected**: Either rejected or handled without resource exhaustion
**Pass criterion**: No OOM; no infinite processing; either error response or bounded processing
## SEC-04: Malformed JSON in Route Request
**Trigger**: POST /api/satellite/route with invalid JSON body
**Expected**: Parse error returned
**Pass criterion**: HTTP 400; error message indicates parsing failure; no crash
---
## Cycle 2 — AZ-487 JWT validation baseline
The pre-AZ-487 assumption "no authentication" is superseded by these scenarios. The SEC-01..SEC-04 scenarios above still hold (they probe input handling, not the auth layer), but every authenticated test variant must now attach a Bearer token.
## SEC-05: Anonymous Request to Any Authenticated Endpoint Returns 401
**Trigger**: GET `/api/satellite/tiles/latlon?Latitude=...&Longitude=...&ZoomLevel=18` (or any `/api/satellite/*` endpoint) with NO `Authorization` header.
**Precondition**: API running with `JWT_SECRET` configured.
**Expected**: HTTP 401 Unauthorized; `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer` header present; response body does not leak validation internals.
**Pass criterion**: status == 401 AND `WWW-Authenticate` header starts with `Bearer`.
**AC trace**: AZ-487 AC-1.
## SEC-06: Expired Token Returns 401
**Trigger**: Same request as SEC-05 carrying a JWT signed with the configured secret but with `exp` in the past (clock-skew margin already exceeded).
**Expected**: HTTP 401; the failure reason surfaces via `WWW-Authenticate` (e.g. `error="invalid_token"`, `error_description="The token is expired"`), never in the response body.
**Pass criterion**: status == 401 AND response body does not contain `Expires:` / `NotBefore:` / stack traces / internal exception types.
**AC trace**: AZ-487 AC-2.
## SEC-07: Tampered Signature Returns 401
**Trigger**: Same request as SEC-05 carrying a JWT whose payload was modified after signing so the HMAC no longer verifies.
**Expected**: HTTP 401; body free of cryptographic detail.
**Pass criterion**: status == 401 AND request never reaches downstream handlers (no DB write, no Google Maps fetch).
**AC trace**: AZ-487 AC-3.
## SEC-08: Startup Fails on Missing / Short Secret
**Trigger**: Boot the API container with `JWT_SECRET` unset, empty, or shorter than 32 bytes.
**Observable**: Container exit code, stdout error message.
**Pass criterion**: container exits non-zero within 10s of start; stderr contains a message identifying the missing or short `JWT_SECRET` and the 32-byte minimum; Kestrel never binds to its port.
**AC trace**: AZ-487 AC-5. Behavioral test — no input data.
## SEC-09: Valid Token Reaches Handler Unchanged
**Trigger**: GET `/api/satellite/tiles/latlon?...` with a JWT signed by the configured secret and `exp` in the future.
**Expected**: Response is byte-identical (status, body, headers other than `Authorization`/`WWW-Authenticate`) to the pre-AZ-487 baseline for the same parameters.
**Pass criterion**: status == 200 AND response body matches BT-01 expected schema.
**AC trace**: AZ-487 AC-4. Also exercised by AZ-487 AC-8 / integration smoke parity.
---
## Cycle 2 — AZ-488 UAV upload authorization
## SEC-10: Valid Token Without GPS Permission Returns 403 on UAV Upload
**Trigger**: POST `/api/satellite/upload` carrying a JWT with `permissions: ["FL"]` (no `GPS`); body is an otherwise-valid 1-item batch.
**Precondition**: AZ-487 in place; AZ-488 endpoint registered with the `GPS` permission policy.
**Expected**: HTTP 403 Forbidden; no row in `tiles`; no file under `./tiles/uav/`.
**Pass criterion**: status == 403 AND `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM tiles WHERE source='uav' AND ...` == pre-test count AND uploaded file does NOT exist on disk.
**AC trace**: AZ-488 AC-6.
## SEC-11: Reject-Reason Details Do Not Leak Server Internals
**Trigger**: POST `/api/satellite/upload` with a batch where item-1 deliberately fails Rule 5 (`IMAGE_TOO_UNIFORM`) and item-2 deliberately fails Rule 1 (`INVALID_FORMAT`).
**Precondition**: Authenticated request with `GPS` permission.
**Expected**: HTTP 200 with per-item results; each `rejectDetails` is short, human-readable, and contains none of: server-side file paths, exception type names, stack traces, internal class names, secrets, or hostnames.
**Pass criterion**: For every rejected item, `rejectDetails` matches `^[A-Za-z0-9 .,()<>=:%/-]{0,200}$` AND contains no path separator (`/` or `\`) followed by a directory name from the server image (`tiles`, `src`, `obj`, `bin`).
**AC trace**: AZ-488 § Security NFR.
## SEC-12: Wrong `iss` Claim Returns 401
**Trigger**: Same request as SEC-05 carrying a JWT signed with the configured secret, with valid `exp` / `nbf` / signature, and with an `aud` claim matching `JWT_AUDIENCE` — but with `iss` set to `https://wrong-issuer.invalid/` (not equal to `JWT_ISSUER`).
**Precondition**: AZ-494 in place; API started with `JWT_ISSUER` + `JWT_AUDIENCE` env vars both populated (fail-fast contract).
**Expected**: HTTP 401 Unauthorized; no handler reached; no leaked detail in body.
**Pass criterion**: status == 401 AND response body contains no `iss` / `aud` value or internal exception detail.
**AC trace**: AZ-494 AC-1.
## SEC-13: Wrong `aud` Claim Returns 401
**Trigger**: Same request as SEC-05 carrying a JWT signed with the configured secret, with valid `exp` / `nbf` / signature, and with `iss` matching `JWT_ISSUER` — but with `aud` set to `wrong-audience-not-satellite` (not equal to `JWT_AUDIENCE`).
**Precondition**: AZ-494 in place; API started with `JWT_ISSUER` + `JWT_AUDIENCE` env vars both populated.
**Expected**: HTTP 401 Unauthorized; no handler reached; no leaked detail in body.
**Pass criterion**: status == 401 AND response body contains no `iss` / `aud` value or internal exception detail.
**AC trace**: AZ-494 AC-2.