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Oleksandr Bezdieniezhnykh
510df68bcf
Captures the full output of autodev existing-code Phase A through Step 4 (Code Testability Revision) for the Azaion UI workspace: - Step 1 Document: _docs/02_document/ (FINAL_report, architecture, glossary, components/, modules/, diagrams/, system-flows, module-layout) plus _docs/00_problem/ + _docs/01_solution/ + _docs/legacy/ + _docs/how_to_test + README. - Step 2 Architecture Baseline: architecture_compliance_baseline.md. - Step 3 Test Spec: _docs/02_document/tests/ (environment, test-data, blackbox/performance/resilience/security/ resource-limit tests, traceability-matrix), enum_spec_snapshot, expected_results/results_report.md (98 rows), plus the run-tests.sh + run-performance-tests.sh runners. - Step 4 Code Testability Revision: 01-testability-refactoring/ run dir (list-of-changes C01-C07, deferred_to_refactor, analysis/research_findings + refactoring_roadmap) and the 7 child task specs AZ-448..AZ-454 under _docs/02_tasks/todo/ plus _dependencies_table.md. - _docs/_autodev_state.md pins the cursor at Step 4 / refactor Phase 4 entry so /autodev resumes cleanly. Epic AZ-447 (UI testability gates) tracks the 7 child tasks that will land in subsequent commits. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
245 lines
8.5 KiB
Markdown
245 lines
8.5 KiB
Markdown
# Resilience Tests
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Failure / recovery scenarios at the SPA's observable boundary: bearer expiry, refresh cookie loss, upstream 5xx, network partition, oversized uploads, SSE drop. Every fault injection is at the network / browser layer; the UI is observed for graceful behavior and recovery.
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### NFT-RES-01: 401 → refresh → retry recovery is transparent
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**Summary**: An authenticated request that returns 401 mid-session is refreshed and retried without unmounting the routed view.
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**Traces to**: AC-01, AC-23
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**Preconditions**:
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- Active session on `/flights`.
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**Fault injection**:
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- Force a 401 on the next outbound authenticated request.
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**Steps**:
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| Step | Action | Expected Behavior |
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|------|--------|------------------|
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| 1 | Stub the next request to return 401 once | first response 401 |
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| 2 | Observe the SPA's reaction | `POST /api/admin/auth/refresh` with `credentials:'include'`; on 200, original request retried with new bearer |
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| 3 | Inspect `<ProtectedRoute>` children | not unmounted; re-render delta ≤ 1 |
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**Pass criteria**: row 03 sequence; row 11 re-render bound (≤ 1); row 12 refresh count == 1 — all hold simultaneously.
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**Expected result source**: `results_report.md` rows 03, 11, 12.
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---
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### NFT-RES-02: SSE bearer-rotation — both streams reconnect within 5 s
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**Summary**: A bearer rotation during open SSE streams (live-GPS + annotation-status) tears them down and reopens them with the new token.
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**Traces to**: AC-24
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**Preconditions**:
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- Two EventSources open.
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**Fault injection**:
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- Trigger a server-driven rotation of the bearer (force a refresh).
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**Steps**:
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| Step | Action | Expected Behavior |
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|------|--------|------------------|
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| 1 | Rotate bearer | new token in memory |
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| 2 | Observe each EventSource | closes, then reopens with new `?token=` |
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| 3 | Measure max reconnect time | ≤ 5 000 ms |
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**Pass criteria**: both streams close+open exactly once; max reconnect ≤ 5 000 ms (`results_report.md` row 13).
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**Status**: `quarantined` until SSE reconnect-on-rotation ships (Step 8 hardening).
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**Expected result source**: `results_report.md` row 13.
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---
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### NFT-RES-03: Network offline at boot — error state, no offline mode
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**Summary**: With network disabled, app boot results in a user-visible error state — NOT a service worker-served cached UI.
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**Traces to**: AC-N3
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**Preconditions**:
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- Browser network disabled (or all `/api/*` stubs respond with offline error).
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**Fault injection**:
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- All outbound requests fail with `net::ERR_INTERNET_DISCONNECTED` (or equivalent).
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**Steps**:
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| Step | Action | Expected Behavior |
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|------|--------|------------------|
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| 1 | Load the SPA | static assets served by nginx OK; API calls fail |
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| 2 | Observe DOM | login or general error surface present |
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| 3 | Inspect `navigator.serviceWorker.controller` | `null` |
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**Pass criteria**: row 93 — error/login-failed state present; no service worker controller.
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**Expected result source**: `results_report.md` row 93.
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---
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### NFT-RES-04: ProtectedRoute loading timeout fallback after 10 s
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**Summary**: The `<ProtectedRoute>` spinner has a bounded loading window; a stalled auth bootstrap surfaces a retry CTA / error.
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**Traces to**: AC-17
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**Preconditions**:
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- Bootstrap refresh stubbed to never resolve.
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**Fault injection**:
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- `POST /api/admin/auth/refresh` hangs (no response).
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**Steps**:
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| Step | Action | Expected Behavior |
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|------|--------|------------------|
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| 1 | Mount `<ProtectedRoute>` | spinner rendered |
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| 2 | Advance fake time to 10 s | timeout fires |
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| 3 | Inspect DOM | retry CTA or error message present; spinner unmounted |
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**Pass criteria**: row 59 — fallback present, spinner absent.
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**Status**: `quarantined` until timeout fix lands (Step 4).
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**Expected result source**: `results_report.md` row 59.
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---
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### NFT-RES-05: Settings save with upstream 500 — UI state recovers
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**Summary**: A 500 on settings save surfaces an error and resets the `saving` flag.
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**Traces to**: AC-27
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**Preconditions**:
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- Form filled in valid state on `/settings`.
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**Fault injection**:
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- Upstream `PUT /api/annotations/settings/system` returns 500 after T ms.
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**Steps**:
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| Step | Action | Expected Behavior |
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|------|--------|------------------|
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| 1 | Click Save | PUT issued |
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| 2 | Stub responds 500 within 2 s | failure |
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| 3 | Inspect within 2 s | toast / inline error; `saving === false`; no route navigation |
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**Pass criteria**: row 68.
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**Status**: `quarantined` until Step 4 try/finally fix.
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**Expected result source**: `results_report.md` row 68.
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---
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### NFT-RES-06: Settings save with network drop — try/finally state reset
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**Summary**: When the underlying fetch throws (network drop), `saving` resets and the user sees an error.
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**Traces to**: AC-27
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**Preconditions**:
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- Form filled in valid state.
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**Fault injection**:
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- Network drop mid-PUT (`fetch` rejects).
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**Steps**:
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| Step | Action | Expected Behavior |
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|------|--------|------------------|
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| 1 | Click Save | PUT issued |
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| 2 | Stub throws | rejection delivered |
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| 3 | Inspect | `saving === false`; error surfaced |
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**Pass criteria**: row 69.
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**Status**: `quarantined`.
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**Expected result source**: `results_report.md` row 69.
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---
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### NFT-RES-07: nginx 413 on oversized upload surfaces user-visible error
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**Summary**: An upload that exceeds `client_max_body_size 500M` returns 413; the UI presents a user-facing message (no silent failure, no `alert()`).
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**Traces to**: AC-10
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**Preconditions**:
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- Authenticated; `<MediaList>` open.
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**Fault injection**:
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- Drop a 501 MB synthetic file.
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**Steps**:
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| Step | Action | Expected Behavior |
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|------|--------|------------------|
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| 1 | Upload 501 MB | upload starts |
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| 2 | nginx rejects | 413 delivered |
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| 3 | Inspect UI | error containing the i18n "file too large" string; no `alert()` invoked |
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**Pass criteria**: row 39.
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**Expected result source**: `results_report.md` row 39.
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---
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### NFT-RES-08: Refresh cookie expired — redirect to /login
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**Summary**: When the refresh cookie is gone (or expired) and a 401 occurs, the SPA redirects the user to `/login` rather than silently looping refresh.
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**Traces to**: AC-01, AC-22
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**Preconditions**:
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- Cookie cleared from the browser jar.
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**Fault injection**:
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- 401 on any authenticated call; subsequent `POST /api/admin/auth/refresh` returns 401.
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**Steps**:
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| Step | Action | Expected Behavior |
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|------|--------|------------------|
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| 1 | Issue authenticated call | 401 |
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| 2 | Refresh attempted | 401 (no cookie) |
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| 3 | Observe routing | redirect to `/login` |
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**Pass criteria**: final URL `/login`; no infinite refresh loop (single refresh attempt). Derived from AC-01 + AC-22; no specific results_report row binds the loop bound — Phase 3 flags this and the loop bound is added to row 03 if accepted.
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---
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### NFT-RES-09: Annotation download tainted-canvas fallback
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**Summary**: When `<canvas>.toBlob()` raises a tainted-canvas exception (cross-origin video frame), the user sees an error rather than a silent no-op.
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**Traces to**: NFR (`04_verification_log.md` finding on `handleDownload` tainted-canvas risk)
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**Preconditions**:
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- An annotation is loaded from a video sourced with CORS that taints the canvas.
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**Fault injection**:
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- Cross-origin video source taints the canvas; `toBlob` throws.
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**Steps**:
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| Step | Action | Expected Behavior |
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|------|--------|------------------|
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| 1 | Click Download | export attempted |
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| 2 | toBlob throws | error handled |
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| 3 | Inspect UI | user-visible error; no `alert()`; no silent swallow |
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**Pass criteria**: row 96 — error surfaced; no silent swallow; no fabricated blob; no `alert()`.
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**Expected result source**: `results_report.md` row 96.
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---
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### NFT-RES-10: SSE server disconnect — UI surfaces a connection-lost indicator
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**Summary**: When the suite server closes a live-GPS or status-events SSE without rotation, the UI does NOT show stale data and DOES indicate the connection lost.
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**Traces to**: AC-08, AC-09, AC-24
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**Preconditions**:
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- One SSE stream open.
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**Fault injection**:
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- Server force-closes the stream (no rotation).
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**Steps**:
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| Step | Action | Expected Behavior |
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|------|--------|------------------|
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| 1 | Drop the stream from the server | `error` fires on EventSource |
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| 2 | Observe DOM | a connection-lost indicator is rendered (or stale-data badge) |
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| 3 | Observe reconnect behavior | `EventSource` auto-retries per browser default; if the SPA re-creates it, exactly one new instance |
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**Pass criteria**: row 97 — connection-lost indicator OR reconnect attempt within 10 s; stale data NOT rendered as live; reconnect attempts ≤ 1 in the 10 s window.
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**Expected result source**: `results_report.md` row 97.
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