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ab22223580
Implements 22 blackbox test scenarios across the four batch-2 tasks:
AZ-457 - Auth & token handling (11 scenarios, fast + e2e):
- src/api/client.test.ts: FT-P-02, NFT-SEC-04, NFT-PERF-02, NFT-RES-01,
NFT-RES-08 (apiClient surface)
- src/auth/AuthContext.test.tsx: FT-P-01 (it.fails - Step 4 drift),
FT-P-03, NFT-SEC-01, NFT-SEC-02
- src/auth/ProtectedRoute.test.tsx: FT-N-04, NFT-RES-08 (router half)
- e2e/tests/auth.e2e.ts: FT-P-02 e2e, NFT-SEC-01/02/03 (cookie attrs
via Playwright context.cookies(), gated by suite stack)
AZ-459 - Wire-contract enums (4 scenarios):
- tests/wire_contract.test.ts: FT-P-04 (AnnotationStatus, it.fails),
FT-P-05 (MediaStatus + Affiliation it.fails; CombatReadiness skip
per verification_pending), FT-P-06 (AnnotationSource control +
spec value-set membership), FT-N-15 (typed-enum shape + skip for
value-set verification)
- e2e/tests/wire_contract.e2e.ts: FT-P-06 against real annotations/
service, drift-gated via AZAION_RUN_DRIFT_E2E
- scripts/run-tests.sh STC-FN15: ripgrep static for MediaType
magic-literal hygiene
AZ-465 - i18n (4 scenarios, all static + quarantined fast):
- scripts/check-i18n-coverage.mjs: FT-P-22 (en vs ua key parity) +
FT-P-23 (no raw user strings outside t() in src/**/*.tsx); refined
JSX text-node regex with negative lookbehind to drop TS generics
+ arrow-function false positives
- tests/i18n-allowlist.json: snapshot of current pre-existing raw
strings (CI gates growth per AZ-465 Constraints)
- tests/i18n.test.tsx: FT-P-24 + FT-P-25 it.skip (QUARANTINE - i18n
detector + persistence not wired today; control tests assert the
gap so the skip flips to a real test once Step 4 lands)
AZ-481 - CI image labels (3 scenarios, static against
.woodpecker/build-arm.yml):
- scripts/check-ci-image-labels.mjs: NFT-RES-LIM-11 (tag scheme
${CI_COMMIT_BRANCH}-arm), NFT-RES-LIM-12 (revision/created/source
PASS, image.title reported as DRIFT - foundation/CI-CD owns the
fix), NFT-RES-LIM-13 (revision = $CI_COMMIT_SHA)
Cross-cutting:
- scripts/run-tests.sh: src_grep now excludes *.test.{ts,tsx} +
*.spec.{ts,tsx} so production-source static checks (STC-SEC4,
STC-FN15, etc.) don't false-positive on test prose
- tsconfig.json: exclude src/**/*.{test,spec}.{ts,tsx} so production
tsc -b doesn't see jest-dom matchers
- _docs/03_implementation/batch_02_report.md: full per-task AC
coverage matrix + drift inventory + verification run
- _docs/_autodev_state.md: 22 tasks remain after batch 2
Verification (host):
fast : 7 files, 38 passed | 4 skipped (quarantined)
static : 19/19 checks PASS (was 13 in batch 1; +6 from batch 2)
e2e : not run on host (Risk 4 - requires suite docker stack)
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
146 lines
6.1 KiB
TypeScript
146 lines
6.1 KiB
TypeScript
import { test, expect } from '@playwright/test'
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// AZ-457 — e2e variants for auth-surface scenarios that require the real
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// suite stack (admin/auth/login + admin/auth/refresh).
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//
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// FT-P-02 — 401 → refresh → retry against the real admin/ service
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// NFT-SEC-01 — bearer never written to localStorage / sessionStorage post-login
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// NFT-SEC-02 — document.cookie does not expose the refresh token value
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// NFT-SEC-03 — refresh cookie attributes Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict
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//
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// Profile: e2e (gated by docker compose stack — Risk 4 in AZ-456). Skipped
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// when running locally without the suite stack.
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//
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// Black-box discipline: every assertion is at the network, browser-storage,
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// or DOM surface. The tests do NOT import production modules (e2e bodies
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// only touch Playwright primitives).
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//
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// Seed login: `op_alice@test.local` is in fixtures/seeds.sql and the
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// admin/:test image accepts the test password set by ENABLE_TEST_ONLY_ENDPOINTS.
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const ALICE_EMAIL = 'op_alice@test.local'
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const ALICE_PASSWORD = 'TestPassword!23' // matches admin/:test seed password
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test.describe('AZ-457 e2e — auth surface', () => {
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test('FT-P-02 (rows 03, 12): 401 → refresh → retry against real admin/', async ({ page }) => {
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// Arrange — login via the real service and capture the bearer.
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await page.goto('/login')
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const loginResponse = await Promise.all([
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page.waitForResponse(
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(r) => r.url().includes('/api/admin/auth/login') && r.request().method() === 'POST',
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),
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page.getByLabel(/email/i).fill(ALICE_EMAIL).then(() =>
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page.getByLabel(/password/i).fill(ALICE_PASSWORD),
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).then(() => page.getByRole('button', { name: /sign in/i }).click()),
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])
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expect(loginResponse[0].status()).toBe(200)
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// Force the next /users/me call to 401, then let the retry succeed.
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let firstHit = true
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let refreshHits = 0
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await page.route('**/api/admin/users/me', async (route) => {
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if (firstHit) {
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firstHit = false
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await route.fulfill({ status: 401 })
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return
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}
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await route.continue()
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})
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await page.route('**/api/admin/auth/refresh', async (route) => {
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refreshHits += 1
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await route.continue()
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})
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// Act — trigger an authed call. Any navigated-to admin page exercises
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// /api/admin/users/me on mount through the production AuthContext.
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await page.goto('/admin')
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// Assert — exactly one refresh observed, original request retried, page
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// reaches an authed surface (defensive: just verify no /login redirect).
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await expect.poll(() => refreshHits, { timeout: 10_000 }).toBe(1)
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await expect(page).not.toHaveURL(/\/login$/)
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})
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test('NFT-SEC-01 (row 04) + NFT-SEC-02 (row 05): bearer not in storage; refresh-cookie not in document.cookie', async ({ page, context }) => {
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// Arrange — full login flow.
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await page.goto('/login')
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await page.getByLabel(/email/i).fill(ALICE_EMAIL)
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await page.getByLabel(/password/i).fill(ALICE_PASSWORD)
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const loginResp = await Promise.all([
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page.waitForResponse(
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(r) => r.url().includes('/api/admin/auth/login') && r.request().method() === 'POST',
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),
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page.getByRole('button', { name: /sign in/i }).click(),
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])
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const responseBody = await loginResp[0].json()
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const bearer: string = responseBody.token
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expect(bearer.length).toBeGreaterThan(0)
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// Wait for the post-login route to settle.
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await page.waitForLoadState('networkidle')
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// NFT-SEC-01 — neither localStorage nor sessionStorage contains the bearer.
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const stored = await page.evaluate(() => {
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const out: Record<'local' | 'session', Record<string, string>> = {
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local: {},
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session: {},
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}
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for (let i = 0; i < localStorage.length; i += 1) {
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const k = localStorage.key(i)!
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out.local[k] = localStorage.getItem(k) ?? ''
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}
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for (let i = 0; i < sessionStorage.length; i += 1) {
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const k = sessionStorage.key(i)!
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out.session[k] = sessionStorage.getItem(k) ?? ''
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}
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return out
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})
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const flat = JSON.stringify(stored)
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expect(flat, 'bearer leaked to localStorage / sessionStorage').not.toContain(bearer)
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// NFT-SEC-02 — JS-visible document.cookie does not expose the refresh token.
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const jsCookies = await page.evaluate(() => document.cookie)
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expect(jsCookies).not.toMatch(/refresh/i)
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expect(jsCookies).not.toContain(bearer)
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// Defence-in-depth: the actual refresh cookie IS present in the browser jar
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// (HttpOnly is invisible to JS but visible via context.cookies()).
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const allCookies = await context.cookies()
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const refreshCookie = allCookies.find((c) => /refresh/i.test(c.name))
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expect(refreshCookie, 'refresh cookie should be set in the jar but invisible to JS').toBeDefined()
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})
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test('NFT-SEC-03 (row 07): refresh cookie attributes — Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict', async ({ page, context }) => {
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// Arrange + Act
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await page.goto('/login')
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const loginResp = await Promise.all([
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page.waitForResponse(
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(r) => r.url().includes('/api/admin/auth/login') && r.request().method() === 'POST',
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),
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page.getByLabel(/email/i).fill(ALICE_EMAIL).then(() =>
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page.getByLabel(/password/i).fill(ALICE_PASSWORD),
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).then(() => page.getByRole('button', { name: /sign in/i }).click()),
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])
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// Inspect the Set-Cookie header from the login response.
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const setCookie = loginResp[0].headersArray()
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.filter((h) => h.name.toLowerCase() === 'set-cookie')
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.map((h) => h.value)
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.join(' ; ')
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expect(setCookie, 'Set-Cookie header missing').not.toEqual('')
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expect(setCookie).toMatch(/Secure/i)
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expect(setCookie).toMatch(/HttpOnly/i)
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expect(setCookie).toMatch(/SameSite\s*=\s*Strict/i)
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// Cross-check via the cookie jar (HttpOnly is visible to context.cookies()).
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const allCookies = await context.cookies()
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const refreshCookie = allCookies.find((c) => /refresh/i.test(c.name))
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expect(refreshCookie).toBeDefined()
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if (refreshCookie) {
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expect(refreshCookie.httpOnly).toBe(true)
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expect(refreshCookie.secure).toBe(true)
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expect(refreshCookie.sameSite).toBe('Strict')
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}
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})
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})
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